Vol. 2006:07   

COURT OF APPEALS -  FEB 10, 2006

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PUBLISHED.

TOLER V. RAPID AMERICAN
CIVIL PROCECURE - Dismissal for lack of prosecution
2004-CA-002281
VACATING AND REMANDING [HENRY, J.]
Published  
Date: 2/10/2006

COA vacated and remanded dismissal for lack of prosecution.  The two year delay was based on the Jefferson County Asbestos Master Order, and the record was unclear whether the Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W. 2d 717 (Ky. App., 1991) factors were properly considered.  See also, Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d. Cir, 1984).

The following factors should be considered: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the history of dilatoriness; (3)  whether the attorney’s conduct was willful and in bad faith; (4) the meritoriousness of the claim; (5) prejudice to the other party;
and (6) the availability of alternative sanctions.

'The responsibility to make such findings as are set forth in Ward before dismissing a case with prejudice falls solely upon the trial court. Accordingly, even though we understand and sympathize with the court’s desire to move the cases on its docket along in a timely and expeditious manner, we find ourselves compelled to vacate its orders as to dismissal here and to remand this action for further consideration in light of Ward. In doing so, we express no view as to whether dismissal with prejudice will ultimately be merited.'

Theodore H. Lavit, Real Party In Interest, appealed order entered by Judge Doughlas M. George of the Taylor Circuit Court which held Lavit in contempt of court and fined him $825.001 for his failure to appear in court on November 10, 2003, for the trial of Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Catina Brockman.  Held the trial court erred by finding Lavit in indirect criminal contempt of court without allowing him to have a jury trial.

SMITH V. COMMONWEALTH
CRIMINAL - Drugs (forfeiture)
2004-CA-001757
Published  
AFFIRMING (PAISLEY,J.)
Date: 2/10/2006

COA rejected defendant's argument that it was double jeopardy and unconstitutionally excessive punishment to be fined up to $10,000 for felony and to have his vehicle seized  by the police due to drugs. 

Affirmed trial court's denial of CR 60,.02 and affirmed 12 year sentence for methamphetamine conviction in light of Kotila v. Com., 114 S.W.2d 226 (Ky., 2003).

Criminal conviction was reversed when trial judge sustained Commonwealth's objection striking opinion evidence as KRE 608 had been changed in 2003 to mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence and the evidence was admissible.  "Because Beve’s (Stewart)  trial occurred in 2004, after the effective date of the amendment to KRE 608(a), the issue of the admissibility of the testimony regarding Brenda’s truthfulness must be determined under the new rule that a witness, if qualified, can express an opinion as to another witness’s character for telling the truth. Although Kentucky has yet to address the scope of KRE 608(a), the advisory notes to the federal rule and cases applying that rule make clear that opinion testimony such as that offered in this case is admissible."

 In addition to presenting two alibi witnesses, Beve called Brenda’s mother as a witness to give evidence concerning Brenda’s character for truthfulness. When asked, she responded, “I don’t know if she’ll tell you the truth or not. She might and she might not.” The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to the response and admonished the jury to disregard the question and the answer. We agree with Beve that the trial court erred when it sustained the Commonwealth’s objection. (emphasis added).

CA reviewed TC's Decree of Dissolution and associated findings regarding classification of marital and non-marital property, division of marital property, maintenance, and award of attorney fees.

Standard of Review: In reviewing division of property in dissolution and the classification of property as marital or non-marital, there should be a two-tiered standard of review. Given the fact that the trial court is unquestionably in the best position to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence, the factual findings underpinning the determination of whether an item is marital or non-marital are entitled to deference and, consequently, should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Because classification is a question of law, it should be reviewed de novo.

Classification of Marital and Non-marital Property: The increase in value of Wife's non-marital stock should not be deemed marital property merely because Husband worked for the company, as Husband made no financial decisions or exerted any managerial discretion concerning the development and profitability of the company, and he received a salary for the work he did perform.

Life insurance proceeds received by Wife as Beneficiary of Wife's father's policy were Wife's non-marital property, despite the fact that during his life, premiums were made by both Wife and Husband after receiving cash gifts in those amounts from Wife's parents. Intent of the donor is the primary factor in determining whether a transfer is a gift and, if so, whether the gift is made jointly or to only one spouse. As testimony indicated that cash payments were made to Husband only to avoid gift tax penalties and only Wife was named as beneficiary of life insurance policy, logic dictates that Wife's father intended them for the benefit of Wife alone.

Forgiveness of Loan: Wife's father's forgiveness of loan was not wife's non-marital property merely because of her father's general intent to provide for his children and a generic (and suspect) note of forgiveness in his lockbox; Wife had burden of proof on this issue and this evidence was insufficient to overcome presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital property.  The trial court’s decision to treat the forgiveness of the loan as a nonmarital gift to Carolyn is clearly erroneous and, consequently, must be reversed

Assignment of Debt: There is no presumption that debts must be divided equally or in the same proportion as marital property. Rather, debts are generally assigned on the basis of such factors as receipt of benefits and extent of participation. As Husband had signed no notes signifying his obligation to repay Husband’s father, and as Wife was unaware of the extent and nature of these alleged loans, TC did not abuse its discretion in assigning all of these debts to Husband.

Gifts Between Spouses: In determining whether a gift between spouses should be considered marital or non-marital property upon dissolution, a court must consider: the source of the money with which the "gift" was purchased, the intent of the donor at that time as to intended use of the property, status of the marriage relationship at the time of the transfer, and whether there was any valid agreement that the transferred property was to be excluded from the marital property. Wife expended non-marital funds to reimburse the IRS so that Husband would not find himself in legal trouble. The parties had not separated at the time of the gift, nor had they agreed that the gift was to be excluded from marital property. Thus, Wife's payment of non-marital funds on behalf of Husband was appropriately deemed a gift by TC and Wife should not be reimbursed for this expenditure.

Maintenance: TC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Husband maintenance award where Husband had received sizeable marital estate, stood to receive a substantial inheritance upon his father's death, and had the education and ability to find work as an attorney. CA found that Husband continued to enjoy the "lifestyle of the marriage" and was not in need of additional support.

This appeal arose from a boundary line dispute (aka the 'fence') in which the Turners prevailed with the Embrys filing a motion for new trial and judgment NOV.  The judge granted the new trial motion (one year later!), and then set aside the new trial order after the Turners so filed their own motion. (Confuses yet?)   In setting aside the order for a new trial and reinstating the trial verdict, the judge admitted in his order that he was only trying to get the litigants to settle the matter.  COA took the trial judge (Ronnie C. Dortch) to task for this misapplication of the rules.

Here is the trial judge's acknowledgement of same in his order setting aside the new trial order.  Emphasis is from the opinion of the COA.

This matter was tried before a Jury in Butler Circuit Court and the Jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on January 28, 2002. Prior to this matter being tried, this Court had required the Plaintiff and Defendant to attempt to settle this matter on more than one occasion. This Court had always felt that, for various reasons, this is a matter that should have been settled without the necessity of trial; however, the parties were unable settle [sic] the matter with the resultant jury trial. Thereafter,
on February 11, 2003, this Court entered its Order sustaining the Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial but overruling the Plaintiff’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Candidly, this Court issued its Order for a new trial simply to allow the parties an additional chance to settle the case without the necessity of an appeal, with the parties incurring additional attorneys’ fees, etc. even at that point in
the litigation. This Court felt that the  parties could and should be able to settle this matter but this Court was wrong. Therefore, this Court finds that it was in error when it sustained the Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and it is therefore this Court’s prerogative to correct its earlier error. (Emphasis added by COA in their opinion).

The first issue addressed was 'minor' in that "the grant of a new trial under CR1 59.01 terminates the running of time for appeal. CR 73.02(1)(e).  In this case there was no new trial and therefore no new final judgment from which to appeal.  Nevertheless, the COA was satisfied that the court continued to have jurisdiction to enter an order setting aside its prior order granting a new trial, as was done here.  Thus, the appeal in this case was timely filed. 

The next issue was 'major' after addressing the 'procedural anomalies' was the denial of the new trial motion.  In undertaking the analysis of the trial judge’s eventual decision not to allow a new trial here, the COA "must be mindful that the decision is presumptively correct, and that we cannot reverse unless it was clearly erroneous. McVey v. Berman, 836 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Ky.App. 1992) . . .; see also Prater v. Arnett, 648 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Ky.App. 1983). . . ."

In affirming the the denial of the new trial motion, the COA rejected these issues raised by the losing party - evidence not substantial and the credibility of an expert was question (rejected since function of jury is to determine questions of credibility and issues of fact where the evidence is conflicting, Woods v. Asher, 324 S.W.2d 809 (Ky., 1959));  verdict was contrary to the law (reject the loser's arguments on 'agreed boundary line' which would have allowed for parol agreements to establish the property line and which was premised on estoppel). 

The three cases addressed on the agreed boundary line issue are:  Faulkner v. Lloyd, 253 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1952); Redman v. Redman, 240 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1951); and Wolf v. Harper, 313 Ky. 688, 233 S.W.2d 409 (1950).

In addressing the impropriety of the trial judges actions, the COA stated the trial judges "interference was inappropriate at best and injudicious at worst."

Finally, we must address the major peculiarity present 
in this case – the trial judge’s grant of a new trial upon
grounds that he ultimately admitted that he fabricated in an
effort to coerce a settlement. It is one thing for a judge to
mediate settlement of a case prior to trial, which may be done
if ethical requirements are scrupulously observed. See SCR3
4.300 Canon 3 B(7)(d); Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Saul
Subsidiary I Ltd. Partnership, 159 S.W.3d 339, 341 (Ky.App.
2004). It is quite another to set aside an otherwise valid jury
verdict for reasons of personal belief or bias. The overturning
of a jury verdict in favor of a new trial is a matter of the
utmost seriousness, and should only occur when the specific
criteria set forth in CR 59.01 are carefully considered and met.
To flout those criteria due to one’s personal belief about a
case is incompatible with our system of justice. Such conduct
tends to erode public confidence in the fairness and 
impartiality of our court system. Nearly four years have passed
since a Butler County jury unanimously decided this case in
favor of the appellees. At least two years of delay in bringing
this case to its ultimate conclusion was caused by the trial
judge’s improper – even if well-intentioned - intervention. His
interference was inappropriate at best and injudicious at worst.

Reversed decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board finding that an award of future medical benefits is not authorized after a claimant reaches maximum medical improvement in the absence of a permanent impairment and resulting disability and reinstated the award of the Administrative Law Judge.

Claimant had neck and back injury and reached MMI. ALJ concluded that, although she had received “temporary total disability” income benefits for the period from June 5, 2003 to January 4, 2004, due to her injuries, claimant was not entitled to income benefits for “permanent partial disability” after that point because the evidence did not merit a permanent disability impairment rating for those injuries. The ALJ further ruled that – despite his finding of no permanent disability – claimant was entitled to “future medication as may be needed” and ruled that she “shall further recover of the Defendant, Kentucky River District Health Department, and/or its insurance carrier, for the cure and relief from the effects of the injury such medical, surgical and hospital treatment including nursing, medical and surgical supplies and appliances, as may reasonably be required at the time of the injury and thereafter during disability.”

Despite the Board’s belief that the conclusion in Cavin v. Lake Construction Co., 451 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1970) that future medical benefits may still be awarded in the absence of a finding of disability is mere dicta and “conflicts with the plain language of KRS 342.020, which confines an award for medical expenses to those expenses which ‘may reasonably be required at the time of injury and thereafter during disability’” (italics in original), this proposition has been repeatedly recognized and followed by our courts – even given the sweeping legislative changes of the workers’ compensation system in 1996. See Alcan Foil Products, a Division of Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Huff, 2 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Ky. 1999) Moreover, the particular portion of KRS 342.020 noted above that was cited by the Board as being in conflict with Cavin was in effect well before that decision was rendered, and our predecessor court presumably was aware of it when the case was decided. While the Board may disagree with this precedent, it is still bound to follow it. Accordingly, until our Supreme Court decides to explicitly overturn its decision in Cavin, we will continue to abide by the principles set forth in that case. Therefore, COA "must reverse the Board on this issue."

NOT PUBLISHED .

HARLAN COUNTY BOARD OF ED. V. INTERNATIONAL UNION
CIVIL - ADR;  Enforcement of arbitor's decision
2004-CA-002175
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (JOHNSON)
Date: 2/10/2006

Affirmed lower court and arbitor's award as UMWA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Courts in general “have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim.”

WELCH V. EDDS, M.D.
CIVIL - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - Discovery Rule in Medical Negligence 
2004-CA-002255
NOT PUBLISHED  
VACATING AND REMANDING (KNOPF)
Date: 2/10/2006

Plaintiff/patient was entitled to rely on what her physicians told her, and CJOA did not believe she should have discovered the false statements any sooner. Her claim based on the lack of informed consent is thus not barred by the statute of limitations.

However, the COA was not willing to go beyond that issue.  The parties did not treat this as an informed-consent case, and  did not present the trial court with the appropriate sources for determining whether the plaintiff/patient had raised material issues of fact on all the elements of her cause of action.  They have raised the informed-consent issue on appeal, but as a Court of review it is  generally unwilling to address matters the trial court has not had an opportunity to rule upon.  These are important and complex issues deserving of a fully developed record and the summary judgment is thus vacated and the matter remanded in light of the law of informed consent.

CA denies petition for writ of prohibition preventing DNA testing of petitioner's children, finding that TC was justified in ordering this type of physical examination.  [John Hamlet]

LOVELACE V. HOLIDAY INN HURSTBOURNE
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Judgment NOV
2004-CA-001412
NOT PUBLISHED   
REVERSING AND REMANDING; MINTON
Date: 2/10/2006

The trial court granted j.n.o.v. to Holiday Inn Hurstbourne, setting aside a substantial jury verdict awarded to Richard Lovelace on his personal injury claim against the hotel  for a slip and fall jury verdict awarding plaintiff  $887,379.86 (subject to 15 per cent comparative).  Jefferson Circuit Court trial judge Thomas Wine was reversed after he granted judgment NOV (notwithstanding the verdict).  

COA  reversed the j.n.o.v. and remanded the case back to the circuit court with direction to reinstate the original judgment because the COA held that Lovelace presented proof at trial sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of Holiday Inn’s liability, which precluded entry of the j.n.o.v. 

A trial court may not enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) unless there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or there is no dispute on issues of fact upon which reasonable jurors could differ. I

NOTE:  Judge Thomas Wine who was reversed in this decision is a candidate for Court of Appeals.

BARRISTER FARM LLC V. UPSON DOWN FARMS, INC.
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Summary Judgment (No genuine issue of material fact in hay storage case)
2004-CA-002651
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (SCHRODER)
Date: 2/10/2006

LOVETT V. COM.
CRIMINAL - RCr 11.42 & CR 60.02 Denial
2003-CA-002657
NOT PUBLISHED   AFFIRMING (PAISLEY)
Date: 2/10/2006

BARKER V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Voice Identification
2004-CA-000598
NOT PUBLISHED   AFFIRMING (MILLER, J.) 
Date: 2/10/2006

There was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction and 10 year sentence for Robbery in the First Degree.  Given victim’s undisputed familiarity with Barker through numerous conversations with her, her identification of Barker’s voice as the robber’s on the security videotape was admissible.

BLYTHE V. COM.
CRIMINAL - RCr 11.42 dismissal
2004-CA-001087
NOT PUBLISHED   AFFIRMING (JOHNSON) 
Date: 2/10/2006

CA could not reach the merits of Blythe’s arguments because he has failed to substantially comply with the requirement that an RCr 11.42 motion be signed and verified by the movant. The trial court had no other alternative but to dismiss the motion and did not err in doing so.

PARTIN V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Assault I
2004-CA-002049
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TACKETT)
Date: 2/10/2006

Defendant's conviction for Assault in the First Degree affirmed.  No error in the trial court’s decision declining to hold a hearing on the morning of trial to assess Partin’s disagreement with her counsel.  TC did not improperly question Partin during her testimony, did not allow hearsay testimony by the victim’s daughter, and properly sustained the prosecutor’s objection to evidence of the victim’s character.

EARLY V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Double Jeopardy 
2004-CA-002656
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TACKETT)
Date: 2/10/2006

Defendant was properly convicted of fleeing or evading police in the first degree.  No double jeopardy because Defendant was charged in Indiana for conduct that took place in Indiana and was charged in Kentucky for conduct that took place in Kentucky.

HARROD V. COM.
CRIMINAL 
2005-CA-000177
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (DYCHE)
Date: 2/10/2006

Not error to exclude evidence that the victim of robbery was an alleged drug dealer.  

RANKIN V. COM.
CRIMINAL - RCr 11.42 Denial
2005-CA-000210
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TAYLOR)
Date: 2/10/2006

DILL V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Untimely appeal results in dismissal
2005-CA-000275
NOT PUBLISHED   
DISMISSING (MILLER) 
Date: 2/10/2006

COFFEY V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Set aside forfeiture of car used in drug case
2005-CA-000424
NOT PUBLISHED   
VACATING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS (TAYLOR)
Date: 2/10/2006

COA held the term owner of vehicle, in KRS 218A.410(h)(2), means either the individual who holds legal title to the vehicle or the individual who has physical possession of the vehicle under a bona fide sale.

MOORE-BAKER V. COM.
CRIMINAL - CR 60.02 Denial
2005-CA-000610
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TAYLOR)
Date: 2/10/2006

MILLINER V. WEBB (WARDEN)
CRIMINAL -  Prison Discipline Hearing
2005-CA-001322
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (GUIDUGLI)
Date: 2/10/2006

Due process for prison discipline hearing requires that the inmate receive written notice at least 24 hours prior to the hearing, and a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken

MERRICK V. COM.
EVIDENCE - Opinions ('collective facts rule' and lay testimony) 
2002-CA-002034
NOT PUBLISHED   AFFIRMING (GUIDUGLI)
Date: 2/10/2006

Merrick appealed conviction of burglary, criminal attempt to commit manslaughter, and assault charges stemming from an attack on his ex-wife, arguing that TC erred in admitting rebuttal testimony from his ex-wife's mother about past instances in which she had witnessed violent and angry behavior.  Merrick also appealed the TC's admission of a book (The Vietnam Directory of Names) through the mother's rebuttal testimony that was offered to disprove Merrick's testimony of an event that occurred during his tour in Vietnam. Merrick had argued this event caused him to develop post-traumatic stress disorder that led him to "black out" in response to hearing his ex-wife's statement.  On both points, Merrick argued improper impeachment on a collateral matter.

Held: The mother's testimony about other instances of anger and violence was not improper since it specifically addressed issues raised by Merrick in his testimony. The COA also felt its probative value outweighed any prejudical effect.  The COA finally noted that even if it was improper, the TC's admission was harmless error at best.

As to the admission of the book, the COA also felt that the TC's ruling was proper since it contained evidence that directly contradicted Merrick's testimony about the death of one of his comrads and its role in his alleged disorder.  The COA also noted that even if improper, the TC's admission was harmless error.

FITZGERALD V. FITZGERALD
FAMILY LAW - Support (Voluntary underemployment)
2004-CA-001895
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TACKETT)
Date: 2/10/2006

During the marriage the husband earned well over $100,000.00 per year running his own hauling business; wife assisted in the business, but husband was the entrepreneur. Immediately after the divorce, husband quit the business, closed it down and lost or sold the assets; he went to work for his brother for $15.00 per hour. He subsequently tried twice, both times, unsuccessfully, to have his child support reduced based on change of circumstances. The trial court, appropriately, held that he had the ability to apply his skills to earning the amount of money he had earned for several years during his marriage; he did not have to return to the exact same business, but his skills were such that he could apply them to another line of work and be just as successful.

BRINKLEY V. WILSON
PROPERTY - Real Property (quasi-easement)
2005-CA-000892
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (GUIDUGLI)
Date: 2/10/2006

CA denies appeal denying Brinkley either a prescriptive or quasi easement over parcel.

MIFFLIN V. MIFFLIN
WILLS, ESTATES, PROBATE - 
2002-CA-000225
NOT PUBLISHED   (GUIDUGLI)
REVERSING AND REMANDING 
Date: 2/10/2006

This case was before the Court of Appeals following a remand by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Supreme Court addressed a procedural issue and instructed the Court of Appeals to consider the appeal despite the records’ inclusion of only 28 seconds of the videotaped trial and 3 pages of testimony. It was up to the appellee to designate additional portions of the record. After summarizing the resolution of that procedural issue, the Court held that the Circuit Court had erred in calculating the damages. While sympathizing with the Circuit Court’s difficulty, the Court of Appeals remanded with a suggested strategy for the calculation. The Court of Appeals noted that the difficulty rose in part from incomplete record-keeping during the time that the family agreed on matters. The case thus serves as a reminder of the important role of a skilled, competent fiduciary even when it appears that the estate will be a harmonious one.

TURNER V. DIXIE FUEL CO.
WORKERS COMP - Substantial Evidence
2005-CA-000880
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (JOHNSON)
Date: 2/10/2006

ALJ Marcel Smith’s award of a 7% disability to a 56 year old injured miner, apportioned 70% to injury and 30% to pre-existing problem, is upheld on appeal.  Substantial evidence supported the award, therefore it could not be disturbed on appeal.

An award to a hairdresser based on a cumulative trauma injury is upheld on appeal, there being substantial evidence to support the findings of ALJ Frasier.  The Court of Appeals explicitly reject the appellant’s invitation to change the standard of review on appeal to one of preponderance of the evidence.

ROSS V. THREAVE MAIN STUD
WORKERS COMP - Exacerbation
2005-CA-001832
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TAYLOR)
Date: 2/10/2006

ALJ Borders dismissed a claim based on the claimant’s getting kicked in the knee by a horse.  The claimant had only recently settled a claim for injury to the same knee, and the ALJ held that this was only a temporary exacerbation of symptoms.  Where the party with the burden of proof loses he must show that overwhelming proof supports his case in order to succeed on appeal.  Otherwise, the decision is affirmed, as it was here. 

OSBORNE V. EAGLE COAL #10
WORKERS COMP - ALJ Factfinding Authority
2005-CA-001844
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TAYLOR)
Date: 2/10/2006

The ALJ found that 7.5% was attributable to the work-related injury and 7.5% was attributable to a nonwork-related automobile accident that occurred in 1988.  In the case at hand, it was within the province of the ALJ to accept certain parts of Dr. Goldman’s testimony and to reject others. Indeed, the ALJ found that appellant suffered a 15% permanent impairment; hence, rejecting Dr. Goldman’s opinion that appellant suffered no permanent impairment.

MCCLANAHAN V. THE CAMPBELL COUNTY FISCAL COURT
ZONING 
2004-CA-002535
NOT PUBLISHED   
AFFIRMING (TACKETT)
Date: 2/10/2006

Thanks to Scott Byrd, Patrick Bouldin,  John Hamlet, Cherry Henault, Sam Hinkle, , Chad Kessinger,  Stephen Keller,  Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes , Peter Naake,  Paul C. O'Bryan, Bryan Pierce, Alma Puissegur, Paul Schurman, Michael Stevens and James Worthington for their efforts in digesting Kentucky's published appellate decisions.