This property dispute arose over the use of a passageway over the other's property claiming an easement by estoppel (among other theories). In rejecting this claim, the trial court determined that the passageway was not a county road, and that the Gosneys did not have a right to traverse the passageway based upon easement by necessity, easement by prescription, or easement by estoppel.

An easement by estoppel concerns prohibiting a party from denying the existence of a right to use property, i.e., a license, based on justifiable reliance that the license will continue. The reliance derives from conduct by the licensor and typically also includes actions by the licensee such as the making of improvements based on that reliance. Cole v. Gilvin, 59 S.W.3d 468, 477-478 (Ky.App. 2001).

At the heart of this case was a bank employee who was fired without cause when the bank changed hands and he sued on nine years later.  The court addressed statutes of limitation and laches.  

The bank defended claiming  terminated employee McGuire’s compliant was barred from enforcement by the doctrine of laches. It claims that it and its successors were unduly prejudiced by McGuire’s “unreasonable” delay of almost nine years in filing this action, despite the fact that the action was filed well within the fifteen-year limitations period contained in Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 413.090.  

While both laches and statutes of limitations may afford defendants repose, laches is not a substitute for a statute of limitations and the rules applicable to statutes of limitations do not necessarily apply to laches.  Laches is principally a question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced – an inequity founded on some change in the conditions or relations of the property or the parties involved. Laches thus is premised on prejudice, not solely delay. 

Statutes of limitation, on the other hand, are premised on delay, not prejudice, but while laches is unlike a statute of limitations, which is based merely on time, laches has been called an equitable time limit on a party’s right
to bring suit.

CA affirmed TC's denial of Anglen's RCr 11.42 motion.  Following a jury trial, Anglen was convicted of Murder and sentenced to 22 years in prison.  He later filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Anglen's mental health history and to develop a mental illness defense.  CA held that Anglen failed to show that his counsel's conduct was objectively unreasonable and that a favorable result was likely to occur in the absence of counsel's conduct.  Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003). 

This appeal arose from a high-profile case in Jefferson County in which Bradford was convicted of First Degree Rape and other offenses and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.  The evidence at trial included testimony from several women who stated that Bradford would detain them while claiming to be a police officer, would take them to a secluded spot, and would rape them.  Also, during its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth introduced videos that police seized from Bradford's vehicle pursuant to a search warrant.  The videos showed his sexual activity with many of the victims.  Bradford testified at trial that he was an amateur adult-film producer and that the women willingly engaged in the sexual activity shown on the videos.  He also denied raping anyone.  As rebuttal proof, the Commonwealth then introduced video recordings portraying Bradford engaging in sexual activity with unindentified women in which the women begged him not to hurt them.  Following his conviction, Bradford waived his right to appeal in exchange for a 20-year sentence.  He later filed an RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct.  CA held that the prosecutorial misconduct allegation (i.e. that the prosecutor brought rape charges against him based on the unidentified "Jane Doe" victims as a ruse to show the jury the videos showing the women being raped) was an error that could have been raised on direct appeal.  Because Bradford waived his direct appeal, he could not raise this error in the context of an 11.42 motion.  In addition, the Court held that his counsel's failure to challenge the validity of the search warrant application was not objectively unreasonable because the warrant contained sufficient information to establish probable cause for the search.  TC's denial of 11.42 motion was affirmed.    

CA affirmed TC's denial of Byars' motions pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 59.05 seeking postconviction relief.  The case has a complicated factual and procedural history in which Byars pleaded guilty to various charges in five (5) separate indictments in exchange for a 23-year sentence.  He later filed an 11.42 motion alleging that his counsel were ineffective for: failing to raise his competency to stand trial as an issue; failing to investigate an extreme emotional disturbance defense; and failing to request a competency hearing.  TC appointed counsel to assist with the 11.42 proceeding and even approved funds for a mental health expert.  After 10 months passed with no action in the case, TC entered an order denying the 11.42 motion.  Byars then filed a CR 59.05 motion alleging that the order denying his 11.42 motion was premature and was entered without notice to counsel.  TC then set aside its earlier denial of the 11.42 motion and gave Byars additional time to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel theory.  After Byars supplemented the record with additional arguments, TC yet again denied his motion.  CA held that TC properly denied the 11.42 motion because the record of his guilty plea showed no indication that competency was an issue.  It further noted that Byars received a 23-year sentence when he faced 70 years in prison if he went to trial on all of the indictments. 

Technical modification of opinion previously released on 2/4/05.  Result unchanged (i.e. conviction affirmed).

CA affirmed TC's denial of Helm's CR 60.02 motion to modify his judgment of conviction for Robbery in the First Degree.  Helm previously pleaded guilty to this offense in exchange for a 13-year sentence.  Pursuant to KRS 439.3401, he was classified as a "violent offender" for purposes of parole eligibility and therefore was not eligible for parole until he served at least 85% of his sentence.  CA rejected his argument that the statute did not apply to First Degree Robbery offenses where the victim did not die or suffer serious injury. 

Appellant sued lawyer for legal negligence from his criminal representation.  Trial Court dismissed per statute of limitations.  Held, the appellant’s damages for the alleged legal malpractice became fixed and  nonspeculative in December 1998 when his direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court was affirmed. See Hibbard v. Taylor, 837 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1992). The fact that appellant filed a habeas corpus action in federal court has no effect on the running of the statute of limitations for a professional malpractice claim against the appellee.

Affirmed trial court's denial of RCR 11.42 motion of defendant. 

Police had tip that appellant was manufacturing methamphetamine.  She gave the police permission to "come in and look around."  This is a consent search.

In the divorce, the trial court erred by placing total reliance on unqualified lay opinion evidence to establish real estate values. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the distribution of the marital estate was made according to law.  COA reversed and remanded for further proceedings on these issues. 

CA affirms TC denial of motion to modify custody.

Four years after entry of decree, Appellee filed motion for contempt for nonpayment of child support. Appellant responded with motion for a more specific visitation schedule. The court found appellant in arrears, but not contempt, and entered a visitation schedule. Two years later appellant filed motion to modify custody because appellee was incarcerated; grandparents moved to intervene as de facto custodians. TC held grandparents were de factos, but left custody as joint.

On appeal, appellant alleged TC error, arguing he had been denied his custodial rights. CA holds that TC ruling essentially maintained the status quo, so appellant's argument is without merit.

The claimant's hand was crushed when he was moving railroad ties by hand, in his job as a crane operator for Koppers Industries.  The ALJ found did not apply the triple multiplier.    However, Goodwin left his job at Koppers for higher paying construction work in Florida, with some breaks in employment.  So, either the 3x multiplier, for being unable to return to work doing the same job as at the time of the injury, would apply, or the 1x, in cases where the worker is earning a higher wage than at the time of the injury, would apply.  In Fawbush v. Gwinn Ky., 103 S.W3d 5 (2003), the Supreme Court gave the ALJ discretion to chose between the two, based on whether the worker was likely to continue in his higher paying work indefinitely.  Here, the ALJ did not apply the 3x multiplier, but used the 2x multiplier at those times when Goodwin was not earning the same or greater wages than at the time of the injury.  He argued on appeal that it should be applied throughout the duration of the award because the employer, in its brief before the ALJ, agreed that the 2x multiplier should be applied to the claim.  However, neither the ALJ, the Board, nor the Court of Appeals considered this a judicial admission that the multiplier should be applied in spite of the clear wording of the statute, and rejected the appellant's argument.