SEPT. 20, 2007 SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY DECISIONS (Vol. 2007:45)
PUBLISHED
(SCOKY)
SC affirmed Gray's convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, illegal possession of marijuana, and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia (subsequent offender), all of which were firearm-enhanced. Gray was also found guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree and was sentenced to a total of fifty-eight (58) years.
Gray's first argument is that the forfeiture of the money found during Deputy Madden's search violates Kentucky forfeiture law and his due process rights. In particular, Gray argues that the forfeiture was improper because there was no connection between the money and the charged offenses since the money was not shown to have been exchanged in the sale of illegal drugs.
Kentucky's forfeiture statute, KRS 218A.410, permits the forfeiture of "[e]verything of value furnished. . . in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, all proceeds . . . traceable to the exchange, and all moneys. . . used, or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this chapter." Brewer v . Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 313, 326 (Ky. 2006) . The statute further provides that it shall be a rebuttable presumption "that all moneys, coin, and currency found in close proximity to controlled substances, to drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia . . . are presumed to be forfeitable under this paragraph ." Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 326. "The Commonwealth may meet its initial burden of proof by producing slight evidence of traceability." Id. at 326 . The Commonwealth must prove that "the currency or some portion of it had been used or was intended to be used in a drug transaction." Osborne v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Ky. 1992). If the Commonwealth provides additional proof that the currency sought to be forfeited was found in close proximity then it is deemed sufficient to make a prima facie case. Id . "Thereafter, the burden is on the claimant to convince the trier of fact that the currency was not being used in the drug trade." Thus, the trial court is vested with the discretion to determine whether the burdens contained in KRS 218A.410 are met as well as discretion in ordering the ultimate forfeiture. Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 325.
TC's order of forfeiture was proper. The considerable amount of money found on Gray coupled with the large amount of drugs found in Gray's van - including a large quantity of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia - leads to a reasonable conclusion that Gray had used or, at the very least, intended to use the currency in an illegal drug transaction.
Lastly, there were no reasonable grounds to believe that Gray was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court took into consideration the fact that the case had been ongoing for a year with no sign of incompetency from Gray. Gray testified competently, and spoke clearly and intelligently while answering his counsel's questions. On cross-examination Gray was clever and evasive with his answers. Even Gray's counsel admitted that he did not detect any signs of mental illness throughout the representation. Gray fully communicated with his attorney and participated rationally in his own defense. There being no contrary evidence to support or reasonably believe that the problems he was being treated for rose to the level of incompetency, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in rejecting Gray's late request for a competency hearing.
Digested by Scott C. Byrd
www.olginandbyrd.com
SC reversed CA decision and reinstated Coker's convictions. The sole issue before the SC involved the Commonwealth's exercise of a peremptory challenge during jury selection in Coker's trial on charges that he extorted, or attempted to extort, his former employer. Upon accepting discretionary review, SC disagreed with CA's finding that the trial court's acceptance of the Commonwealth's facially race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike was clearly erroneous.
The Equal Protection Clause is violated when a potential juror is struck from a venire solely on the basis of race. When a litigant believes that a potential juror has been impermissibly struck for racial reasons, the complaining litigant's objection is governed by the three-step process the United States Supreme Court set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed .2d 69 (1986). The Batson framework is designed to be efficient in order for jury selection to be as uninterrupted as possible. Step one required Coker to make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination by the Commonwealth in its strike of the African-American veniremember. The Commonwealth was not required to respond to Coker's challenge unless the trial court found that Coker had satisfied his burden of making a prima facie showing. But whether Coker actually made a sufficient prima facie showing is moot since the Commonwealth responded to Coker's Batson objections. So the parties proceeded to step two of the Batson framework. Under step two, the burden shifted to the Commonwealth to demonstrate a racially neutral reason for exercising its peremptory challenge. At this step, all that is required is that a prosecutor's articulated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge be race-neutral on its face. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he second step of this Batson process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible."s There is nothing inherently racially-oriented about the Commonwealth's proffered reason-its belief that the veniremember's volunteered answers evidenced a bias in favor of the defendant. Step three of the Batson framework required the trial court to determine if Coker had met his burden of proving "purposeful discrimination ."" In other words, having properly found that the Commonwealth's proffered reason was, on its face, race-neutral, the final step was for the trial court to determine if the Commonwealth's race-neutral reason was actually a pretext for racial discrimination. Because the trial court's decision on this point requires it to assess the credibility and demeanor of the attorneys before it, the trial court's ultimate decision on a Batson challenge is like a finding of fact that must be given great deference by an appellate court. Under the facts of the case at hand, SC did not agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trial court's decision on this point was clearly erroneous.
Digested by Scott C. Byrd
www.olginandbyrd.com
Ex-Wife appealed to SC from CA opinion that affirmed TC’s order providing that Ex-Husband’s KTRS account would be fully excluded from classification and division of the parties’ marital property pursuant to KRS 161.700(2). Ex-Wife argued to SC that both TC and CA erred in failing to give effect to the provisions set forth in KRS 403.190(4).
At time of trial, Ex-Husband had approximately $81,410 in his KTRS account while Ex-Wife had approximately $1,896 in her Fidelity Simplified Employee Pension (SEP-IRA). Ex-Husband argued to TC that his KTRS account was exempt from classification and division as marital property under KRS 161.700(2), while Ex-Wife argued her SEP-IRA qualified as a retirement account and therefore KRS 403.190(4) overrode KRS 161 .700(2) and operated to limit the amount of the KTRS funds that Ex-Husband could claim as exempt. CA affirmed TC’s opinion, holding that KRS 403.190(4) and KRS 161 .700(2) were in conflict, and thus, pursuant to principles of statutory construction, the exemption provisions set forth in KRS 161.700(2) would control over the provisions set forth in KRS 403.190(4). CA held that, alternatively, KRS 403.190(4) is inapplicable unless both spouses have an account that qualifies as a "retirement-benefit" as is defined in KRS 403.190(4), and held that Ex-Wife’s SEP-IRA was not such a "retirement benefit" as defined in that statute.
SC found no conflict between the two statutes. SC held that KRS 161.700(2) specifically exempted the KTRS retirement benefits accumulated by Ex-Husband during the marriage from being classified and divided upon divorce, but that the language set forth in KRS 403.190(4) clearly anticipates statutes such as KRS 161.700(2). Thus, by the plain language of the statute, KRS 403.190(4) is meant to be read in conjunction, not in conflict with, KRS 161.700(2) and so limits the exemption available in KRS 161.700(2). Furthermore, SC held that any retirement plan that is covered by ERISA is subject to the application of KRS 403.190(4), and as Ex-Wife’s SEP IRA was an employer funded plan covered by ERISA, KRS 403.190(4) applied to the classification and divisibility of the parties’ retirement accounts.
Digested by Michelle
Eisenmenger Mapes
Diana
L. Skaggs + Associates
Digested by Peter Naake
Priddy, Cutler,
Miller & Meade
ATTORNEYS
RODNEY S. JUSTICE V. KBAKBA V. JERRY C. STOLLINGS
ATTORNEYS
2007-SC-000295-KB.pdf
DATE RENDERED: 09/20/2007
KBA V. DEAN SEXTON
ATTORNEYS
2007-SC-000461-KB.pdf
DATE RENDERED: 09/20/2007
NOT PUBLISHED (SCOKY)
BUTTREY V. COM.JOHNSON V. COM.
CRIMINAL
2005-SC-000948-MR.pdf
NOT PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
DATE RENDERED: 09/20/2007
BROCK V. MANALAPAN MINING CO.
WORKERS COMP
2006-SC-000786-WC.pdf
NOT PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
DATE RENDERED: 09/20/2007
CLARK V. ELMO GREER & SONS
WORKERS COMP
2006-SC-000832-WC.pdf
NOT PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, REMANDING
DATE RENDERED: 09/20/2007
LEWIS V. COM.
CRIMINAL
2006-SC-000900-MR.pdf
NOT PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
DATE RENDERED: 09/20/2007
Thanks to Scott Byrd, John E. Hamlet, Cherry Henault, Sam Hinkle, Chad Kessinger, Hays Lawson, J. Russell Lloyd, Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Peter Naake, Paul O'Bryan, Bryan Pierce, Paul Schurman, Michael Stevens and James Worthington for their efforts in digesting Kentucky's appellate decisions.