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KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS
September 22 - 26, 2003
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- Kentucky SUPREME COURT Decisions
PUBLISHED - September 22, 2003
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SUMMARIES OF DECISIONS |
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1998-SC-000915-MR.pdf
Size: 2422 kb
Date: 9/22/2003
As Modified 9/22/2003
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HOLLAND
V. COM
CRIMINAL - Jury Instructions
SC reversed Defendant's conviction and 40
year sentence for Attempted Murder and Burglary due to
erroneous instructions. TC's failure to define
the term "voluntary intoxication" entitled Defendant
to a new trial. This omission deprived the jury
of any basis upon which to distinguish between the
statutory concepts of voluntary and involuntary
intoxication. Error might have been compounded
by prosecuting attorney's declaration during his
closing argument.
TC further committed reversible error
by denying Defendant's request (1) to
incorporate Extreme Emotional Distress (EED) as
an element of the Attempted Murder instructions; and
(2) to instruct the jury that it could find
Appellant guilty of Attempted First-Degree
Manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.
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- Kentucky SUPREME COURT Decisions
PUBLISHED - September 23, 2003
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SUMMARIES OF DECISIONS |
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2000-SC-000342-DG.pdf
Size: 1332 kb
Date: 9/23/2003
As modified Sept. 23, 2003
this is a modification and was
previously summarized. the nuances of any modification
have not been noted.
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WILLIAMS
V. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Board
of Claims, Sovereign Immunity, Negligent Supervision
HS student was killed in car accident when he was
a passenger in car driven by another student at a time
when he was supposed to be at school sponsored
extra-curricular activity (decorating gym).
Administrator of estate filed in board of claims for
minor's death and loss of consortium for minor.
SC affirmed the dismissal of the
claims for loss of consortium but reversed the
dismissal of the claim for wrongful death. Because the
Board of Claims dismissed that claim without reaching
the issues of negligence, causation, apportionment, or
damages, SC remanded to the Board for further
proceedings on those issues.
A school teacher can be held liable
for injuries caused by negligent supervision of
his/her students. Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 65
S.W.3d 510, 529 (2001); Wesley v. Page, Ky.,
514 S.W.2d 697, 699 (1974).
SC noted that among other facts,
many of the students brought alcoholic beverages to
the gymnasium in their private vehicles and openly
consumed those beverages while supposedly decorating
the gym. An ALJ could believe that the described
pandemonium at Betsy Layne High School and at the
gymnasium on the morning of April 28, 1989, was the
result of negligent supervision (or no supervision),
and that such was a substantial factor in causing the
death of Anthony Williams.
Each teacher and administrator in
the public schools shall in accordance with the rules,
regulations and bylaws of the board of education made
and adopted pursuant to KRS 160.290 for the conduct of
pupils, hold pupils to strict account for their
conduct on school premises, on the way to and from
school, and on school sponsored trips and activities.
The "special relationship" formed between a school district and its students imposes an affirmative duty on the district, its faculty, and its administrators to take all reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to its students.
Faculty members in charge of this
school-sponsored event conducted during school hours
and on school premises should have foreseen that
students who consumed alcoholic beverages on the
premises, then left the premises in their private
vehicles during the event, with or without permission,
were likely to be involved in an accident causing
injury or death. Thus, the fact that an
alcohol-related accident actually occurred and caused
the death of one of the students was neither
"extraordinary" nor
"unforeseeable."
The Department of Education waived immunity for itself
or any of its agencies or managerial officials and
employees from vicarious liability for negligent
performance of ministerial acts by employees of a
local board of education.
Loss of consortium is not a
recoverable claim under Board of Claims Act. |
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- Kentucky Court of Appeals Decisions
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - September 19, 2003
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SUMMARIES OF DECISIONS |
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2001-CA-002483.pdf
Size: 29 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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ARLINGHAUS
V. COVINGTON URBAN DESIGN & REVIEW BOARD
ZONING
Appellant owns property within an historic
preservation overlay zone in the city of Covington.
Appellant replaced 35 single pane windows due to
rotting and leaking with vinyl clad double-pane insulated
windows. The
windows were smaller than those they replaced.
Appellant was criminally cited for failure to
obtain the proper permit.
After a lengthy process involving an appeal to the
Kenton Circuit Court, the Covington Urban Design and
Review Board (“UDRB”) denied appellant’s
after-the-fact application for a permit.
The Kenton Circuit Court upheld that decision.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Appellant argued that
the UDRB failed to comply with various requirements of the
local zoning ordinance which included requirements to make
certain findings of historic significance and to review
its surveys of historic sites periodically.
The court rejected these arguments
Appellant argued that
the zoning ordinance gave the UDRB jurisdiction only over
those portions of his building which are visible from the
street. The
court rejected that argument as “nonsensical,”
concluding that public view does not mean only visible
from the street. Appellant
also argued that its window repairs were an ordinary
repair which was exempt under state law and the city
zoning ordinance. The
court rejected this argument as well.
A principal lesson the
case teaches is the importance of strict compliance by
local zoning authorities with their own ordinance in
enforcing historic district overlays.
Compliance with the ordinance is sure to be
scrutinized in any dispute with a real property owner. |
2001-CA-002691.pdf
Size: 25 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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SPRADLIN
V. SPRADLIN
DIVORCE, PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
Court of Appeals affirms trial court ruling on
valuation and division of assets related to corporations
that both husband and wife owns. Referenced
in the case is KRS 403.190 and Russell v. Russell, Ky.,
878 S.W.2d 24 (1994),where the Court of Appeals held
that there is not a presumption or requirement that
marital property be equally divided. |
2002-CA-000058.pdf
Size: 18 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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GAINES
V. COM.
FAMILY - CHILD SUPPORT
Incarceration does not justify
modification of child support pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 403.213. |
2002-CA-000696.pdf
Size: 24 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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HOWARD
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed Defendant's conviction for Cultivation
of Marijuana with Intent to Sell. TC properly
denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress alleging Miranda
violations. |
2002-CA-000786.pdf
Size: 32 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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BARKER
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed TC's denial of Defendant's motion to
vacate conviction for Sexual Abuse pursuant to CR 60.02. |
2002-CA-000980.pdf
Size: 44 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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BARNES
V. COMMUNITY TRUST BANK
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
C.A. held that an auto loan
assigned to the bank carries the four year statute of
limitation for breach of contract under Article 2 and
not a fifteen year under the statute. |
2002-CA-001248.pdf
Size: 22 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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TIMBERLINE
CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. PEDLEY
ARBITRATION
The
C.A. decided that four years was too long to wait to
assert an arbitration clause defense to a lawsuit.
C.A. said "waiver" does apply to
arbitration clauses in contracts.
BEWARE REALTORS BEWARE!!! |
2002-CA-001342.pdf
Size: 25 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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HENSLEY
V. FIRST HEALTHCARE CORP.
WORKERS COMP, EXCLUSIVE REMEDY, UP THE LADDER
Vencor subsidiary entitled entitled to 'up the
ladder' defense from suit filed by other Vencor
subsidiary involving injuries when claimant Hensley slipped on the freshly waxed hallway just outside her workplace and suffered a disabling injury. Her employer,
Vencare, Inc., a provider of respiratory therapy services, paid her workers' compensation benefits.
Claimant brought suit seeking negligence damages against First HealthCare Corporation (a/k/a Lexington Centre for Health and Rehabilitation), a Lexington nursing home, which owned and operated the premises where the injury occurred.
At the time of the accident, both Vencare and First HealthCare were wholly owned subsidiaries of Vencor, Inc.
CA affirmed dismissal holding First Healthcare was
Hensley's up-the-ladder employer and thus was immune from Hensley's negligence action under the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers Compensation Act. |
2002-CA-001385.pdf
Size: 27 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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JOHNSON
V. ST. CLAIRE MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, BATTERY
CA affirmed summary judgment dismissing suit by
aggressive and disruptive patient who was continually
trying to kick, punch, bite or hit any staff member that
approached him against hospital for his treatment in
emergency room claiming malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and battery as a result of the treatment he received in the emergency room. |
2002-CA-001504.pdf
Size: 31 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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E.B.
V. COM.
FAMILY LAW, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Court of Appeals affirms trial court ruling that
father's rights to his children are terminated after
there was a finding of abuse and neglect. KRS
625.090 controls termination of parental rights.
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2002-CA-001630.pdf
Size: 35 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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PHIPPS
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed Defendant's conviction following guilty
plea to complicity to commit theft by unlawful
taking of property over $300 and bail jumping in the
first degree. |
2002-CA-001657.pdf
Size: 35 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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CITY
OF MURRAY V. BILLINGTON
WORKERS COMP, UP THE LADDER DEFENSE
CA affirmed Board that the issues raised by City of Murray
pertaining to prior award of attorneys fees were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and the "law of the
case". |
2002-CA-001926.pdf
Size: 28 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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MOORE
V. B & Z DEVELOPMENT, INC.
ZONING
Developer sought to rezone property located in the
City of Ft. Wright.
The application was approved by the Ft. Wright
city council subject to certain conditions, including
submission of a development plan.
The city council required that the development
plan be reviewed, approved and adopted by it.
Developer submitted
its proposed development plan, which included a Wal-Mart
supercenter. Learning
about Wal-Mart, various members of the community,
including appellants, commenced public opposition.
At a public hearing, the city council denied the
development plan. Developer
appealed to Kenton Circuit Court.
During the pendency of the circuit court appeal,
developer submitted a revised development plan,
apparently in consultation with the city council.
The city council and developer entered into a
settlement agreement adopting the revised development
plan.
The appellants filed
a motion to intervene in the circuit court proceeding to
challenge both the settlement agreement and the revised
development plan. Developer
and city council objected on the grounds that the
pending proceeding was moot.
The circuit court agreed and denied appellants’
motion to intervene.
It also adopted, “as its judgment,” the
settlement agreement and dismissed the case with
prejudice. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
It reasoned that the circuit court’s adoption
of the settlement agreement was not res judicata as to
the appellants and that the appellants were still able
to appeal the city council’s approval of the revised
development plan. As
a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that appellants
were not entitled to intervene as a matter of right and
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying appellants’ motion to intervene under the
provisions of CR 24.02, which addresses permissive
intervention.
COMMENT:
Although appellants lost the battle, the court
concluded they were still able to appeal the revised
development plan. However,
it is unclear whether or not the time for taking such an
appeal had run. Did
the appellants file an appeal of the city council action
in adopting the second development plan even while the
appeal of the motion to intervene was pending? |
2002-CA-001985.pdf
Size: 25 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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COLLINS
V. CHANDLER
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
CA affirmed summary judgment dismissing taxpayers'
lawsuit against Commonweath of Kentucky disputing
disposition of proceeds from the "Tobacco
Lawsuit" based upon sovereign immunity. |
2002-CA-001989.pdf
Size: 31 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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SINGER
V. PERKINS
GRANDPARENT VISITATION, VENUE
Main issue is that of grandparent visitation
pursuant to KRS 405.021. Where no Petition
for grandparent visitation is filed and a specific
finding of it being in the child's best interest to have
specific grandparent visitation, then no visitation with
the grandparents can be enforced.
Note: The child's mother was named
Misty Singer. The child's name was Jazz. Thus
we are left to assume that the child's name was
"Jazz Singer". As if the child's
life wasn't already distorted, the child's mother was
strangled by her new boyfriend (not the father of Jazz)
before a hearing in the underlying case could be
completed. Child then lived with Misty's parents at time
of hearing to determine if father should have custody. Custody
was subsequently given to the natural father. In
this Order granting custody of Jazz to father the Court
noted that the grandparents should be allowed to visit
the child. Court of Appeals held that
grandparents were not granted scheduled visitation
because they had not filed a Petition for same. JERI |
2002-CA-002055.pdf
Size: 27 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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POPE
V. ALLSTATE INS. CO.
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS, NOTICE OF
SETTLEMENT
CA affirmed dismissal of underinsured claim because
plaintiff failed to provide Allstate notice of the
settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier and
afford Allstate of the opportunity to protect its
subrogation rights under Coots v. Allstate. No
requirement for UIM carrier to show that it was
prejudiced by failure to be notified.
COMMENTARY:
The "prejudice" issue was disposed of
rather summarily by the CA with more space dedicated to
the adequacy of the Coots/KRS 304.39-320 notice of
settlement. The latter should have been cut and
dry per the statute, but the former issue regarding
prejudice presented an interesting idea that never
played out in the facts of this opinion (and we did not
read the briefs either).
Here is the thought. The notice
to the UIM carrier is designed to allow the UIM carrier
the opportunity to protect its subrogation rights
against the underinsured tortfeasor. What if it
turned out that the underinsured tortfeasor was judgment
proof so that the subrogation rights were effectively
worth nothing? Result - UIM carrier has not
been "really" prejudiced as it relates to
subrogation, but has lost the opportunity to advance the
settlement and keep the underinsured tortfeasor in the
lawsuit. However, we venture down a slipper slope
here since the prejudice is the lost opportunity and not
the value of the lost opportunity. Prejudice is not the
issue. CA reached the right result.
For those followers of appellate
trends, the CA (consisting of Guidugli, Rockingham and
Tacket) sent us another 'aside' on appellate practice
and procedure about the proper inclusions of exhibits
and the technical application of the rules, to wit:
"Prior to addressing the merits of the appeal, we must first address a procedural matter regarding documents Pope attached as exhibits to her brief. Pope attached three letters regarding the settlement between herself and Shelter, the last being an August 24, 2001, letter from Pope's counsel to Ms. Nicole M. Mignone of Allstate regarding the proposed $17,000 settlement. Pursuant to CR 76.12(4)(c)(vii), only materials or documents included in the certified record on appeal may be included in the appendix to a brief. The three documents were not introduced in the circuit court nor were they included in the certified record on appeal, and therefore should not have been included as exhibits to Pope's brief. Accordingly, we shall disregard the letters dated August 17, 2001, August 21, 2001, and August 24, 2001, as well as any citations to the documents in Pope's brief. Croley v. Alsip, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 418 (1980)."
It was just a
few months ago that another CA (consisting of Johnson,
Guidugli, and Knopf) as opposed to this CA (consisting
of Buckingham, Guidugli, and Tacket) laid down the law
and ignored documents putatively attached to briefs
involving Allstate (Powell v. Allstate).
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2002-CA-002263.pdf
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Date: 9/17/2003
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FULTZ
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed Defendant's conviction following
conditional plea of guilty (RCr 8.09) to the offense of
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. TC
properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress alleging
defective search warrant. |
2002-CA-002599.pdf
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Date: 9/17/2003
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ADAMS
STONE CORP. V. CANTRELL
WORKERS COMP
CA affirmed findings that Adams Stone Corporation (Adams) and the Workers' Compensation Funds (WCF) were each responsible for one-half of the total dollar value of an award payable to the estate of Terry Cantrell, Sr. (Cantrell). The ALJ calculated the award to Cantrell's estate by adding the permanent total disability (PTD) benefits awarded for the period preceding Cantrell's death, and the survivor's benefits awarded to Cantrell's widow for the remainder of Cantrell's life expectancy. In making his calculations, the ALJ credited Adams with a dollar-for-dollar credit for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits previously paid to Cantrell. |
2003-CA-000067.pdf
Size: 22 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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YORK
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed TC's order denying pro se
Defendant's motion to relief pursuant to CR 60.02. |
2003-CA-000079.pdf
Size: 29 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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BAKER
V. CITY OF LOUISVILLE
WORKERS COMP
Claimant's attempt to re-open his workers
compensation claim following back surgery was barred by
4 years statute of limitations.
CA also rejected claimant Baker's
equitable estoppel argument relying upon employer's
payment of TTD following second surgery. Here the court
addressed the concept of equitable estoppel and its
application to this case.
One-Minute CLE on Equitable
Estoppel Compliments of Judge Paisley:
"Although Baker does not identify a specific estoppel theory, we construe his argument as relying upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The essential elements of that doctrine are:
(1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.
And, broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
Weiand v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement
Systems, Ky ., 25 S.W.3d 88, 91 (2000)(quoting Electric and Water Plant Board of
City of Frankfort v. Suburban Acres Development, Inc., Ky., 513 S.W.2d 489, 491 (1974)).
Clearly, the facts herein do not satisfy the requirements for equitable estoppel. The city's payment of voluntary TTD benefits, consistent with its obligation under KRS Chapter 342, was not conduct which amounted to a false representation of a material fact. Further, it cannot be said that Baker lacked the means to acquire knowledge regarding the limitations period set out in KRS 342.125(8). Hence, no basis exists for applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel so as to deprive the city of its limitations defense."
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2003-CA-000149.pdf
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Date: 9/17/2003
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BOB
LAYER GENERAL EXCAVATING V. CHILTON
WORKERS COMP
"We think the ALJ's finding that Chilton was extremely emotionally distressed about undergoing surgery was supported by Chilton's testimony and that this finding constitutes substantial basis upon which to base the ALJ's award of TTD benefits during the ten-month period. As such, we reject Bob Layer's claim that the ALJ's award of TTD benefits between the time period of March, 1999, and January, 2000, was not based upon substantial evidence." |
2003-CA-000171.pdf
Size: 19 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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GARDER
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed TC's order denying pro se Defendant's
motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02. |
2003-CA-000784.pdf
Size: 34 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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JOHNSON
V. RONNIE ABLES DRYWALL
WORKERS COMP
CA ruled that previously entered sanctions to be
imposed against employer who had raised without merit
defenses of intoxication and lack of jurisdiction after
the Board had erroneously resurrected findings and
conclusions made by the previously sitting
ALJ. |
2003-CA-000868.pdf
Size: 31 kb
Date: 9/17/2003
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CONSOL
ENERGY, INC. V. HALL
WORKERS COMP
CA held "as a matter of law a factual
determination must be made regarding the timeliness of
notice as to the hearing loss claim" and remanded
that issue for further consideration by the ALJ in a
black lung and hearing loss claim. |
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- Kentucky COURT OF APPEALS Decisions
PUBLISHED - September 12, 2003
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SUMMARIES OF DECISIONS |
2002-CA-000279.pdf
Size: 34 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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PRATER
V. CASTLE
CIVIL PROCEDURE, 'FRATZKE' RULE, CR 8.01
INTERROGATORIES AND DAMAGES
CA held it is within the discretion of the trial
court during the trial to determine whether it will
allow the plaintiff to supplement late answers to CR
8.01(2) damage interrogatories so as to change the
last amount stated.
COMMENTARY:
Prater addressed the easy
part of it's holding but passed the buck to the trial
court to handle the tougher part. Specifically,
the parties in Prater announced ready for trial and
the defense moved for a directed verdict since the CR
8.01 damages interrogatories were not answered.
The trial court reserved its ruling on the issue until
after the jury had been called and sworn. Prior to the
hearing on Castle’s motion, but after the jury had
been sworn, counsel for Prater handed the answers to
interrogatories. The matter was reversed and
remanded to the trial judge to consider plaintiff's
belated motion to amend his answers.
CA allows a "Fratzke end
run" by going with the judge's discretion to
amend discovery responses which if followed by the
Supremes could effectively gut the rule.
Although plaintiff may be bound by his/her last
interrogatory answer on damages, the plaintiff can be
granted leave to amend even after trial has
started. Of course, this explains why
conservative defense counsel never moved in limine
to strike the answers or objected during trial but
rather waited till the case was closed and either
moved for a DV at the end or argued the point during
instructions.
The better practice for plaintiff's
counsel is to state a large amount in their
interrogatory answers solely to comply with the
technical limitations of CR 8.01 and Fratzke while
reserving the right to amend (eg., reduce at trial)
and by making an objection since the answered amount
is provided solely for settlement purposes and is
otherwise inadmissible under KR 408 as an offer to
compromise and is to be used solely in
instructions. The Supremes in Thompson
explained the CR 8.01 arose because of concerns over
the constitutionality of the ad damnum
clause. More importantly, Judge Cooper in Thompson v. Sherwin Williams Co., Inc.
2001-SC-000516-DG.pdf
stated "Finally, the purpose and the only requirement of CR 8.01(2) is that information be furnished as to the "amount claimed" in unliquidated damages, not an itemization of each category of unliquidated damages for which that amount is claimed. Fratzke, supra, at 272-73. The rule is a substitute for the previous procedure of stating the amount claimed in the ad damnum clause of the complaint and serves the same purpose as the former procedure
in addition to the salutary purpose of facilitating
settlements (emphasis added)."
Although the Supreme Court backed
off Fratzke recently ih in its decision Thompson v. Sherwin Williams Co., Inc.
2001-SC-000516-DG.pdf,
the Supremes did not back off the mandatory
requirement that the last CR 8.01 answer rules.
In Thompson, the Plaintiff was allowed his
award of pain and suffering which had not
distinguished between past and future pain and
suffering since the award was less than the last
amount identified in the answers to interrogatories
simply denominated "pain and
suffering." Oddly enough, the CA in Prater
did not even cite Sherwin Williams but rather returned
to the source - "Fratzke" - to conclude that
CR 8.01(2) may be mandatory, but there was an out -
amending the answers.
Of course, if the answers are
amended prior to trial, then the defendant should be
entitled to a continuance to re-evaluate, but no
continuances are allowed after trial begins (or at
least that's a new one on me since everyone did
announce they were ready to proceed, or at least some
more ready than others.) And it would appear
that the applicable standard on review is the ever
elusive "abuse of discretion" a/k/a
"pass the buck" a/k/a "the trial judge
was in a better position than those looking from a
distance." For the inquiring few, both
Fratzke and LaFleur addressed abuse of discretion, but
in the context of granting the directed verdict based
upon the last interrogatory answer. ;^)
Actually, "the test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles."
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (2000).
The bottom line from the above is
that bad facts make bad law. Fratzke is a land
mine for the unwary plaintiff, and the only reason
trial courts apply it is because the Supremes said it
was mandatory. The eventual dismissal based upon
a Fratzke fryer follows a feud of finger pointing
which may fuel a frenzied phone call to a malpractice
carrier. These hearings are going to be a
hoot. Dilatory or overburdened plaintiff's
attorney faces hiding in the bushes defense
counsel. Presumably any judge will state if the
defense was so concerned then how can you now say you
were prejudiced as you slept on your rights and not
file a motion to compel??? Gunfight at OK
Corral.
PS There is also an excellent
summary of Fratzke and Prater in the next issue of the
Kentucky Trial Court Review. MIKE
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1999-CA-001439.pdf
Size: 26 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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ROGERS
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed Defendant's convictions for cultivating
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.
There was sufficient evidence for convictions, testimony
was properly replayed during jury deliberations, and
statements by Defendant were properly admitted. |
2000-CA-000080.pdf
Size: 18 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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BOBO
V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Sex Offender
Registration Act
CA affirmed Circuit Court's
classification of Defendant under Sex Offender
Classification Act.
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2001-CA-000641.pdf
Size: 25 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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COM.
V. LANE
FAMILY LAW, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, CHILD SUPPORT
"This case involves the status of a child support order issued by a court in Florida, and subsequently registered in Kentucky pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) that was adopted by Kentucky in 1998. See KRS 407.5101 et seq. After confirming the Florida order, the Fayette Circuit Court discovered, on the basis of evidence offered by the parties and in consultation with the issuing court in Florida, that the order was based on a mistake of fact. Consequently, the trial court ordered the child support stayed and unenforceable in the state of Kentucky. The Fayette County Attorney appeals, citing KRE 407.5608, and the Full Faith and Credit to Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738B. No brief was filed for the appellee. Because KRS 407.5608 unequivocally states that a child support order, once confirmed, may not be contested, we reverse." |
2001-CA-002159.pdf
Size: 33 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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BRYANT
V. COM.
CRIMINAL - Jury Instructions
CA affirmed Defendant's convictions for
unlawful transaction with a minor in the third degree
and terroristic threatening but reversed his
convictions for unlawful imprisonment in the first
degree and being a persistent felony offender in
the second degree. TC committed reversible
error in refusing instructions on unlawful
imprisonment in the second degree. |
2001-CA-002377.pdf
Size: 32 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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GRZYWACZ
V. GRZYWACZ
FAMILY LAW, CHILD SUPPORT, CHILD CARE,
VISITATION
"James Grzywacz appeals from an order of the Warren Circuit Court awarding child support and work-related child care costs to his former spouse, Deborah Grzywacz, and establishing a visitation schedule based on Deborah's work schedule. Deborah cross-appeals from an order changing the designation of their child custody arrangement. We affirm as to the appeals, vacate as to the cross-appeal, and remand for further findings in accordance with this opinion." |
2002-CA-000553.pdf
Size: 30 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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BIGSBY
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA
affirmed Circuit Court's order r evoking Defendant's
mandatory three year conditional discharge under KRS
§ 532.060. Circuit Court did not abuse its
discretion. |
2002-CA-000984.pdf
Size: 32 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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THACKER
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA affirmed Defendant's convictions for Escape 2
and PFO 1. Defendant was not entitled
to dismissal of the charges pursuant to KRS 500.110
and his convictions were supported by the
evidence. |
2002-CA-001050.pdf
Size: 32 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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LOUDEN
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
Consolidated appeals of co-defendants. CA
affirmed convictions for Robbery 2nd and Complicity.
Defendants not entitled to directed verdicts, TC did
not arbitrarily reject plea offer, and prosecutor's
closing remarks were not improper. |
2002-CA-001410.pdf
Size: 30 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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MOBLEY
V. COM.
CRIMINAL
CA reversed Defendant's conviction for Possession
of Cocaine and Promoting Contraband following
conditional guilty plea. The search of his
person and the car in which he was a passenger was
incident to an unlawful arrest for possession of drug
paraphernalia. |
2002-CA-001610.pdf
Size: 22 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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MCGINNIS
V. ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF COVINGTON
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
CA affirmed dismissal of plaintiff McGinnis'
claims as there there is no evidence that the Diocese concealed or had knowledge of abuse of children by Father Fedders either during McGinnis's minority or between the age of his majority and the time he notified the Diocese of his claims.
The trial court correctly ruled that McGinnis's claim is barred by the statute of limitations |
2002-CA-001706.pdf
Size: 43 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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HAWKINS
V. CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, DEMOTION
CA affirmed police disciplinary decision that
demoted police officer after finding he was guilty of
incompetency, inefficiency, and the accumulation of
minor infractions. |
2002-CA-001714.pdf
Size: 62 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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GRIFFIN
INDUSTRIES V. TURNER ENVIROLOGIC, INC.
JURISDICTION, LONG ARM STATUTE
Kentucky's long-arm statute was examined and
applied for extending personal jurisdiction over
Florida corporation for availing itself and having
minimum contacts with Kentucky.
COMMENTARY: This is an
excellent case which spells out the black letter law
requirements for personal jurisdiction.
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2002-CA-001788.pdf
Size: 30 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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HOUSE
V. CASTANIS
FAMILY LAW, JOINT CUSTODY, MOVING OUT OF STATE
This case addressed parent with joint custody who
remarried and wanted to move out of state. This
is companion case to House v Roberts. This child
(Tessa) wanted to stay with father in Kentucky.
"Ultimately, the circuit court determined that the decisive factors in this case were Tessa's integration into her father's household and, most importantly, her own clearly-expressed wishes. Having reviewed the record, we hold that the circuit court's findings are based on substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous. In regard to the statutory factors for which the circuit court did not make specific written findings, we hold that even if such findings had been required, the evidence in the record suggests that the court's failure to make them would have resulted in harmless error"
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2002-CA-001789.pdf
Size: 22 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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HOUSE
V. ROBERTS
FAMILY LAW, JOINT CUSTODY, MOVING OUT OF STATE
In petition to modify previously awarded joint
custody, CA agreed with TC thta both parties involved appear to be loving, capable parents whom
the child loves. However, mother's choice to move with her new husband to another state does not justify the drastic disruption to
child's life caused by such a move. It is noted that
mother, under the court's order, is given liberal timesharing with
child and that joint custody remains in effect. |
2002-CA-001796.pdf
Size: 48 kb
Date: 9/11/2003
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STEPHENSON
V. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
CIVIL PROCEDURE, AMENDED COMPLAINT
CA addressed CR 15 for the amendment of the
complaint and the relation back of such amendments in
a cause of action based upon a substantive federal
right (FELA - Federal Employees Labor Act) and
reversed and remanded since trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the amendment.
COMMENTARY: This
decision addressed cumulative trauma vs. a traumatic
episode and whether the defendant CSX would have had
sufficient notice of claim for hearing loss arising
from a single inicident or continuing exposur | | | |