Held the one-year statute of limitations applied to injuries suffered in a personal watercraft accident (and not five year period).  KRS 413.140(1)(a) and not KRS 413.120 applies.

Mardis appealed from an order denying his motion to vacate judgment pursuant to CR 60.02. The issue is whether Mardis should be granted relief from his conviction and 12-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine in light of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s later decision in Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003).  Held the trial court properly denied Mardis’s motion, and thus affirmed.

Mardis overlooks the fact that he pled guilty to the offense. “Kentucky courts have long held  that a guilty plea precludes a post-judgment challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Ky. 2003). We reject Mardis’s argument for that reason. 

Affirmed conviction and admissibility of weapon found during pat down.  Officers had reasonable suspicion in approaching defendant and asking few questions.  He was not seized at that point.  In light of defendant's immediate associates running off at this point, the officer was justifed in full-scape Terry stop.

Reversed lower court summary judgment as fact did not support it.  

It is undisputed that a mortgage insurance policy was put in place for the period from October 23, 2000, to October 23, 2001, but that the policy was cancelled effective May 14, 2001, and the unused, unearned premium for the remainder of the term was credited to appellant’s escrow account. Thus, by appellee’s own admission, the property was not uninsured for the four-month period found by the trial court, but was covered by insurance purchased by appellee and charged to appellant as provided for in the security instrument. 

Under these provisions, appellee was entitled to “force-place” an insurance policy on the mortgaged property and to charge the costs of obtaining that policy to appellant’s escrow account. 

This trial involved breach of contract, bad faith andUnfair Claims Settlement Practices Act claim involving a denial of the Yazell's claim under a homeowner's insurance policy following a fire that destroyed their home.

During the trial the jury had mistakenly been allowed to hear evidence of the insured's (Yazells) refusal to take a polygraph.  The trial court denied motion for a mistrial.

The polygraph evidence had been excluded in a Daubert challenge, but had inadvertantly made its way into the trial exhibits and was seen by the jury.  However, since the parties were ordered by the judge to delete and redact evidence of the polygraph, Yazell was estopped to take advantage of the error produced by his own act.

In holding the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial, the COA noted that Wright v. Jackson, 329 S.W.2d 560 (Kyl. 1959) held a party is estopped take advantage of error produced by his on act (proffered instructions on pain and suffering contained 'if any') and distinguished In Re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981) which impeached a verdict when extraneous evidence (police report) was brought to bear on the jury's deliberations.  However, the polygraphy did not constitute an improper outside influence.

The record contained no substantive argument for a directed verdict of acquittal, no suppression issues, and no objections to the jury instruction. COA found no preserved allegation of error and no issue apparent on the face of the record to indicate any merit to Wilson’s appeal.   Note Wilson's attorney found found no basis for Wilson’s appeal of his conviction and sentence, Wilson’s attorney filed an Anders brief, which presents no legal argument or issue for our review. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 

No error in admitting in sexual assault case evidence that defendant displayed pornographic pictures to the victim to relax her.  Judge did not err in excluding defendant's rebuttal expert testimony to impeach government's expert on DNA testing.

In Commonwealth v. Mobley, 160 S.W.3d. 783, 787 (Ky. 2005), the Supreme Court held that “[t]he appropriate analysis to determine a lawful misdemeanor arrest is whether a reasonable officer could conclude from all the facts that a misdemeanor is being committed in his presence.” 

COA found the police officer herein could have reasonably concluded that Crooks had committed the offense of alcohol intoxication in a public place in her presence.

Rejected claim by hispanic speaking defendant he did not understand plea and that his interpreter failed to explain rights.

Requiring sex offender to attend treatment as condition of parole within discretion of parole board.

Affirmed lower courts finding that the pro se separation agreement was not unfair or unconscionable and rejected ex-wife's claim that it was procured under duress (she claimed she “was unaware of the meaning” of many of its terms, that Jeffery misled her into signing it, and that she now believed it was manifestly unfair and unconscionable.)

Affirmed lower count and found easement by necessity.  An easement by necessity is one based on the policy favoring beneficial use of property and exists in favor of the dominant estate, whether used or not, if necessary for access.

There was strict compliance with the notice provisions of CR 5.02.  If the warrantor had notice of an action challenging title as warranted, the warrantor can be liab;le for the necessary costs and expenses incurred in defending title, including reasonable attorneys fees.

ALJ did not exceed scope of his authority as fact-finder by selecting the missing psychiatric class impairment under the AMA guides in order to suport the translation to the required percentage of disability.