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Kentucky
Supreme Court Decisions
June 16, 2005 - 30 Decisions |
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| AOC
LINKS - FULL TEXT |
SUMMARIES OF DECISIONS |
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| PUBLISHED
DECISIONS OF KY SUPREME COURT FOR
6/16/2005 |
2005-SC-000204-.pdf
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
KBA
V. SLOAN
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
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2005-SC-000216-.pdf
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
KBA
V. SIVALLS
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE |
2003-SC-000716-TG.pdf
Judge: COOPER
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
BROWN V.
COM
CRIMINAL - Wanton Murder
SC affirmed Defendant's
convictions and 20 year sentence for two
counts of wanton murder, KRS
507.020(1)(b), and two counts of wanton
endangerment in the first degree, KRS
508.060, following motor vehicle
accident. Defendant was not
entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal on the wanton murder charges.
Defendant's conduct was substantially
more than a mere traffic violation.
In addition to driving at a rate
exceeding the speed limit and violating
a traffic signal, there was substantial
evidence that Defendant was watching
television rather than monitoring the
traffic at the intersection and that he
attempted to "time" the
traffic light despite the fact that
it remained red at all times during his
approach.
Defendant was not
entitled to new trial based upon
allegation of juror misconduct.
Allegation of improper redirect
examination and closing argument by the
prosecutor did not warrant reversal.
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2003-SC-000927-DG.pdf
Judge: JOHNSTONE
REVERSING
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
COM.
V. MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - Argument (Send a Message)
Defendant sentenced to 71/2 years for
selling 6 Oxycontin drugs to an uncover
police informant. REVERSED COA WHICH HAD
REVERSED Defendant’S CONVICTION.
Prosecutor in closing argued it was time
for the jury to "send a message"
to the community that KY was going to
punish drug dealers. Defendant did not
object to this argument at trial. After
jury deliberations began, defense counsel
argued that the comment was improper. TC
treated such as a motion for a mistrial
and denied it. SC noted that the
prosecutor cannot place upon the jury what
is necessary to protect the community.
However, comments did not rise to level of
reversal of conviction since KY was
responding to defense counsel’s
arguments not to send his client away for
a long time for 6 year and that Defendant
did not look like a drug dealer.
At trial, the lead
detective also testified about the nature
of Oxycontin. The SC noted that such
testimony has little relevance as to
whether Defendant sold the drug or not.
However, the SC noted that it did not
think that such testimony fell under
"matters of specialized scientific
knowledge" under KRE 702.
SC also held that
detective’s comments that they had
"identified several targets and had
purchased narcotics from them" as a
basis for using an undercover agent in
this case was not improper investigative
hearsay or improper KRE 404(b) evidence.
In large part, SC held Defendant did not
properly preserve this objection at trial. |
2003-SC-000989-MR.pdf
Judge: COOPER
REVERSING
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
THOMAS
V. COM
CRIMINAL
Thomas
was convicted of first-degree assault and
second-degree assault and was sentenced to
24 years. In a 5-1 opinion, SC reversed
and remanded for a new trial.
The primary issues on appeal were: (1)
whether the TC erred by failing to
instruct on Assault under Extreme
Emotional Disturbance; (2) whether
statements from the victims made at
the hospital while they were being
treated for their injuries were
properly admitted as excited utterances;
and (3) whether opinion testimony
concerning the higher rate of alcohol
absorption in the body of an
alcoholic was proper. SC held
that the trial judge improperly denied an
EED instruction because there was evidence from
which a jury could infer a reasonable
explanation or excuse for the defendant's
conduct under the circumstances as he
believed them to be. KRS
507.020(1)(a) and Engler v.
Commonwealth, 627 S.W.2d 582 (Ky.
1982). In addition, the Commonwealth
did not prove that the victim's statements
at the hospital while they were undergoing
treatment were "excited"
utterances because there was no proof that
either man was still under the stress of
the startling event. Souder v.
Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730 (Ky.
1986). And finally, opinion evidence
that Thomas had a higher
blood-alcohol level on the night in
question because of his history of
alcoholism was improper because there was
no proof that he actually did have
such a history of alcohol abuse. Justice
Wintersheimer dissented, stating that the
failure to give an EED instruction was
proper under the evidence and that the
excited utterances of the victims were
properly admitted. |
2003-SC-000730-DG.pdf
Judge: JOHNSTONE
REVERSING
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
KY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS V.
LEWIS
EMPLOYMENT LAW - Government (Exhaust
Administrative Remedies)
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Lewis was relieved of her obligation to exhaust all administrative remedies due to an inconsistency between 105 KAR 1 :210 and KRS 61 .665(2)(e) . Lewis was obliged to obtain a final order from the agency before seeking judicial redress. |
2002-SC-000516-DG.pdf
Judge: JOHNSTONE
REVERSING
RENDERED: 3/17/2005
MODIFIED: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
KENTUCKY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS V.
LEWIS
EMPLOYMENT LAW - Government Disability
Benefits
Medical examiner reviewed Lewis'
disability application and determined
there had not been a substantial change in
condition and thus denied the
application. However, Lewis is still
required to pursue her administrative
remedies to conclusion before seeking
judicial intervention. |
2003-SC-000424-DG.pdf
Judge: 936
Date Modified: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
A.W.,
A CHILD V.
COM.
FAMILY LAW - Juveniles (Contempt)
KRS 635.060 does not act as a limitation on the length of sentence a juvenile court may impose in the appropriate exercise of its inherent contempt powers for violation of its orders. The Juvenile Code simply does not allow a court to give up on the rehabilitation of a juvenile who refuses to perform the terms of probation . Thus, the contempt power exists for the purpose of compelling the juvenile to comply
with the court's orders and to enable the court to help the juvenile become a productive citizen .
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| NONPUBLISHED
DECISIONS OF KY SUPREME COURT FOR
6/16/2005 |
2004-SC-000907-MR.pdf
JUDGE: COOPER
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
BOWLING
V. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOV'T
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - OPEN RECORDS
Appellant, sentenced to death
in a separate criminal proceeding, brought
an action under the Kentucky Open Records
Act alleging the county government had
willfully and wrongfully withheld records
that Appellant requested to bolster his
claims that he had been framed in the
criminal case. Held: the trial court
acted properly when, pursuant to KRS
61.878(1)(h), it quashed the Appellant’s
subpoenas for records that were part of an
ongoing criminal investigation. The
Court of Appeals further held that there
was no evidence that the county’s
refusal of Appellant’s request was made
in bad faith. |
2003-SC-000915-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
BEARD V.
COM
CRIMINAL - Domestic Violence, Prior
Bad Acts
SC affirmed Defendant's
convictions and 40 year sentence for
Murder and PFO 2nd. TC did not err
in permitting the prior bad act
evidence. The prior crimes and bad
acts were relevant, probative and the
potential for prejudice did not outweigh
their probative value. TC did
not err in allowing the jury to be
informed of two sentencing
guidelines -eligible for parole after
serving twenty percent of her sentence
under the domestic violence provision,
or eighty-five percent under the violent
offender provision. In order to be
eligible under the former, the trial
judge was required to make a finding
that Beard was a victim of domestic
violence and abuse. Defense
counsel had not complied with the
procedural requirements of the statute
and it was not certain at that time
which percentage applied.
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2003-SC-001063-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
CHAMBERS V.
COM
CRIMINAL - Resentencing
SC affirmed Defendant's
sentence following remand on
appeal. TC did not deny
Defendant due process of law by
refusing to allow him to be re-sentenced
by a jury. A jury sentenced
Defendant, those sentences were reviewed
and affirmed by SC, and therefore no
basis exists to re-sentence Defendant on
those convictions. Next,
Defendant's due process rights were
not violated when the TC
failed to obtain an updated PSI before
his re-sentencing hearing.
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2004-SC-000853-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
COOK V.
COM.
CRIMINAL - Evidence,
Sentencing
SC affirmed Defendant
sentence following remand. The
trial judge correctly declined to admit
evidence of sentences imposed in other
cases during the penalty phase of the
trial.
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2004-SC-000198-MR.pdf
affirming
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
DAUGHERTY V.
COM
CRIMINAL - Complicity; Jury
Instructions
SC affirmed Defendant's
conviction for Complicity to Rape.
There was sufficient evidence that
accomplice committed act of rape to
justify denial of directed verdict.
Objection over jury instructions was not
properly preserved. Counsel for
the Commonwealth clearly explained to
the jury that the first instruction
referred to Daugherty's actions as a
principal, while the latter addressed
his actions as Brooks' accomplice,
leaving no room for juror confusion. Daugherty
was not substantially prejudiced by the
instructions nor did they contribute to
any manifest injustice.
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2003-SC-000363-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
DAWSON V.
COM
CRIMINAL
SC affirmed Defendant's
convictions and 25 year sentence for
First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled
Substance and First-Degree Possession of
a Controlled Substance. Defendant unequivocally
admitted his guilt with no discernible
uncertainty or lack of conviction. Defendant
gave the trial judge no reason to
question the voluntariness of his
consent to the lawyer's chosen trial
strategy, thus the failure to engage in
a Boykin colloquy was not error. Next,
Defendant was not entitled to a
mistrial based upon the testimony
of the arresting officer as to
Defendant's resistance during his
arrest. Finally, the
possession charge should not have merged
with the trafficking charge as they
involved separate quantities of cocaine.
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2003-SC-000374-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
DEAN
V. COM
CRIMINAL - Child-Sex
Offenses; Adoptive Admissions; Harmless Error
Dean
was convicted of first-degree sodomy and
other sex offenses involving two
child-victims. His convictions and
underlying sentence of 20 years were
upheld. The primary issues on appeal
were: (1) whether Dean's reaction to a
statement made in his presence could be
used as an admission by silence; and (2)
whether Dean's failure to notify family
services when one of the child victims lived
in his home for an extended period of time
could be used as an admission by conduct.
On the first issue, the statement was
improperly admitted because there was no
evidence of manifestation of adoption or
belief in the truth of statement. Perdue
v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148 (Ky.
1995). On the second issue, the
"conduct" of Dean's residing
with the child victim was not a reaction
to an earlier statement made in his
presence. Therefore, the
statement preceding the conduct was improperly
admitted as an admission.
Nonetheless, because there was no
substantial possibility that the outcome
would have been different in the absence
of the errors, they were considered
harmless. |
2004-SC-000059-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
DOWNING
V. COM
CRIMINAL - Child-Sex
Offenses; Relevancy; Directed Verdict; Instructions
Downing
was convicted of attempted rape,
kidnapping, and first-degree sexual abuse
and was sentenced to 40 years. The
primary issues on appeal were: (1) whether
the TC abused its discretion in admitting
evidence that the victim's family was poor
and that Downing had made conflicting
remarks about his sexual activity with his
wife; (2) whether a directed verdict
should have been granted on the kidnapping
and attempted rape charges; and (3)
whether the TC properly denied Downing's
request for instructions on unlawful
imprisonment. On the first issue, SC
held that such evidence was properly
admitted under the circumstances because
it was relevant to explain the victim's
behavior and to help the jury assess the
defendant's credibility. On the
second issue, the TC properly denied the
DV motions because sufficient evidence
existed to support the convictions.
And finally, there was no evidence with
which to justify an instruction on
unlawful imprisonment. Affirmed.
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2004-SC-000649-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
EDWARDS
V. COM
CRIMINAL - Child-Sex Offenses; Directed Verdict
Edwards
was convicted of first-degree sodomy (two
counts) and first-degree sexual abuse (two
counts). On appeal, SC rejected his
argument that there was insufficient
evidence to support his convictions. Affirmed.
|
2004-SC-000871-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
HOOTEN
V. COM
CRIMINAL
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES - Writ of
Prohibition
Hooten's
request for a writ of prohibition stemming
from her transfer to circuit court under
KRS 640.010 was denied because there was
an adequate remedy by appeal. |
2004-SC-000106-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
ISAACS
V. COM
CRIMINAL - Homicide; Directed Verdict
Isaacs
was convicted of wanton murder,
first-degree robbery, and tampering with
physical evidence and was sentenced to
life in prison. On appeal, SC
rejected his argument that the TC
improperly denied his motion for a
directed verdict on the wanton murder
charge. Affirmed. |
2004-SC-000269-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
PAYNE
V. COM
CRIMINAL
Defendant convicted of multiple counts
of Rape 1st and Sodomy 1st,
and being a persistent felony offender. Defendant
argued on appeal that TC erred in denying
his motion for a directed verdict; that
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; and
that his counsel was ineffective. SC
affirmed conviction. Defendant did not
preserve directed verdict argument or
prosecutorial misconduct argument. Defendant
cannot raise ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on direct review. |
2004-SC-000462-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
VAUGHN
V. COM
CRIMINAL
Defendant convicted at trial of
Assault 1st, Robbery 1st,
Arson 1st, and being a
persistent felony offender. Defendant
found to have beat up victim and setting
his house on fire. During the assault, Defendant
allegedly told victim: "I can’t let
you live and that I [the defendant] had no
trouble killing my daughter." Defense
counsel did not cross-examine as to this
statement.
The lead detective
testified and defense counsel tried to
cross-examine the detective about the
unrelated prior event involving the death
of Defendant’s daughter. TC denied this
line of cross-examination. SC held that
trial judge had wide discretion in
limiting cross-examination. SC held that
the proposed cross-examination was factual
inquiry into the daughter’s death and
was not intended to impeach, show bias
against the defendant etc. Defense wanted
to show that Defendant was not a suspect
in daughter’s death. SC held that TC did
not abuse its discretion regarding
cross-examination. |
2003-SC-000206-TG.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
WINGATE
V. COM
CRIMINAL
Defendant convicted of 1st
degree manslaughter. Defendant claimed
that dismissal of juror who was 45 minutes
late on 2nd day of trial was
error. Juror was only African-American on
jury and Defendant was African-American
also. SC held that TC dismissal of juror
was not an abuse of discretion because it
was done for a race neutral and valid
reason and there were sufficient jurors to
proceed.
Defendant was given not
jail time credit at sentencing because he
was serving a federal sentence. Defendant
did not object until 3 years later. SC
held that issue should have been raised at
sentencing and thus was not preserved.
Defendant objected to
jury instructions. Defense counsel
participated in jury instruction process
and since he made no objections, such
arguments on appeal are waived. |
2004-SC-000032-MR.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
WILLIS
V. COM
CRIMINAL
Defendant convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine, possession of anhydrous
ammonia in unapproved container; and PFO. Defendant
sentenced to 69 years.
Defendant claimed on
appeal the KY did not either show that he
actually manufactured methamphetamine or
had that he had dominion and control over
the items found in the case that could be
used to manufacture meth. SC ruled there
was sufficient evidence since Defendant
was found hiding near where the police
found the meth items and Defendant told
police he had been present when
methamphetamine was made at the location.
Further, methamphetamine related items and
methamphetamine were found in Defendant’s
car. |
2003-SC-000443-DG.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
SCOTT
V. SCOTT
FAMILY LAW - Visitation (Jurisdiction, Out
Of
State, Modification)
Parties divorce mom is named as the
primary residential caregiver of the
parties’ two children. Mom moves
to
Texas
and got an Agreed Order from Livingston CC
(KY) that modified visitation with dad to
most of the spring, summer, Christmas and
Thanksgiving breaks. Mom then files
a motion in
Dallas
, Texasand succeeds in getting orders for
change of custody and an ex parte
restraining order with the
Texas
court taking jurisdiction because the
children had been there more than 8 mos.
and under UCCJEA. Dad filed a motion
to hold mom in contempt in Livingston CC
but the TC denied his motion and
relinquished jurisdiction to Texas because
the children resided there for more than 6
mos. and that KY was no longer the home
state of the children. Although the
Texas
court was without jurisdiction to modify
custody unless the KY court declined its
jurisdiction to modify, the KY court could
decline jurisdiction under UCCJA and PPKA.
|
2004-SC-000631-WC.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
AKERS
V. PIKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
WORKERS COMP - Statute of Limitations
The claimant filed his application for
adjustment of claim more than two years
after voluntary TTD benefits were
terminated. Upon termination, the
Office of Workers Claims is notified by
the carrier of the termination and the OWC
notifies the claimant that he has two
years from that date to file a aclaim for
permanent benefits. In cases where
the termination letter is not sent due to
the carrier's failure to notify it of the
termination, the statute of limitations is
tolled. In this case, the carrier
notified the OWC, and the OWC sent the
letter to the claimant's address, but the
claimant testified that he did not receive
it. The ALJ noted that the
claimant's testimony was credible, but
refused to apply estoppel to toll the
statute, and dismissed the claim. The
Board, CA, and Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that estoppel does not apply where
there is no failure to follow the law on
its part. The claimant's argument
that the letter should have been sent by
registered mail also failed.
|
2004-SC-000665-WC.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT
PUBLISHED |
BOWLING
V. THE CHISHOLM COAL CO.
WORKERS COMP - Reopening
The claimant settled his claim for
benefits against his employer and listed
as a source of income during disability
$167 per week in sickness and accident
disability benefits, paid for by the
employer. When the claimant applied
for and received Social Security
Disability benefits, the sickness and
accident plan demanded reimbursement for
benefits paid, and eventually sued Bowling
over it. Bowling moved to reopen the
claim on the grounds of fraud, alleging
that the settlement extinguished any right
Chisolm Coal had against him, and that
Chisolm misled the ALJ by asserting
otherwise. The Chief ALJ refused to
reopen the award on these grounds, and the
decision was affirmed, finding that the
allegations made in the motion to reopen
were unrelated to the workers compensation
proceeding and the listing of other income
in the standard settlement agreement did
not constitute an agreement regarding the
sickness and accident benefits.
|
2004-SC-000648-WC.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
CLARK
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
V. OSBORNE
WORKERS COMP -
The employer reopened a claim for partial
disability benefits to contest certain
medical treatment, for deep vein
thrombosis and pulmonary embolus, which
were found to be non-compensable. However,
during the proceeding the claimant moved
to reopen the award for a worsening of
disability, which was not opposed. The
ALJ found that the claimant was totally
disabled, but based on the same impairment
rating as prior to the reopening. The
Board reversed and remanded, but the ALJ
again found grounds for a total disability.
This time the Board reversed stating
that the claimant had not shown a prima
facie worsening of impairment, so as to
allow reopening. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed, citing Dingo Coal v.
Tolliver 129 S.W. 3d 367 (Ky 2004). That
case was decided while this one was before
the Court of Appeals, and it states that
the increased impairment standard
according to the current reopening statute
only applies to the motion to reopen,
which went unopposed here. Once the
claim is reopened for proof, it is the law
in effect at the time of the injury which
applies, and in this case, total
disability was proven by age, education,
and effect of the injury, by substantial
evidence.
|
2004-SC-000654-WC.pdf
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/16/2005
PUBLISHED |
KIRK
V. RUTH CONTRACTORS
WORKERS COMP - Medical Treatment for Black
Lung
The claimant was found to be totally
disabled as a result of coal workers
pneumoconiosis in 1986. He was
awarded lifetime medical treatment for the
cure and relief of the disease. In
2002 the employer re-opened the case to
contest medical treatment for pulmonary
disease. The claimant, however, had
smoked cigarettes one half a pack a day
for 37 years before he quit in 1991.
There was testimony from doctors
that the treatment the plaintiff was
receiving was for diseases other than
pneumoconiosis, and testimony that it was
for the disease. However, the
testimony from Dr. Broudy, a frequent
witness in these cases, was that the
treatment was for Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Dr. Broudy
admitted, however, that he believed the
claimant did not have pneumoconiosis.
However, the other two medical
experts did not admit to that, and Dr.
Broudy testified the treatment ould have
been for COPD even if the claimant did
have pneumoconiosis. Although the
burden of proof was on the employer to
prove that the treatment was unrelated to
the claimant's work-related disease, the
ALJ found the medical expenses on
compensable. Thus, there was
substantial evidence to support the
decision. This is a strange
decision, and one that will encourage many
reopenings for contest of medical expenses
against miners with black lung. Either
the ALJ did not believe that the claimant
really quit smoking, or he failed to apply
the law of the case and accept that the
claimant had black lung. The coal
company certainly found more doctors to
testify than the claimant, but that is to
be expected because there is no money
recovery from which an attorney can be
paid to defend a reopening for medical
expenses.
|
2004-SC-000442-WC.pdf
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Date: 6/16/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
THORNTON
V. WORKERS COMP BOARD
WORKERS COMP - Impairment Rating Guides
This is a case which is very
interesting to practitioners in that it
looks behind the medical testimony as to
the claimant's impairment rating and
reverses the ALJ for failing to apply the
A.M.A. Guides to the evaluation of permant
impairment properly. The Court held
that where the evidence is uncontradicted
that the claimant has one herniated disc
and one bulging one, it is error for the
ALJ to rely on an impairment rating that
only takes into account a resolved
radiculopathy. This is a must read
for practitioners of the all too common
unoperated back injury case. |
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