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Kentucky's Legal Headlines for January
2002
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- 2002
Louisville Bar Association Officers
- Martha Hasselbacher, President
- Michael Luvisi, President-Elect
- D. Scott Furkin, Vice-President
- Cynthia Young, Secretary
- Does anyone know how the officers are elected?
- Local Attorneys Participate in Civil Liberties
Roundtable
Jan. 16, 2002
Several local lawyers and historians participated in a
recent round table discussion addressing civil liberties
and the recent war on terrorism. Discussion was
sponsored by the Courier-Journal at the Speed Art Museum
at University of Louisville. Participants were Jonathan
Dyar, a local prosecutor; Jon Fleischaker, a Louisville
attorney who wrote the state's open records laws; David
Friedman, general counsel for the American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky; Thomas Mackey, chairman of the
University of Louisville History Department; Stephen
Pence, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky;
and Paul Weber, a U of L political science professor and
author of numerous books and articles about civil
liberties.
- DUI Warning
Causing Headaches for Prosecutors As Supreme Court
Hears Arguments
LouisvilleLaw.Commentary, Jan.
13, 2002.
You can please some of the lawyers all of the time, and
all of the lawyers some of the time, but you can't please
em all, all of the time. Last year Kentucky changed
the punishment and warnings required under its DUI laws,
then some defense lawyers around the state won some local
rulings in circuit court dismissing DUI charges against
their clients on the grounds that the warning was
defective.
Defense attorneys in Jefferson County had questioned the
warning because they say it misleads first-time offenders
into believing their mandatory minimum jail time will
double if they refuse to take the test. However, there is
no mandatory jail time for first offenders, unless
aggravating circumstances exist.
Consequently, Jefferson County Attorney Irv Maze attempted
to clean up the legislative oversight and preserve the
arrests under the new law by adding - ''The Jefferson
County Attorney's Office has determined that there is no
mandatory minimum jail time for a DUI first offense.''
Local law enforcement and prosecutors are now in a
conundrum as defense counsel challenge not only the
warning as worded in the statute, but also the warning as
modified by Irv Maze. See the recent story where the
modified warning is being attacked in Jefferson County (click
here).
The sentence added by Maze is being challenged by
Emerson Baynard of Louisville, whose blood-alcohol level
was tested at 0.18. If Bayard loses, he would serve a
mandatory four days in jail because of the alcohol level
in his blood -- even though he was a first-time
offender. Baynard wants a Jefferson district judge
to block prosecutors from seeking the mandatory four days
in jail for that aggravating circumstance. ''The
County Attorney's office tricked [ Baynard] to submit to a
breath test by promising no jail time,'' John Olash,
Baynard's attorney, said in his motion.
Meanwhile, Kentucky Supreme Court now has to address
the warning as prescribed by statute and which arises from
a Jefferson
County District Court Case wherein Judge Judge James Green
ruled that the warning misrepresented the potential
penalty facing first-offense DUI suspects. Other
judges elsewhere had issued rulings similar to Green's,
dismissing blood-alcohol test results as evidence and
making it difficult to prosecute cases.
- Click
here for Courier-Journal story regarding the
district court dismissal.
- Click
here for the Courier-Journal story on the
arguments before the Kentucky Supreme Court.
In the meantime, Jefferson County has over 900 DUI cases
affected by the ruling under the old warning (the one
required by the legislature).
Jefferson County Attorney Irv Maze is now left with the
monumental task of cleaning up after the legislature and
convincing the Supremes that the warning given to
drunken-driving suspects about taking a blood-alcohol test
is really an issue of penalties, rather than a
constitutional problem. Any problems with the
warning are ''harmless,''. Of course, he has to
fight the current onslaught of the modified warning.
Some days it's tough to be a prosecutor and see that
justice is done.
Click
here for the search results on other Courier-Journal
articles on the DUI Warning issues.
- Epilogue On Radolovich Story - It's really a tale of
three tales or which tale is wagging which dog?
LouisvilleLaw.Commentary
Jan. 13, 2002, Mike Stevens .
The beauty of the internet is that it is
interactive. After publishing a commentary
on the Courier-Journal story on allegations against a
local Louisville lawyer telling some whoppers,
another attorney mentioned to me that there were actually
THREE stories on Fred Radolovich - the first was a critical piece
highlighting the malicious prosecution suit brought
against Radolovich by local neurosurgeon Dr.John
Guarnaschelli as a result of a dismissed malpractice suit
earlier (this story was by Andrew Wolfson who published
the third story); the second story was the puff piece on
Radolovich highlighting his war crimes and barrister
status which hit the press just weeks after the first
(author unknown to me at this time, but I am told she is
no longer with the Courier); and the third story
correcting factual errors in the second story (by Andrew
Wolfson). I did not hit up on this series in too
much detail because Wolfson did an outstanding factual
recitation of these in his third story with the obvious
implications behind the puff piece.
It's only a shame the
other stories are no longer on line to give the reader a
complete picture of the scenario.
- Kudos to Wolfson;
- Raspberry to the CJ overseers.
- A Tale of Two Tales -
Courier-Journal Articles on
Louisville Lawyer Fred Radolovich
LouisvilleLaw.Commentary
January 10, 2002, Mike Stevens
The January 8, 2002 Courier-Journal had a front page
article on local lawyer Fred Radolovich - "Tribunal officials say Louisville lawyer lied about war-crimes work".
Unfortunately, the on line story from July 4, 2000 was no
longer available and was only summarily reviewed.
However, what is the real story here? Lawyer lied or
Louisville newspaper posted front page story without
verifying facts in the first article? Or is neither
headline really a headline?
If the first reporter had simply checked the sources that
Andrew Wolfson did in his second article, then there would
have been no story other than lawyer tells tall tales to
friends and reporter. Big deal.
However, this does raise an interesting issue regarding
the newspaper. The earlier story was obviously
designed as a flattering piece and the contents of the
story were newsworthy (if true); and heaven knows lawyers
can use all the favorable publicity they can get,
individually and professionally. But without
verifying the facts in a story, then the story becomes the
fact.
- "Once a newspaper touches a
story, the facts are lost forever, even to the
protagonists." Norman Mailer.
- "A newspaper is a device for
making the ignorant more ignorant and the crazy
crazier." H.L. Mencken.
Now what is the point I am trying to make? The
rest of the story is that there should have been no story
on July 4, 2000. Failure to investigate produced not
one but two headlines, and the second headline still
focused on the lawyer and ignored the newspaper's conduct.
Make no doubt about it - I do not sanction lawyers
lying. But keep in mind who was the victim of these
alleged tall tales? Was an individual client
hurt? No. Was the public hurt? A little (but
let us put it in perspective in today's environment). Was
the legal profession tarnished? You bet.
Should he lose his license or be sanctioned? No
way. Drop it, and drop it now.
However, the Courier-Journal should take another look
and give kudos to Mr. Wolfson for correcting the error
which really amounts to a left-handed retraction and a
slap on the wrist to whoever allowed the first story to
hit the print. Mr. Wolfson laid what appears to be
an organized and factual story on Mr. Radolovich and his
alleged involvement in war crimes prosecution.
Now let's see if the Courier tells the rest of the story
regarding the part they played, or more importantly - how
the newspaper became the story too.
For other Courier-Journal articles which mention Fred
Radolovich and his representation of clients here in the
local courts (much easier to verify don't you think), then
click
here.
- Jefferson
Commonwealth's Attorney Dave Stengel Assumes
Presidency Of Kentucky's Commonwealth's Attorneys
- Dave Stengel, Commonwealth’s
Attorney for Jefferson County, Kentucky,
assumed the Presidency of Kentucky’s
Commonwealth’s Attorneys at their Winter
Conference in Lexington
for year 2001.
- As leader of
Kentucky’s 56 elected felony prosecutors,
Stengel will work closely with the Legislature
when it convenes in January, 2002. He brings
experience to his new position, having
previously served as a member of the Kentucky
General Assembly.
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- Franklin
Circuit Court stops way state rules reviewed
Courier Journal Story Jan. 12, 2002
Franklin circuit judge Judge William Graham ruled
lawmakers have exceeded their authority by, in effect,
vetoing regulations between legislative sessions. This
ruling affects issues from the state's regulation of huge
hog farms to the cost of prescription drugs in the Medicaid
program to insurance practices. Administrative
regulations often 'flesh' out laws implemented by the
legislature.
State agencies can not reinstate regulations previously
rejected by a single committee. If the legislature doesn't
like the regulation, then the legislature (not a single
committee) can make that decision during a session and not
allow the single committee to do so between sessions.
- Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams,
No. 00-1089 (Jan. 8, 2002)
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION -- HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION
In an employee's suit under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 claiming to be disabled by carpal
tunnel syndrome from performing her automobile assembly
line job, the Sixth Circuit did not apply the proper
standard in determining that the employee was disabled
where it analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and
failed to ask whether the employee's impairments prevented
or restricted her from performing tasks that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives.
Link: http://www.usscplus.com/current/cases/PDF/9920009.pdf
- Louisville Lawyers on the Move in December
- Courtney Howell-Kidd opens her own office in Dupont
Circle.
- Edward J. Smith, Richard A. Greenberg, and Dan
Deetsch form new partnership together.
- Heather Hughes joings Pedley Zielke & Gordinier.
- David Bowles joins Landrum & Shouse.
- Kevin Norris & Ashley Pack join Disnmore &
Shohl.
- Jennifer Frazier joins Donald H. Smith.
- Carolyn Bauer & Thomas Fenton join Morgan &
Pottinger.
- Martin A. Arnett member of Phillips Parker Orberson
& Moore (who adds Deirdre MacCarthy and Tricia Le
Meur as associates).
- Tom McMahon hired by Greater Louisville Health
Enterprises Network.
- Who Pays For Police Misconduct? We do.
But is it really police misconduct or just a 'cop out'
by the insurers and the city???
The cost? $1.15 million in legal settlements in Rodney
Abernathy, Desmond Rudolph, and Adrian Reynolds'
deaths.
Series of headlines of settlements reviewed.
Jan. 20, 2002
Over the last year, there have been headlines over the
Rodney Abernathy, Desmond Rudolph, and Adrian Reynolds
deaths that occurred in situations involving Louisville
law enforcement or jail personnel. In the last month
or so, these suits have been settled for a total or $1.15
million dollars. Although these settlements may have
been paid by the city's insurer, the money ultimately
comes out of the citizens' pockets whose taxes are used to
pay the insurance premiums which are surely going to go up
- so all of us will be paying for quite some time.
Let's go one step further. Why are they
paying? The series of articles in the papers seem to
favor the police in Abernathy and Rudolph; so why
pay? If the police did nothing wrong in these
deaths, then don't pay. Let a local jury decide the
issue and either exonerate or blame the police.
However, when the cases are settled it looks like the city
did something wrong even though all lawyers know that
liability is not the only reason cases settle. Other
factors come into play such as the costs of defense,
problems of proof, avoidance of bad publicity, putting the
matter behind, avoid bad press, etc. etc. etc.
The past is the past, but as the old saw goes - those who
forget the past are doomed to repeat it. It would be
nice if the city and the law enforcement agencies would
institute some type of publicity campaign to let us know
what has been learned by these incidents and how they are
going to be avoided again. I know they are out
there; I have read about them on the back pages of
the newspapers. But the bad news hits the front
page, but the good news gets much less print and
visibility.
Even if the individual police officer is in error, most
of the police officers in Jefferson County are the
finest in the nation. But even the best have some bad days
and some bad situations. However, three deaths under
controversial circumstances are three too many. And
I am not convinced based upon the news articles that the
police are entirely wrong in causing these deaths. I am
sure something has been done, is being done, and continues
to be done. Let's see some of the positive works
make it to print. Even if it does not sell
newspapers, it can sell the public that the police force
is working hard for all of us and needs our respect and
support.
But the news stories continue - Patricia Lewis,
mother of 18-yearold Clifford Lewis, said she was hurt and
disappointed after learning Detective Johann Steimle would
not be disciplined for her son's death on Jan. 9, 2001 and
that she plans to sue the city. Again, an upset
mother who claims she will sue is news and only represents
one side of the story. But, it does make the job for
those on the front line harder to do. Click
here for Courier-Journal story on Clifford Lewis.
- Rodney Abernathy:
- Desmond Rudolph:
- Adrian Reynolds:
- How about some online stories culled from the
archives of the Courier-Journal on:
- Epilogue (Jan. 27, 2002) - Here are some responses
per news articles:
- Crazed Cats Fans File A "No Class" Action Suit Against
Lawry Minors - Local Sports Celebrity and Former Shock
Jock
The following parody was prompted by the recent online
onslaught against Terry Meiners a/k/a Lawry Minors.
- New Local Chief Judges
for 2002
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Chief
Judge James Shake
Jefferson Circuit Court |
Chief
Judge Kevin Garvey
Jefferson District Court |
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Chief
Judge John G. Heyburn, II
U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky
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- Civil-rights
group files suit over secession issue
The Justice Resource Center's suit asks that a Jefferson
Circuit Court judge remove the state law's legal barriers
that greatly limit residents' ability to form a new
municipality within Louisville. The suit claims that
residents have been denied the right to choose their own
leaders and contends that Louisville services are
inadequate. 12.29.2001 Courier-Journal.
- Jury
awards $30,000 in excessive-force case
Testimony of 2 Jefferson officers is
shown to have changed at trial. A man who says he
was kicked, punched and beaten by two Jefferson County
police officers after they thought he made a wisecrack
about ''cops and doughnuts'' has won $30,000 in damages
from a jury that found the officers used excessive force.
12.29.2001 Courier-Journal.
- Suit
over DUI arrest removed to federal court
Woman with Multiple Sclerosis
alleges officer's acts malicious. The
case of a Pewee Valley woman with multiple sclerosis who
claims an Oldham County police officer falsely arrested
and maliciously prosecuted her on a charge of driving
under the influence of drugs has been removed to federal
court at the request of Dave Whalin, an attorney for
Officer Aaron Gutermuth, because it involves federal
constitutional claims. Courier-Journal 12.28.2001.
- $80
million Humana verdict
re-examined by Florida court
An appeals court that threw out a nearly $80
million verdict against a Kentucky-based health insurance
company for terminating treatment for a girl with cerebral
palsy will rehear the case.
The 4th District Court of Appeals said it will hold
a rehearing before a three-judge panel, but denied a
hearing before its full 11 judges, or en banc. Herald
Leader 12.28.2001.
- Judge Forester Dismisses Ashland Actor Sonny
Landham's Lawsuit in Federal court
U.S. District Court Eastern Kentucky District Chief
Judge Karl S. Forester dismissed a civil rights suit
against his former wifeBelita Adams, former Lewis County
Commonwealth's Attorney Lloyd Spear and two officials with
the Lewis County Child Welfare Agency, for failure to
state a claim. Landham, representing himself, had alleged
the defendants violated his civil rights during and after
his 1998 divorce and custody fight and during his
prosecution on felony non-support charges.
The alleged civil rights allegations arose from the
defendants' conduct which resulted in a federal criminal
case that led to Sonny's conviction on charges of
threatening to injure and kidnap Adams and making lewd and
harassing interstate calls. The criminal case was
overturned on appeal after Landham had served three years
in prison.
The decision held there was no civil rights claim again
the ex-wife who was not a state official and did not act
under color of state authority; claims against Spear were
dismissed since the commonwealth attorney is immune from
suit;.
Sonny Landham starred in such movies:
Taxi Dancers (1993); Maximum
Force (1992);Lock
Up (1989); CondenaçãO
Brutal (1989);Predator
(1987); Firewalker
(1986); Fortune
Dane (1986); Northstar
(1986); Aventureiros
Do Fogo (1986); Dirty
Dozen: The Next Mission (1985); Fleshburn
(1983); 48
HRS. (1982); The
Switch (1979).
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The
members of Team RB4BIAK practiced recently
for the Race Across AMerica, which covers
2,980.04 miles from Portland, Ore., to
Pensacola, Fla.
Photo by PAM
SPAULDING LouisvilleScene.com
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Morris Dees |
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Jury recommends life in prison for Quarels
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Dawahare's manslaughter conviction tossed
-
Three to be tried over fliers mocking public figures
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Tina
Quarles found guilty of murder in arson death of her
2-year-old child
-
Former
Oldham police officer sues over her dismissal
-
Woman's plea ends harassing e-mail
case in Bullitt County
-
Basketball players take stand in trial
-
Sex used to lure murder victim in Anderson, prosecutor says
-
Trying to overcome the bad dreams
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Murder suspect has waited for trial since 1987
-
Ex-Harlan sheriff, guilty in murder plot, seeks election
-
Tippecanoe judge's suicide puzzles friends, colleagues
-
Town reaches out to law school in wake of shooting
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At 92, lawyer is still practicing
-
Ragland murder trial postponed until March
- Suspect mentally ill, both lawyers agree
- Couple held on charge of setting fire at church
- Cheerleader at UK charged in rape case
- Lawyer says woman was insane when she killed son
- Doctor goes on trial on charges he prescribed OxyContin without
- Order on abortion counseling is filed in court
- Roger
Holsey's fight for justice hits close to home
- Bill would expand use of DNA evidence in Kentucky courts
- Law student kills 3 at Appalachian college
- Prisoner claims denial of speedy trial
- Teen gets life sentence in killing
- Ignatow sentenced to 9 years for perjury
- Order on abortion counseling is filed in court
- City to pay $600,000 in police-shooting suit
- Funeral directors' board bans man for life
- Psychologist says woman charged with sex abuse not fit for trial
- Family says it will sue over police shooting
- Judge allows tests of bullets as evidence in DiGiuro murder case
- Former UK professor gets 3 years' probation
- Ex-Indiana trooper's trial in slaying of wife, kids begins
- Jefferson corrections officer charged with drug possession
- Homicide total falls sharply in Louisville, rises by one in Jefferson
- Group takes on ACLU over postings
- Judge sets aside verdict that awarded deputy $762,000
- Doctor accused of overprescribing wants license back
- Suit targets prospect of free electricity
- 16 indicted for policies sold to
Kelco in Lex.
- Ex-Garrard official sentenced in theft
- Judge fines women who return to their alleged abusers
- Suit says body was buried in wrong grave deliberately
- OxyContin maker wins round in court
- Man sentenced in drug-test bribery case
- Lawyer was colorful figure
- City will pay $200,000, settle suit in shooting
- Reynolds settlement $350,000, Maze says
- Foreclosures up in Jefferson County
- Bullet tests may be key to Ragland trial
- Lexington officer sues firm over mall shooting
- Poster often last resort for child support
- Ex-friends say Wilkinson got loans by fraud
- Security firm sued for hiring of guard
- Ex-Lowe's worker's bias suit reinstated
- Commandments litigation hinges on U.S. history
- Patton staff member is accused of burglary
- Taulbee told to enter prison on Jan. 7
- Court approves property manager
- Florida appeals court to revisit its verdict in $80 million Humana case
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J.C.J.D.
v. R.J.C.R., 803
S.W.2d 953, Ky.,1991.
Disciplinary proceeding was brought against Supreme Court
justice for his conduct during election campaign. On appeal
from administrative finding of misconduct, the Supreme Court,
Ruth H. Baxter, Special Chief Justice, held that Code of
Judicial Conduct provision prohibiting all discussion of
judicial candidate's views on disputed legal or political
issues unnecessarily violated constitutional free speech
rights of judicial candidates.
Vacated.
Robert L. Bertram, Special Justice, concurred and filed
opinion.
*953
Frank E. Haddad, Jr., George Salem, Jr., Louisville, for
movant.
George F. Rabe, James D. Lawson, Executive Secretary,
Retirement and Removal Com'n, Lexington, for respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
RUTH H. BAXTER, Special Chief Justice.
Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against J.C.J.D.
("Justice Combs") by the R.J.C.R.
("Commission") on November 7, 1988, pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 4.180, for conduct during his campaign for
the Kentucky Supreme Court in the primary election, and
thereafter as a candidate for justice of the Supreme Court in
the general election. He was elected to the Court by the
voters of the Seventh Judicial District in the 1988 November
General Election.
*954
Seven (7) separate violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct ("Code") were charged which can be
summarized as follows:
Count I: Justice Combs violated SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i) and
Canon 7(B)(1) by announcing his views on disputed legal and
political issues by criticizing the "firemen's
rule," laws against carrying handguns by felons, and the
standard for court review of workers' compensation cases;
Count II: Justice Combs violated SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i) and
Canon 7(B)(1)(b) and (c) when he allowed the Jefferson County
Sheriff to send a letter on his behalf to sheriffs, police
chiefs and fire chiefs in Seventh Judicial District discussing
his position on the "firemen's rule";
Count III: Justice Combs violated SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i)
and Canons 1, 2, and 7(B)(1) when he criticized the Code and
the Supreme Court;
Count IV: Justice Combs violated SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i) and
Canons 1, 2, and 7(B)(1) by challenging his opponent to a
televised debate, and making statements concerning his
opponent and the Supreme Court's ruling in a personal injury
case;
Counts V, VI and VII: Justice Combs violated SCR
4.020(1)(b)(i) and Canon 7(B)(1) through statements that
appeared in his campaign advertisements.
Counts I, II, III and IV resulted from a written complaint
filed with the Commission, and Counts V, VI and VII were
initiated by the Commission upon its own motion.
The Code violation charges followed a preliminary
investigation by the Commission in June of 1988, and an
informal discussion conference with Justice Combs on August
19, 1988. Notice of the alleged Code violations was given to
him by letter dated August 23, 1988. Justice Combs denied the
Commission's charges and further defended that the application
of the Code to his campaign conduct was violative of his
federal and state constitutional rights. Formal charges were
subsequently filed on November 7, 1988. An amendment to the
charges was made by the Commission, and a full hearing on all
amended charges held on July 27, 1989. A Stipulation of Facts,
with copies of the campaign material in question, was entered
into by the parties and is filed with the record.
By order dated February 10, 1990, the Commission found Counts
I, III, IV, V, VI, and VII proved by "clear and
convincing evidence," and determined Justice Combs'
campaign conduct violative of the Code. Count II was dismissed
upon motion of counsel for the Commission on the basis that
the charge could not be proved. The Commission further found
that the conduct of Justice Combs was deliberate and in bad
faith, and therefore constituted "misconduct in
office" in violation of SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i). It ordered
Justice Combs suspended from his elective office and his
judicial duties without pay for a period of three (3) months.
Justice Combs appealed the Commission's Order to this Court,
seeking review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order of the Commission. We are required to accept the
Commission's findings and conclusions unless they are clearly
erroneous. Based upon the controlling case law and for the
reasons cited herein, the Court hereby holds that the Findings
and Order of the Commission relating to Counts I, III, IV, V,
VI, and VII, are clearly erroneous, and further, are in
contravention of state and federal law.
The United States Constitution guarantees the right of an
individual to free speech. Accordingly, Congress can make no
law abridging the freedom of speech. First Amendment, U.S.
Constitution. Similarly, Section Eight of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that "(e)very person may freely and
fully speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty."
Freedom of
speech extends to a candidate for public office, including
judicial offices. "The candidate, no less than any other
person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the
discussion of public issues *955
and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own
election...." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96
S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). This right of free speech is
not absolute, however. States have the authority to regulate
this conduct within certain limitations if in the public
interest. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62
S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942). "(A) person does not
(however) surrender his constitutional right to freedom of
speech when he becomes a candidate for judicial office. A
state cannot require so much." American Civil
Liberties Union of Florida, Inc., et al. v. The Florida Bar,
et al., 744 F.Supp. 1094 (1990).
The courts are charged with reviewing state regulations to
determine if a regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest, and if it has been narrowly written to protect
against the evil that the government can control. Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 71 L.Ed.2d 732
(1982). Where a regulation extends so far as to completely
outlaw speech because of the subject matter of its content,
there is a strong presumption of its unconstitutionality. Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440
(1981).
Moreover, restrictions affecting free speech
that can result in disciplinary action to the speaker are
subject to an even stricter scrutiny. In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978). The question
then becomes whether the enacted regulation has been so
narrowly drafted, and strictly applied, that the compelling
state interest is served without unnecessarily burdening the
exercise of free speech? See, First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707
(1978). By Section 121 of the Kentucky Constitution, the
authority to regulate the conduct of the judiciary was
conferred upon the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Code was
adopted, effective January 1, 1978, through Supreme Court
Rule, drawing upon the text of the 1972 American Bar
Association ("ABA") Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
The ABA Model Code was substituted for the "Canons of
Judicial Ethics" which had been originally formulated
some 50 years earlier to provide judges with minimum ethical
standards of conduct. Although minor amendments have been made
to Kentucky's Code since its adoption, there have been no
substantive changes in its provisions since that time, nor has
this Court previously considered the more recent Model Code of
Judicial Conduct adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on
August 7, 1990.
The focus of the allegations against Justice Combs centers on
Canon 7(B)(1) of the Code. These sections provide in pertinent
part that a candidate for judicial office:
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial
office, ...; (and)
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office; (or) announce his views on disputed
legal or political issues.... SCR 4.300, Canon 7(B)(1).
The Commission found that the statements made by Justice Combs
announced his views on conflicting judicial opinions which it
termed "disputed issues," giving him an
"unwarranted and illegal advantage in the election over
his primary opponents." Commission Findings at 7. It
further determined that his criticism of a Supreme Court
personal injury decision, and his opponent's vote on the case,
was an indirect pledge or promise of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of his duties of
office. Id. at 9. Moreover, because Justice Combs had
been "explicitly warned" in the Commission's
informal conference after the primary election that his
campaign conduct may be in violation of the Code, and he
subsequently continued to speak out on such issues, the
Commission found his actions were "undertaken
deliberately and in bad faith, and constituted misconduct in
office in violation of SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i)." Id. at
10-11.
Justice Combs argues that by becoming a judicial candidate,
subject to the Code, he did not lose his right to exercise his
free speech. By discussing opinions that he has authored,
criticizing his opponent's position *956
on legal issues, and explaining to the public his judicial
philosophy, he was, he submits, informing the electorate of
his views so that an informed decision could be reached at the
ballot box. Justice Combs asserts that to restrict his
political speech from all "disputed legal or
political issues" unconstitutionally deprives him of free
speech without a compelling state interest.
There can be no question that the state has a compelling
interest to protect and preserve the integrity and objectivity
of the judicial system. "The state's interest in ensuring
that judges be and appear to be neither antagonistic nor
beholden to any interest, party or person is entitled to the
greatest respect." Morial v. Judiciary Com'n., 565
F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct.
1887, 56 L.Ed.2d 395 (1978). Untruthful or misleading
statements, or pledges of specific judicial conduct on pending
cases, cannot be tolerated. Nor can judicial candidates be
allowed to make promises or predispositions of cases or issues
that are likely to come before the courts that might reflect
upon a judge's impartiality.
However, SCAR 4.300 Canon 7(B)(1)(c)
is not so narrowly drawn as to limit a candidate's speech to
such specific prohibitions. Instead, the section prohibits all
discussion of a judicial candidate's views on disputed legal
or political issues, and thus unnecessarily violates
fundamental state and federal constitutional free speech
rights of judicial candidates.
It should be noted that Kentucky's
Constitution provides for the selection of its judiciary by
popular election. [FN2] Ky. Constitution, Section 117.
Accordingly, we "... must recognize the candidates' right
to make campaign speeches and the concomitant right of the
public to be informed about the judicial candidates." American
Civil Liberties, supra at 1097. Other than allowing a
judicial candidate to state a professional history, and
promise faithful and impartial performance of duties if
elected, the existing Canon strictly prohibits dialogue on
virtually every issue that would be of interest to the voting
public. Inasmuch as the purpose of an election is to give the
electorate the opportunity to become informed on a judicial
candidate's qualifications for the position, which would
include, among other things, knowledge of the law, and
personal views and beliefs, the Canon fails in this respect.
Instead, we are encouraging the public to judge candidates for
our judiciary by not much more than their personal
appearances. We believe a well informed electorate is
essential to the democratic election process guaranteed by the
Kentucky Constitution. The rights of the voting public to hear
what a candidate has to say is a compelling one. We
further believe candidates for judicial office can announce
their views on legal and political issues without jeopardizing
the integrity and independence of the legal system or
undermining the impartiality of the judiciary.
See, Code, Canons 1 and 2.
[Kentucky is one of 10 states that utilize a nonpartisan
election for selection of its judges at all court levels. The
merit selection method is utilized by the majority of the
states.]
Moreover, we are not persuaded by the
Commission's argument that the language of Canon 7(B)(1)(c)
prohibiting all discussion of "disputed legal
issues" by judicial candidates is necessary to prevent
campaign statements which may indicate a predisposition or
bias in favor of one litigant over another. To specifically
prohibit this type of campaign conduct and avoid
constitutional concerns, this Canon provision can be rewritten
in a much narrower scope to outlaw discussion of pending or
future litigation. We are mindful that the ABA did just that
when it recently amended its Model Code. ABA Canon 7, as
amended, now prohibits judicial candidates from "...
mak(ing) statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that
are likely to come before the court...." ABA Model Code
(August 1990). In its Commentary accompanying this revision,
the ABA explained its change from the previous language of the
Model Code:
... (T)he phrase 'stated personal views on issues that may
come before the Court' replaced 'announce his view on disputed
legal or political issues' because *957
the Committee (on Ethics and Professional Responsibility)
believed the latter was an overly broad restriction on
speech. (emphasis added) Furthermore, as to the question
of whether Justice Combs' campaign advertisements reached the
level of making a pledge of preferential treatment to one
class of persons over another in violation of Canon
7(B)(1)(c), we could find no evidence to support the
Commission's findings. See, Commission Findings at 10-12. The
campaign advertisements in question do not include the exact
statements which the Commission attributed to Justice Combs,
nor do we believe the advertisements as published violated
this Code provision. Moreover, we did not find that the
statements referred to in Counts I, IV, V, VI and VII amounted
to pledges or promises of conduct in office. At no time has
there been a claim that the ads contained false or misleading
information which would have given the public an incorrect
understanding of the issues.
Political advertisements, while
undoubtedly designed to elect a candidate to office, should
provide a voter with information to make an intelligent
decision at the ballot box. It should be noted that the
United States Supreme Court has recently considered the
public's ability to review paid advertisements and utilize the
information contained therein in its proper perspective.
"(T)he disclosure of truthful, relevant information is
more likely to make a positive contribution to decision-making
than is concealment of such information." Peel
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n., 496
U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990). While Peel
was rendered in the context of commercial free speech and not
judicial elections, the principal that disclosure of
information allows the general public to make informed
decisions is equally applicable here.
Finally, we must address the Commission's
determination that Justice Combs' campaign conduct failed to
uphold the integrity of the judiciary, did not promote the
impartiality of the judiciary, and did not maintain the
dignity appropriate to judicial office. See, Code, Canons 1
and 2; 7(B)(1)(a); Commission Findings at 7-9. The basis for
these Findings again centers on speech which falls within
constitutional protections. We can find no evidence that
violations of these Canons occurred, especially when viewed in
the context of Justice Combs' right to free speech. To
criticize the provisions of the Code and published court
decisions does not in our view, in and of itself, undermine
the public's confidence and respect for the judiciary.
Because of our ruling herein, we find it unnecessary to
address the other issues raised by the parties herein in their
briefs.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions and Order of the Commission are vacated and set
aside, and all of the charges against Justice Combs should be,
and are hereby, dismissed.
RUTH H. BAXTER, Special Chief Justice, and ROBERT L. BERTRAM,
WILLIAM DONALD OVERBEY, PATRICK W. MATTINGLY, DAVID F. PRATT,
THOMAS J. MEYER, and WILLIAM H. JONES, Jr., Special Justices,
sitting.
All concur.
ROBERT L. BERTRAM, Special Justice, files a concurring
opinion.
ROBERT L. BERTRAM, Special Justice, concurring.
I agree with the rationale and result reached by the majority;
however, I do not think the opinion goes far enough in that
the Commission materially misrepresented what the
advertisements actually said. A body such as the Commission
should use extreme diligence to insure that the quotes they
attribute to a candidate are accurate. One of the Commission
members had obviously formed an opinion at the informal
conference and, having done so, should have disqualified
himself from serving.
As the Judicial Canon has been determined
unconstitutional, it should be rewritten by this Court.
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