Q.C. appealed to CA after Circuit Court affirmed District Court’s order committing him to Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) because he had violated his probation.  District Court had labelled the hearing a “contempt/probation revocation hearing,” and held the hearing without written notice to Q.C.  

Q.C. first argued to CA that because a juvenile court can only commit a child to DJJ when the child has been guilty of a public offense, a child cannot be committed for probation violation or contempt because the statutory definition of public offense does not include probation violation and specifically excludes contempt.  CA disagreed and held that, because the juvenile court has the authority to impose probation, it also must inherently have the power to revoke the probation.  Further, CA held that adult probation and juvenile probation are sufficiently similar so that the statute allowing district and circuit courts to revoke an adult’s probation also applies to juvenile probation

Q.C. next argued that his state and federal due process rights had been violated as he did not receive a written petition or motion notifying him of the attempt to revoke his probation.  CA agreed, noting that lack of adequate written notice in this instance may have been grounds for reversal, but because Q.C.  had reached the age of majority and was no longer in the DJJ, the appeal should be dismissed as moot.

In 1997, the Rileys (the Appellants herein) were cited for violations of Kentucky’s Recycler Act.  The Graves Circuit Court subsequently issued a permanent injunction barring the Appellants from operating any business without meeting proper legal requirements.  After being held in contempt for violating the order, the vehicles on Appellants’ property were ordered impounded and sold, and a judgment was entered against the Appellants.  The Rileys filed a motion to dismiss claiming the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case since they were not afforded an administrative hearing as required under the Recycler Act.  The motion was overruled and this appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals held that while authorized recycler operators were entitled to hearings under certain circumstances, KRS 177.935(8) permitted the Cabinet to institute proceedings such as this one without an administrative hearing.  In affirming in favor of the Cabinet, the Court of Appeals analogized to a situation where a circuit court could enjoin an unlicensed individual from practicing dentistry without the same administrative hearing that would be afforded to a licensed practitioner.  

CA affirmed TC's denial of Martin's 11.42 motion.  A review of the record indicates that his counsel provided a vigorous defense and negotiated a favorable guilty plea.  

CA affirmed TC's denial of Tungate's 11.42 motion that was filed well beyond the 3-year limitations period for such motions. 

CA affirmed Weathers' convictions for Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Second Degree and Persistent Felony Offender in the First Degree.  The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and there was no prosecutorial misconduct. 

CA affirmed TC's denial of Wilkes' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  A review of the record indicated that his plea was knowing and voluntary. 

Husband challenged TC's award of $300/month permanent maintenance to Wife. CA affirms, holding that TC made its statutorily required threshold findings of fact orally on the record, though they were not repeated as written findings. Also, the amount and duration of maintenance falls within the discretion of the TC; there was no abuse here.

CA affirms TC enforcement of parties' property settlement agreement and award of attorney fees to wife. (Oldham Cir. Ct., Hon. Paul W. Rosenblm, Judge, presiding).

As part of their agreement, the parties agreed to split the "tax liability" on the sale of some stock 50/50; one-half of the actual tax was paid as a "tax pre-payment" from the proceeds of the sale. Husband claimed the entire pre-payment on his tax return; Wife received notice of an underpayment from the IRS with interest and fees exceeding an additional $2,000. Wife made motion to split credit for this pre-payment; TC agreed with her. On appeal, husband argued that the parties' intended to split the total tax "liability" but that he was to receive the entire credit for the first half, which was prepaid from the proceeds. CA holds that, though the agreement does not address it, the TC's finding of the parties' intent to split was supported by sufficient evidence. CA also implied that husband's obstructive tactics justified the award of attorney fees against him.

CA affirms TC grant of sole custody to child's maternal grandparents.

Father had joint custody with Mother. After Mother was arrested for drug possession, the Cabinet for Families and Children (Cabinet) and Father filed petitions alleging child was dependent or neglected. Mother stipulated to neglect, but court left joint custody in place. Maternal grandmother filed a second petition a few months later, alleging Mother had abandoned child in her care. Father moved for custody and Grandparents moved to intervene. Importantly, Father did not object to grandparents' intervention. Grandparents then filed a 3d party petition for sole custody. TC found both Mother and Father unfit to parent this child and awarded custody to grandparents. Father appealed.

CA affirms, holding that grandparents had standing b/c Father did not object and they had physical custody of the child. Father's admitted drug use and sale also supported finding that he was unfit to parent. Finally, a social worker who conducted an investigation that was somewhat favorable to Father, admitted on the stand, after hearing other evidence, that her investigation was incomplete and unreliable.

Case law has repeatedly made clear that the general overriding consideration in a dispute over custody of a minor child is the best interests of said child. See Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Ky. 1993).  Unfortunately, COA must conclude that the trial court erred in failing to make specific and explicit factual findings and conclusions of law as to whether Grandparent was, in fact, the de facto custodian of Briana, as defined by KRS 403.270(1)(a).  Such a determination of de facto custodian status is required before a custody determination can be made under the “best interests” standard.

Court properly assumed jurisdiction as KRS 403.765 very clearly establishes 
the authority for a circuit court to review a DVO upon a petition for certification, and issue orders pertaining to the same subject matter.

Trial Court was correct dismissing the case at the conclusion of the Plaintiff's proof. Expert testimony is required from the Plaintiff even where the heart surgeon incorrectly bypassed the wrong heart vessel (discovered two months after the surgery). The CA reasoned that mis-identification of the LAD artery is a potential reasonable complication of this heart surgery and expert testimony explaining why it is negligence to make the mistake was necessary. 

CA affirmed the TC's dismissal of a legal malpractice claim against attorney in the underlying medical malpractice case because the underlying medical malpractice case was not yet concluded.  This opinion is consistent with case precedent holding that all efforts at recovery should be exhausted before a legal malpractice claim is ripe for filing.