| PUBLISHED
DECISIONS OF KY COURT OF APPEALS FOR
6/3/2005 |
2004-CA-000692.pdf
Judge: BUCKINGHAM
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
PUBLISHED |
ST.
LUKE HOSPITALS, INC. V. CAB.
FOR HEALTH AND FAM. SERVICES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The certificate of need was properly
denied. A public officer's failure
to correctly administer the law does not
prevent a more diligent and efficient
officer's proper administration of the
law. An erroneous interpretation of
the law will not be perpetrated. |
2003-CA-002482.pdf
Judge: MINTON
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
PUBLISHED |
MEADOWS
V. COM
CRIMINAL - Crime (Assault, Elements)
In this criminal assault case, Dr.
Smock testified as an expert witness on
the bite mark on the the defendant's
penis. The defendant claimed the
victim was performing fellatio on the
defendant and accidentally injuring his
penis, causing it to bleed, then
laughing. The defendant went to the
bathroom to scope out his injury after
losing the desire for further sexual
activity because of the laughter and the
injury.
“[the offense] is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.
Second-degree assault is not a lesser included offense of first-degree rape precisely because physical injury is an element of the former offense but not the latter.
The same reasoning applies to fourth
degree assault. |
2004-CA-000840.pdf
Judge: VANMETER
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Date: 6/3/2005
PUBLISHED |
HAMILTON
V. PUGH
EMPLOYMENT LAW - Government At Will
Employees
Non-elected city officers appointed by
the mayor with the approval of the city
council may be removed by the mayor 'at
will' unless otherwise provided by will or
statute. Reversed summary judgment
as the trial court erred by
finding as a matter of law that the mayor acted within his authority by treating appellants as “nonelected city officers” who could be removed from office by the mayor at will, and this matter must be reversed and remanded for further consideration on its merits. |
2004-CA-000745.pdf
Judge: JOHNSON
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
PUBLISHED
|
S.L.,
A CHILD V. COM
FAMILY LAW - Appeal (preserving issue in
habitual truancy)
S.L.appealed from Family
Court order committing her to the
Department for Community Based Services (DCBS),
with recommended placement at Ramey-Estep
Homes. At family court level, S.L.
had cases pending for both habitual
truancy and neglect. S.L. argued that by
disposing of the habitual truancy case
prior to the neglect case the family court
committed reversible error because KRS
610.010(12) required it to dispose of the
neglect case first. S.L. argued that the
error committed by the family court was
palpable error under RCr 10.26, since even
though it was insufficiently preserved for
review, it affected her substantial rights
and resulted in a manifest injustice.
S.L. further claimed that the failure to
properly preserve the issue on appeal may
have resulted from the confusion created
by different attorneys representing S.L.
in the two cases and that she should not
have been penalized for this error.
CA agreed that S.L. did
not properly preserve the issue for review
on appeal. S.L. argued that these
matters were handled informally by the
family court and that CA should review
significant issues of juvenile cases even
if they are not perfectly preserved by
circuit court standards. CA
held that the circuit court’s enhanced
appellate powers provided in KRS 610.150
did not extend to review of unpreserved
errors. CA thus reviewed the issue under
the palpable error rule, allowing reversal
only if an obvious error is found that
affects the “substantial rights” of
S.L. such “that manifest injustice has
resulted from the error.” KRS Chapter
620 (regarding neglect) does take
jurisdictional precedent over KRS Chapter
630 (truancy) in an attempt to prevent a
child from being found a status offender,
when the cause of his actions stems from
underlying abuse or neglect. CA held that
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived,
and thus, it was error for the family
court not to dispose of the neglect case
prior to disposing of the truancy case.
Nonetheless, only if the result of the
case had differed substantially without
the error would S.L. be entitled to
relief.
The family court spent
two years prior to entry of its order
trying to find a way to keep S.L. from
missing school and was careful to point
out in its opinion a history of the many
alternatives that had been attempted to
improve S.L.’s habitual truancy. CA thus
found that disposal of the neglect case
prior to that of the truancy case was
unlikely to have changed the result.
S.L. had clearly shown that she
could not be trusted to attend school,
regardless of where she lived. Thus, the
error by the family court did not result
in manifest injustice. TC affirmed.
|
| NONPUBLISHED
DECISIONS OF KY COURT OF APPEALS FOR
6/3/2005 |
2004-CA-001218.pdf
Judge: BUCKINGHAM
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
HENSON
V. WESTERN STAR TRUCK SALES, INC.
BUSINESS LAW - Warranties (Restricting)
In this appeal involving the sale of a
truck and the application of the Uniform
Commercial Code it was held that the
dealer had the right to restrict all
warranties in the manner that it
did. Affirmed SJ dismissing
plaintiff's claim. |
2003-CA-002742.pdf
Judge: MCANULTY
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
BOLTON
V. BARGER
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Summary Judgment (Real
Property)
Affirmed summary judgment on grounds
no genuine issue on material fact as to
title to real property. |
2003-CA-001969.pdf
Judge: MINTON
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND
REMANDING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
JONES
V. CROUCH
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Summary Judgment,
Material Fact
Folks,
all you really need to know here is that
summary judgment is a high standard to
meet, and the CAs found that while the
trial court correctly ruled that
Reeves Lane in Bath County is not a
country road (because there was no
evidence showing it was ever formally
adopted as such by Bath County), there
did exist genuine factual disputes as to
whether Reeves Lane was a public road
and whether there was access from it to
private property. Need the summary
judgment standard at this late stage of
the game? Check out Steelvest,
807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). |
2003-CA-001964.pdf
Judge: BARBER
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
SEALS
V. HOLLAND
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Proof on Remand
The
CAs reversed a prior jury verdict
in favor of the Seals, holding that they
had not presented sufficient proof of
fraud. The Seals made a 60.02
motion to the trial court, asking to
present further evidence of fraud.
The trial court allowed the proof to
be presented, found it insufficient,
and refused to allow the case to go
back to another jury. On appeal,
the CAs noted it is within the trial
court's discretion to allow further proof
unless the mandate of the appellate court
directs otherwise. And even if the
case is remanded for further proceedings
(which this case was not), the trial court
remains free to enter an order of summary
judgment or other order disposing of
the case unless the appellate court's
mandate specifically calls for retrial. The
CAs agreed with the trial court's ruling that
the new evidence the Seals presented was
insufficient to show fraud and found the
trial court had acted entirely correctly
in listening to further proof and
rejecting the request to have the case
heard by a jury again. |
2003-CA-001903.pdf
Judge: BARBER
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
THE CITY OF
SCIENCE HILL, KY V. MAYES,
SUDDERTH & ETHERIDGE, INC.
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Statute of Limitations
Case
No. 96-CI-00122, Pulaski Circuit Court -
Hon. Robert E. Gillum
The
City hired engineering firm Mayes
to design a new sewage collection system
in 1988. The City then separately
contracted with Kay & Kay
Contracting to construct the system in
1992, which was completed in August
1993. Thereafter, numerous problems with
the system arose beginning in October
1993. The City did not file suit against
Mayes until February 12, 1996 asserting
a professional negligence claim stemming
from its design and oversight on the
system's construction. In April 2001,
the City sought leave to amend its
complaint to add claims for breach of
contract and fraud against Mayes, and
for the first time sought to add Kay
& Kay as a defendant and assert
these same two claims against it as
well. TC allowed the City to amend the
complaint to add the claims against
Mayes, but would only allow the breach
of contract claim against Kay & Kay
since it ruled that the fraud claim was
stale per KRS 413.120(12) and did not
otherwise relate back to the filing of
the original complaint per CR 15.03. TC
subsequently granted summary judgment to
Mayes on the professional negligence
claim as being barred by the 1-year
statute of limitations per KRS 413.245,
and separately ruled that the City had
waived any claim it had for breach of
contract by making its final payment to
Kay & Kay after it knew of the
problems related to the system. The City
appealed.
Held:
TC correctly applied the 1-year statute
of limitations to the City's
professional negligence claim against
Mayes. The COA also upheld TC's
dismissal of the fraud claim against Kay
& Kay, and addressed the relation
back doctrine set forth in CR 15.03 by
stating that the City had failed to
satisfy all the requirements of this
rule. The COA also upheld TC's decision
that the City had waived its breach of
contract claim against Kay & Kay by
its act of ratifying all change orders
and making final payment even though it
already knew about the defective
conditions of the system. The COA did
ultimately remand the case back to the
TC due to its failure to address the
other two claims asserted against Mayes
for fraud and breach of contract.
|
2004-CA-000948.pdf
Judge: TACKETT
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
BROWN V. FURNISH
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Statute of Limitations
Brown,
tenant, sued Furnish, landlord, for
personal injuries, breach of contract
and constructive eviction based on fact
that Furnish allowed water to leak
into Brown's apartment causing
mold problem that Brown had to be
treated for. TC grants SJ, holding
that personal injury claims barred by
one-year statute of limitations.
Brown appeals, arguing that genuine
issues exist on claims of breach of
contract and constructive eviction.
COA denies claims finding that
constructive eviction claimed barred
since Brown did not abandon apartment
due to mold but rather was evicted.
Further, statute of limitations on
personal injury claims can not be
avoided by breach of contract claim.
|
2004-CA-001914.pdf
Judge: GUIDUGLI
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
COM.
V. EVANS
CRIMINAL - Government Appeal; Search
and Seizure (Automobile)
This was an interlocutory appeal taken
under KRS 22A.020(4) addressing the
automobile exception which allows an
officer to search a legitimately stopped
automobile where probable cause exists
that contraband or evidence of a crime is
in the vehicle. |
2003-CA-001527.pdf
Judge: HUDDLESTON
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
HARVELL
V. COM
CRIMINAL - 60.02, Boykin defenses
CR 60.02 is not merely an added
opportunity to raise a Boykin defense. |
2004-CA-000925.pdf
Judge: TAYLOR
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
HENDERSON
V. COM
CRIMINAL - Disclosure of Expert
Witnesses (RCR 7.24)
No error for Commonwealth to simply
disclose it was intending to call a
narcotics expert without identifying that
the particular person listed was such
expert. Upon a reading of RCr 7.24(1)(b), it is clear that the Commonwealth need only disclose “results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with a particular case, or copies thereof, that are
known by the attorney for the Commonwealth . . . .”
RCr 7.24(1)(b) does not mandate disclosure of Detective O’Neal as an expert witness. |
2004-CA-000394.pdf
Judge: BARBER
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
KNIGHT
V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Plea Agreement, Conditional
Guilty Plea, Polygraph
Plea was not conditional and defendant had
no right to withdraw his guilty plea. |
2003-CA-002767.pdf
Judge: MCANULTY
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
MARSHALL
V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Counsel
TC’s denial of D’s 11.42 petition
without a hearing affirmed as D’s
factual assertions (even if true) would
not overcome Strickland standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel. |
2004-CA-000554.pdf
Judge: TACKETT
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
PHILLIPS
V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Crimes (Abandonment Children)
D convicted of four counts of abandonment
of a minor (her four children). COA
affirmed. Kids were ages 5 - 13. D (their
mother) would leave them for weeks at a
time while traveling with their father who
was a truck driver while the kids were
supervised by their 14 year old cousin.
COA said it was not a defense to
abandonment that D did not intend to leave
the children permanently. |
2003-CA-001861.pdf
Judge: SCHRODER
REVERSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND
REMANDING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
PLANK
V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Prosecutorial Misconduct
(Argument)
Direct appeal from trial conviction
for complicity to 1st degree
burglary and 2nd degree
manslaughter. REVERSED. Burglary
conviction reversed because no evidence D
aided co-defendant in burglary.
Manslaughter verdict reversed because of
improper comments by prosecutor.
Prosecutor misstated the law as to the
crime of manslaughter in his closing
argument (regarding the definition of a
wanton act). Defense objected. TC
overruled the defense and admonished
defense not to object again unless she had
a "valid objection." COA thought
defendant’s objections to prosecutor’s
misstatements of the law was a valid
objection and reversed manslaughter
conviction on this ground. Further, TC
answered a jury question without notice to
the parties. This was improper. |
2004-CA-001666.pdf
Judge: HENRY
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
TYLER
V. COM
CRIMINAL - 11.42 Denied
COA affirmed TC denial of D’s 11.42
petition. Petition filed outside of the
three year time limit. Additionally, it
was a successive 11.42 petition. |
2004-CA-001086.pdf
Judge: BUCKINGHAM
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
STEIN
V. BELLARMINE UNIVERSITY, INC.
EMPLOYMENT LAW - University Professor
Upheld termination of tenured Bellarmine
University professor following reports of
disrespectful and harmful remark made by
professor toward his students. |
2004-CA-001162.pdf
Judge: SCHRODER
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
ALEXANDER
V. CARRIER
FAMILY LAW - Grandparent Visitation
CA affirms Rowan CC order granting
grandparent visitation with Carrier and
also that TC was not collaterally estopped
from allowing contact with other family
members. Dad gets custody of child.
Let grandma see the child until child’s
aunt filed motion for visitation (she was
the caregiver after mom lost custody and
before dad got custody but lost her
separate case against Alexander). After a
hearing TC granted visits one Saturday a
month with all family members allowed to
be present except for the child’s
mother. CA ruled in Vibbert v.
Vibbert that parents do not have 100% say
in allowing visits with the child and
adopted the best interest standard. CA
agreed with TC that the parties, and
issues were different in this action—the
TC simply allowed the aunt to have
“contact” with the child and was not
granted visitation.
|
2004-CA-001893.pdf
Judge: BUCKINGHAM
VACATING AND REMANDING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
FROMMEL
V. WYATT
FAMILY LAW - Grandparent Visitation
CA vacates and remands Christian Co.
Family Court order dismissing a Petition
for Grandparent visitation without holding
an evidentiary hearing. FC relied on
Scott v. Scott and CA has since overruled
Scott in Vibbert v. Vibbert. Under Scott
“grandparent visitation may only be
granted over the objection of an otherwise
fit custodial parent if it is shown by
clear and convincing evidence that harm to
the child will result from a deprivation
of visitation with the grandparent.”
In the Vibbert CA found that Scott “set
an unnecessarily strict and unworkable
standard.”
|
2002-CA-002114.pdf
Judge: JOHNSON
AFFIRMING 2002-CA-002114-ME
REVERSING AND REMANDING
2003-CA-001490-ME
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED
|
KINSEY
V. KINSEY
COM. V. KINSEY
FAMILY LAW - Child Support (SSI, Gross
Income, Forgiving or Excusing)
Mom
appealed TC’s decision transferring PRC
status to Dad, arguing, inter
alia, that TC’s order was an
abuse of discretion. CA held that
change in PRC status was a change in
custody, requiring the movant to meet the
same statutory requirements of KRS 403.340
as are required for a change of sole
custody. Because more than two years
had passed since the last custody award,
Dad was required to show that PRC change
was in the best interests of the children,
as demonstrated by the factors enumerated
in KRS 403.340(3). CA held that
TC’s finding that Dad’s status as PRC
was in the best interest of the children
was supported by substantial evidence and
thus not an abuse of discretion.
Mom
also argued that her child support
obligation should not have been
retroactive to the date Dad filed his
motion for change of custody. CA
stated that child support may be ordered
to be retroactive to date motion for
modification of child support was made.
CA further held that, since Dad had
possession of the children at the time of
filing the custody motion, implicit in
that motion was a motion for request of
child support modification. It was
therefore appropriate for Mom’s CS
obligation to be retroactive to the date
of filing of the custody motion. TC
affirmed.
In
a related case, Commonwealth appealed from
TC’s order that Dad did not owe CS
arrearages. TC had ruled that
any arrearage Dad owed as a result of his
failure to make payments in compliance
with the child-support order was forgiven
on the basis that Mom had caused him to
incur additional expenses as a result of
her having failed to comply with TC’s
visitation orders.
Because
unpaid periodical payments for maintenance
of children become vested when due, each
installment of child support becomes a
lump sum judgment, unchangeable by TC when
it becomes due and is unpaid. Courts
are without authority to forgive vested
rights in accrued unpaid maintenance.
Thus, TC was without the authority to
forgive or excuse any unpaid child support
which had accrued. TC reversed and
remanded.
|
2003-CA-001878.pdf
Judge: TACKETT
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
REYNOLDS
V. REYNOLDS
FAMILY LAW - Property (Dissipation of
Assets, Business)
Wife contends that TC
erroneously declined to accept DRC’s
finding that Husband had dissipated
marital assets and improperly reduced that
amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the
DRC. CA found that nothing in the
record established that Husband acted in a
way to intentionally deprive Wife of
marital property. Husband’s decision to
close the family business may have been
unfavorable to Wife, but she cited no
authority to support her position that his
actions constituted dissipation of marital
assets. With regard to the awarding
of attorney’s fees, the awarding of
attorney’s fees is within the “sound
discretion” of TC. TC affirmed.
|
2004-CA-001084.pdf
Judge: MCANULTY
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
WITT
V. KY CAB. FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES
FAMILY LAW - Child Custody
CA
affirms TC denial of motion for temporary
custody by appellants. (Henry Family
Court, Hon. Karen A. Conrad, judge,
presiding).
The
Cabinet for Health & Family Services
placed two half-sisters with foster
parents instead of with one of the girl's
grandfather and step-grandmother, for
several reasons including the fact that
the grandparents were already caring for
three small children, two of whom
displayed "sexually reactive
behaviors." Grandparents appealed
arguing, among other things, that Cabinet
had a duty to consider relative placement
first. CA held TC did not abuse its
discretion in placing the children with
the foster parents. |
2004-CA-001144.pdf
Judge: EMBERTON
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
STATE
FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO. V.
RICE
INSURANCE - Homeowners (Coverage, Child
Care Exclusion)
CA
reverses and remands, holding that
homeowner's insurance coverage is excluded
for childcare business occuring in the
home. (Shelby Cir. Ct., Hon. William F.
Stewart, judge, presiding).
Homeowner
quit work to stay home with her children
and began keeping other children regularly
4-5 days per week to earn income. Several
months later an infant died in her care.
Homeowner sought coverage and defense;
State Farm denied, citing a "business
pursuit" exclusion. Some
jurisdictions exempt
"occasional" child care services
from this exclusion; therefore, TC found
the exclusion ambiguous and held coverage
applied. CA held that the term
"occasional" is clear and the
undisputed facts were that the childcare
was a regular - not occasional - business.
Exclusion applies; reverse and remand. |
2003-CA-002515.pdf
Judge: BARBER
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND
REMANDING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
FRANK
V. BROWN
REAL PROPERTY - Personal Use Gas Well
Affirmed so much of the lower court
ruling on the ownership of the personal
use gas well, but reversed and remanded
judgment relating interpretation of
handwritten note terminated lease in one
well as well as others ruling this was
unsupported in the record and not
supported by the law. |
2004-CA-000185.pdf
Judge: BUCKINGHAM
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
LANIER
V. COM.
TORTS - Discrimination (Gender)
Affirmed summary judgment dismissing
discrimination claim as the ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff. |
2004-CA-000259.pdf
Judge: MCANULTY
AFFIRMING IN PART, AND VACATING AND
REMANDING IN PART
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
PARKER V. HENRY
PETTER SUPPLY CO.
TORTS - Product Liability (Middleman,
Identification)
Case
No. 02-CI-00149, Marshall Circuit Court
- Hon. Charles W. Boteler, Jr.
Parker
sued multiple defendants alleging they
supplied his employer with asbestos
products that caused him to develop lung
cancer. TC granted summary judgment to
Petter Supply and Hannan Supply without
citing the basis for same, although both
defendants argued that they were
wholesale distributors and not
manufacturers of the products, and
therefore were middlemen pursuant to KRS
411.340. Both also argued that Parker
would be unable to establish causation
linked to any products they sold or
distributed. As to the third defendant,
Mine Equipment & Supply, TC
determined that it was an improperly
joined defendant.
Parker
appealed the TC's dismissal with respect
to all 3 defendants, arguing that the
middleman statute was not applicable to
Petter and Hannan for two reasons: 1)
not all of the manufacturers of the
products were identified or subject to
jurisdiction of the court; and 2) there
was evidence that these defendants knew
or should have known that the product
they distributed was defective or
unreasonably dangerous at the time of
Parker's exposure. Concerning Mine
Equipment, Parker argued that it was the
legal successor to another company that
had supplied asbestos products to his
employer, and therefore was legally
responsible for his injuries.
Held:
TC properly dismissed Mine Equipment
since this company was incorporated
after Parker's employment and had
assumed no liability for the selling
company's debts and prior actions.
Therefore, it was not merely a
continuation of the prior company. As to
Petter Supply and Hannan Supply, the COA
reversed the TC's decision based on its
determination that Parker had presented
enough evidence to create an issue of
fact as to whether these companies knew
or should have known about the dangers
of the product. The COA appears to have
placed great weight on the testimony and
opinions of Parker's expert, Dr. Pohl,
as to the dates when the dangers of
asbestos became commonly known to both
the medical and scientific community as
well as the manufacturing and
distribution community (even though he
could offer no evidence on when either
of these two specific defendants first
knew or should have known).
|
2004-CA-002235.pdf
Judge: HUDDLESTON
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
PHILPOT
ENTERPRISES V. BANKS
WORKERS COMP – OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
CAUSATION
The
employer appealed from a finding by the
ALJ that the employee contracted Blastomycosis,
a fungal infection of the lungs, which
spreads to lesions on the body, at his
work while operating a bulldozer.
The employer presented evidence
that the claimant might have contracted
the disease elsewhere, and evidence that
spores of the disease were not found upon
an investigation on the job site.
However, other evidence countered
the assumption that spores must be found
in the soil in order for the disease to
have come from there, and the Court cited
other substantial evidence of work related
causation in affirming the award.
|
2004-CA-002397.pdf
Judge: MCANULTY
AFFIRMING
Date: 6/3/2005
NOT PUBLISHED |
MEADE
V. MCDOWELL APPALACHIAN
REGIONAL
HOSPITAL
WORKERS COMP – SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Workers
Compensation Board, which affirmed the
finding of the ALJ that the claimant’s
disability was due to a pre-existing
active condition unrelated to her
employment. Without
going into the details, the COA recited
the substantial evidence standard, and
used
Western
Baptist
Hospital
v. Kelly to reiterate that it would not
reverse the Board where the Board had
applied the law correctly and had not
committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice. |