-
MCD in MS Word Tables Format
A few emails back I was trying to find out where the did the
Jefferson County MCD in PDF vanish to on the Jefferson Courts
Web Site. Well, attorney Christopher Harrell (www.Harrell-Law.com)
came through with a form - one that was better than the PDF
since it was in MS Word and in tables for ease of editing.
No more need for a typewriter and the rapidly degenerating
copies from Family Court. Thanks Chris. Oh
yeah. Do you think I'm gonna share????? You betcha.
-
KBA Proposed Advertising Regulations
- All comments should be sent to the KBA no later than
September 1, 2003 - the Attorneys' Advertising Commission, c/o
Bruce K. Davis, KBA Executive Director, 514 West Main Street,
Frankfort, KY 40601-1883.
- Proposed
Rule Changes - In PDF <<<--- Here's a
link to the proposed changes.
- KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS
FOR August 4-9,
2003
Adobe Reader Required (www.Adobe.com)
- Kentucky SUPREME COURT Decisions
PUBLISHED -
None
- Kentucky SUPREME COURT Decisions
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - None
Kentucky COURT OF APPEALS Decisions
PUBLISHED - August 8 , 2003
| Links
to AOC Opinions |
Summaries
of Decisions
|
1997-CA-000188.pdf
Size: 164 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Rockwell
International Corp. v. Willhite
Punitive Damages, Argument, Negligence Trespass, S/L
This is the remand from the Supreme Court
involving the toxic tort case against Rockwell in
Logan County involving PCB dischage, disallowed expert
testimony, and $210 million in punitive damages plus
$7+ million in compensatories for the landowners.
CA again reversed the judgment in
favor of the landowners
1. Statute of Limitations.
The landowners did not discover (and therefore did not
have notice of) the pcb contamination until 1988 (per
finding of judge which was unchallenged) and filed
suit within 5 years in 1993. However, the
inquiry does not end here since a determination of the
trespass as permanent or temporary will define the
extent of the landowners' injuries.
"In the absence of binding contrary authority and
consistent with the foregoing, we extend the
application of the federal “discovery rule” to
property damage actions in Kentucky with the necessary
implication being that the landowners, if they have a
viable cause of action, are entitled to recover
damages for injuries incurred outside of the five-year
limitation period preceding the filing of their
complaint." In addition, any wrongdoing
occurring outside the limitations period shall be
admissible in considering punitives.
2. Negligent Trespass.
"Although the landowners have established that
Rockwell negligently trespassed on their properties
when it allowed PCBs originating at its Russellville
plant to flow into a stream and thus be deposited as a
result of flooding on their properties, and although
PCBs are a known carcinogen, the landowners have
nevertheless failed to establish that their properties
have suffered any injury as a consequence of the
trespass. No persons who have come upon the land have
been harmed, no farm animals or pets have been
sickened, nor have any crops been lost. The land and
the buildings thereon continue to be used as they were
before the presence of PCBs was discovered. Thus, the
landowners cannot recover damages under a negligent
trespass theory."
3. Permanent Nuisance.
"In Kentucky, nuisance is primarily concerned
with some use of property by a defendant which causes
sufficient annoyance to an adjacent property possessor
that interferes with the use of the adjacent land to
such a degree that its value is materially reduced.
Borrowing from our analysis of negligent trespass, in
a nuisance case the annoyance and interference with
the use of property are the injury, and the reduced
market value is the measure of damages. In this case,
there is no rational basis for a finding that the
discharge of minute quantities of PCBs onto the
landowners’ properties resulted in any interference
with their use and enjoyment of the properties. While
it is true that the presence of PCBs on land may cause
a reasonable person to stop using that land because of
health risks PCBs pose, it is only the case when a
significantly higher concentration of PCBs is present.
At the concentrations present on the lands in
question, a person of ordinary health and
sensitivities would experience no interference with
his or her use of the property."
4. Punitive Damages -
Passion and Prejudice. The CA looked at
the damages and held "Rockwell would be entitled
to have the punitive damages award set aside on this
basis even if our resolution of the issues previously
addressed did not independently necessitate
reversal. "[I]t is well established that a
jury verdict on a disputed question of fact “may be
reviewed and upset where, as in the present case, the
amount at first sight appears excessive and to have
been rendered as a result of passion or prejudice.”Commonwealth,
Dept. of Highways v. Riley, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 885,
887 (1967) and Simpson County Steeplechase Ass’n,
Inc. v. Roberts, Ky. App., 898 S.W.2d 523, 528
(1995) (applying standard to punitive
damages). A verdict will be set aside
"“where the amount seems disproportionate to
the actual damages suffered and it appears the jury
may probably have been actuated by sympathy or by
bias, prejudice or like unjudicial and improper
motive.”" Field Packing Co. v. Denham, Ky., 342
S.W.2d 524, 527 (1961).
Comment: This is
a long and complex decision, and this summary is brief
and does not do justice to the opinion but rather is
designed to whet the appetite of those who are
curious. Therefore, no real comments on the analysis,
other than a lot of landowners had a very large
verdict set aside against a known PCB polluter based
upon the difficulty of discovery, the characterization
of the tort, and damages/arguments.
|
Kentucky COURT OF APPEALS Decisions
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - August 8, 2003
2000-CA-000995.pdf
Size: 19 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
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Norwest
Bank Minn. NA v. Hurley
Discovery, Sanctions
This case involved a remand from the Sup. Court which
previously had considered the appeal timely filed and now the
CA was to consider the case on the merits.
CA affirmed dismissal for failure to comply
with discovery. "Among the factors to be
considered in reviewing the imposition of sanctions for an
abuse of discretion are: (1) whether the adversary was
prejudiced by the dismissed party’s failure to cooperate in
discovery, (2) whether the dismissed party was warned that
failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal, and (3) whether
less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before
dismissal was ordered. Greathouse v. American Nat’l Bank
and Trust, Ky. App., 796 S.W.2d 868 (1990).
CA also affirmed noting that the failure of
the TC to make findings of fact was not brought to the
attention of the TC by written request or motion per CR 52.04.
Comment: This case addressed a
typical dilemma for counsel who lose a motion - to ask or not
ask for findings of fact. Here, the CA made it clear -
snooze you lose. If there are no findings of fact, then
there is no error. Prior to this analysis, I would have
gone with the inclination that without any factual findings I
might be in a better position to address all the facts on
appeal. However, this case puts a twist on that analysis
by saying if you don't bring it to the court's attention, then
you got no gripe. Ouch. Mike S.
|
2000-CA-002528.pdf
Size: 52 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
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Uninsured
Employers Fund v. Reliance National Indemnity Co.
Workers Compensation - Insurance - Up-Th
e-Ladder Liability
This case involves multiple coal
mining companies who were defrauded into believing they
had purchased workers' compensation coverage and the
"aftermath of this debacle."
In 1995, James Taylor obtained
a policy of workers' compensation insurance from Reliance
for Worldwide
Personnel Services, which he represented to be a
Mississippi employee leasing operation. Omicron
Holdings Corporation, also owned and operated by Taylor,
acquired a majority of Worldwide's stock and was added to
the Reliance policy. Omicron then formed Competitive
Edge personnel Services (CEPS), for the purpose of
entering into co-employment agreements with its clients,
whic h Reliance advised
would not be permissible under its policy.
Similarly, when advised that CEPS was interested in
marketing itself to several coal mines, reliance advised
that it did not write insurance policies for coal mines.
in 1996, Larry Lineman, an insurance agent, began
contacting coal mines on behalf of CEPS proposing that
they enter into co-employment agreements to obtain lower
workers' compensation rates. The mines were to fire
their employees who would then be rehired by CEPS and
leased back to them. The
mines would pay a specified sum to CEPS and CEPS would
provide them with workers' compensation coverage.
Several coal mining companies entered into such
arrangements and in all cases retained control over their
day-to-day operations, complete control over the employees
and continued to maintain the employees on their payroll.
Before long, Reliance learned that coverage notices and
first reports of injury were
being filed involving claims against coal mines in which
Reliance was listed as the insurance carrier and began
termination of Omicron's coverage. Taylor then
contacted another insurance agent, Mike Whitis, and
obtained a policy for CEPS from Farmers Insurance Exchange
based on representations that CEPS was a Texas risk
management/human resources consulting firm with 13 offices
and sales employees
and that it was
not engaged in the business of employee leasing.
Taylor then paid Whitis $6,000 to prepare certificates of
insurance that named the coal mines CEPS had contracted
with as certificate holders. Before long, Farmers
became aware of CEPS' deception and began termination of
its policy. Ultimately, Farmers' policy was voided
ab initio, Taylor was indicted and convicted on
multiple federal charges, and CEPS entered into settlement
agreements with the coal mines to refund their insurance
premiums for workers' compensation coverage that was never
provided.
ALJ Cowden ultimately held that none of the
employees at issue ever became employees of CEPS and
remained employees of the coal mines at all times relevant
, that the coal mines were uninsured,
that the Uninsured Employer's Fund was liable for
payment of benefits to the affected employees, and that
two other companies who contracted with some of the coal
mines were also liable for payment of benefits as
"up-the-ladder" employers and was affirmed by
the Board and Court of Appeals.
|
2001-CA-001615.pdf
Size: 22 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
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Bailey
v. Traditional Bank, Inc.
Real Estate, Foreclosure
CA reversed summary judgment "having concluded that
there is a genuine issue as to a material fact concerning
the indivisibility of the property" and remanded for
further proceedings. CA noted "there was clearly
no agreement of the parties concerning this issue (of
indivisibility), the single affidavit in support of summary
judgment made no averment of indivisibility, and there was
no Commissioner’s report." |
2002-CA-000042.pdf
Size: 59 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
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Haydon
v. Haydon
Divorce, KRS 61.690(2) Gov't Retirement
At issue is the division of husband and wife's
retirement and deferred compensation accounts maintained by
both parties. Court of Appeals holds that KRS
61.690(2) is constitutional (reversing the trial court) and
that state government sponsored retirement benefits are
classified as marital property, but only to the extent those
retirement benefits exceed the statutory set-off. Counsel
is also cautioned against not citing to the record as
provided for in the civil rules.
Comment: Note again the CA's remarks about the appeal
procedures. MLS |
2002-CA-000204.pdf
Size: 28 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
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Stricker
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendant's
sentence. Case involving concurrent federal sentence
remanded to Circuit Court for accurate determination of
sentence. |
2002-CA-000300.pdf
Size: 21 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
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Booker
v. Galen of Kentucky, Inc.
Medical Negligence, Hypodermic Stick
It was
undisputed that a visitor got stuck with a hypodermic needle
discarded by a nurse at Norton's Southwest Hospital.
Needle was never found, and after multiple follow-ups and
testing, plaintiff was never found positive for HIV.
TC granted partial summary judgment
dismissing claims based upon increased risk and fear
of and contracting infectious disease. Jury
awarded plaintiff $1150 for needle stick and pain and
suffering.
CA
disagreed with appellant’s sole contention on appeal that
the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for
appellee as to appellant’s claim for damages relating to
an increased risk of, and her fear of, contracting a disease
in the future. CA then focused its analysis on
whether or not the conduct caused a loss or injury that
caused damage looking at a series of cases - Deutsch
v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141 (1980)(plaintiff awarded
damages for abortion when doctor failed to administer
pregnancy test prior to x-rays concluding the x-rays was
sufficient contact); Capital Holding Corporation v.
Bailey, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 187 (1994)(since asbestos
exposure had not yet caused an injury which resulted in loss
or damage, no cause of action had accrued even though his
exposure to the asbestos increased the likelihood that he
would develop an asbestos related disease in the future); Alagia,
Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, Ky., 882 S.W.2d
121, 126 (1994)(in negligence situations, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run unless and until the
plaintiff suffers the manifestation of a disease or some
other injury which produces loss or damage); Wood v.
Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 849
(2002)(affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, based on the plaintiff’s failure to present any
proof that she had suffered a present injury as a result of
her ingestion of the drug combination commonly known as fen-phen).
"Despite appellant’s
citation to contrary case law from other jurisdictions, in
these circumstances Kentucky case law and SCR 1.030(8)(a)
clearly compel us to find that no cause of action has
accrued for damages relating to appellant’s increased risk
or fear of contracting an infectious disease."
Appellant was already compensated for the needle puncture.
Comment: In the
last few weeks, our CA's have had the opportunity to
look at the outer edges of medical negligence cases (two
different panels, both unanimous).
Here the court looked at the 'increased risk'
situation. In Heavrin v. Jones, 2002-CA-000016.pdf,
a CA looked at the 'lost chance' from failure to
diagnose. Both cases show you that there is more to
this than a simple proximate cause analysis. However, our
appellate courts continue to plow rows from the past and
ignore Justice Liebson's admonition years ago about the
moving stream of the law (paraphrased) when contributory
negligence was abandoned for comparative negligence. The
Booker case is more akin to typical proximate cause middle
of the road negligence.
Initially, I thought this CA
missed the boat (and still do) in their analysis of the
'injury' cases, but I believe they reached the right result
here with the wrong reasoning. Here the plaintiff was stuck
by a needle not properly disposed of by a hospital nurse,
and the plaintiff was worried for a while that she might
have aids or some other infectious disease. As time
passed, her fears were for naught. The plaintiff did
suffer pain and suffering in the form of an unknown
harm/risk in case the needle was dirty. She was
compensated for needle stick and presumably any pain and
suffering from that contact. Although this CA was fixating
on decisions from "our supreme court", they did
not consider a host of CA decisions out there which seem a
little more illuminating on this point, to wit: Wilhoite v.
Cobb, 761 S.W.2d 625 (Ky.App.,1988)(although this CA
declined to allow damages for mother who witnessed child's
death without any physical contact herself, the 'negative
pregnant' to this analysis is that if there is physical
contact then there are damages; the CA then referred
to Deutsch v. Shein by stating "The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that in negligence cases there can be no recovery for fright, shock, or mental anguish which is unaccompanied by physical contact or injury.")
In this case on appeal, Ms. Booker did have physical contact
with a needle and she was entitled to be compensated for any
fright, shock or mental anguish accompanied that contact
from a dirty needle and the potential infections which could
arise and not even be discovered for months).
The harm and damages were the
fears, etc. associated with the dirty needle - her pain and
suffering. I contend she had the contact and the
injury. Just like the 'lost chance' analysis I made 3
weeks ago in Heavrin v. Jones, the damages need to
focus on the objective reasonableness of the harm envisioned
by the plaintiff which is not married to a more likely than
not analysis. Neither Ms. Booker nor the hospital knew
where that needle had been, but it was contaminated which is
why there are protocols for disposing of the needle as a
biohazard. Some diseases take a very long time to do
their damage, and AIDS is notorious for the time-delay.
Shouldn't she be compensated for that pain? Of course.
Now why do I say the result
was correct? Because the TC awarded the plaintiff
something for the stick, and I presume the medicals
available included past and future pain and suffering.
The appeal was then overtaken by events (OBE). To hold otherwise, would be to
allow the plaintiff two causes of actions for the same
injury/contact and then two sources of damages.
Wrong! A needle stick is a needle stick, and the
plaintiff is entitled to damages therefor regardless of the
characterization of "increased risk" or simple ole
pain and suffering for an epidermal puncture of her bodily
integrity.
The cases the CA relied upon
at first blush appear to be intuitively sound, but under
closer scrutiny, they miss the point. Deutsch v. Shein
is the seminal case on contact and damages such that x-rays
equal contact. Then the asbestos exposure shows the CA
at its worst since without injury there was no proof of
contact via the exposure. The reason the asbestos case
went the way it did was that without proof of the contact
with those little asbestos fibers, the court would have
allowed the plaintiff to reverse engineer the injury but
there was no injury (chicken and the egg analysis), but
nonetheless no proof of contact OR injury. Now, the CA
stretches the bounds of reason by relying on Alagia and the
accrual of a cause of action for legal malpractice
(huh?). Then the CA returns to the land of the living
and looks at the Phen-Fen case in which there was ingestion
without injury. However, the Phen-Fen was a products
liability (not negligence) case where the appellate court
equated the two and required contact. But, a needle
stick and a questionable drug provide entirely different
'contacts' and are not the same since the needle stick does
have an objective injury when the skin is pierced by a
bio-hazard object.
Whew. I never thought
this would end. Mike S. |
2002-CA-000493.pdf
Size: 35 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
SL
Hotel Development LLC v. Golden Ranch Development LLC
Contracts,
Summary Judgments upheld and one remanded with an order
to enter a judgment. Basic theory was that they were
entitled to breach the contract because the other party had
not obtained the rights to property that they were selling.
C.A. correctly points out that the contract didn't specify
that the other party had to first obtain the rights.
In other words basic contract law was upheld. |
2002-CA-000530.pdf
Size: 37 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Grammer
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Defendant's conviction and 7 year sentence
for 1st Degree Criminal Abuse. Trial Court did not
abuse discretion in allowing rebuttal evidence after defense
opened the door. Defendant was not entitled to
directed verdict nor lesser included instruction. |
2002-CA-000613.pdf
Size: 37 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Ragozine
v. Com.
Criminal
Co-Defendant of Grammer, 2002-CA-000530.
Conviction for 1st Degree Criminal Abuse
affirmed. Defendant not entitled to directed verdict
nor lesser included instruction. Evidence properly
admitted for rebuttal purposes. Defense photographs
properly ruled inadmissible due to failure to disclose
pursuant to discovery order.
|
2002-CA-000879.pdf
Size: 35 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Stepp
v. Halsey
Wills and Estates,
CA affirmed dismissal of action to invalidate will
claiming appellees exerted undue influence upon decedent
when she executed a will effectively disinheriting Daily and
leaving her individual property to her siblings. CA held
"because appellant was not entitled to amend her
complaint to state new causes of action on remand, and
because if her challenge to the will were successful the
estate would not receive any additional distribution above
what has already been distributed to Daily and/or the estate
pursuant to Daily’s prior renunciation of the will, we
affirm." |
2002-CA-000983.pdf
Size: 18 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Brooks
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Circuit Court's denial of pro se
Defendant's CR 60.02 motion to vacate. |
2002-CA-001011.pdf
Size: 27 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Woolsey
v. Com.
Criminal
- Search & Seizure
CA reversed conviction for conspiracy
to manufacture methamphetamine following TC's denial of
motion to suppress.
Here, the Defendant purchased a small
quantity of lithium batteries at the local Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart
security suspected purchase was to facilitate
manufacture of methamphetamine. Security's
suspicions were heightened after Defendant made the single
purchase, held the bag close to his palm, returned to his
vehicle by an indirect route, and turned south in his
vehicle toward additional shopping areas after leaving
Wal-Mart. Police were alerted and subsequently made
traffic stop based upon Wal-Mart security tip.
CA appropriately found police officer
lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to make
traffic stop based upon Wal-Mart personnel's
observations. Trial Court erred by denying
Defendant's motion to suppress.
|
2002-CA-001052.pdf
Size: 23 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Imboden
v. Phelps
Negligence/Libel/Defamation, Statute of Limitations,
Testimonial Immunity
This case shows how family law is escaping the confines
of family court. Ms. Phelps a psychologist prepared a
report containing her expert opinion that the husband had
sexually abused the children, and this report was used in a
child custody action. Upon completion of the family
law matter, the husband/Mr. Imboden sued Phillips and her
employer (Trover Clinic) for negligence, defamation and
slander.
The defense was based on absolute immunity
for libel and slander and the 1-year statute of limitations
for the negligence claim. The CA stated that the
statute of limitations claim was not preserved on appeal,
then added (presumably in dicta) that the affidavit of abuse
had been filed in May and the suit filed in December of the
following year - too late. With regard to immunity,
the CA relied on Reed v. Isaacs, Ky. App., 62 S.W.3d
398 (2000) , stating there
is no dispute that testimony given in the course of a
judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged against claims
for libel and slander.
Comment: Interestingly
enough, the immunity defense started out relying upon the
psychologist's duty to report sexual abuse which the TC
determined was a fact question when summary judgment was
denied. However, the defendants were not to be
deterred, raising S/L and the absolute testimonial immunity
for libel and slander. But, with the wonders of
hindsight and an incomplete record let's look at some
potential teaching points from the statute of limitations
arena. Briefly, the CA concluded the report on abuse
was made in May but the suit against the psychologist
was not filed until Dec of the following year (or over 19
months later). Then the CA added that the statute of
limitations had expired on the negligence claim.
But, the question I have is did the CA
have more info available to them than was reported to us, to
wit: does simply making the report equate to an accrual of
the cause of action or was there proof that the plaintiff
knew of the substance of the allegations (even with the
privileged nature).
It seems the CAs have been intent on
laying blame on counsel for not preserving the appeal in the
record, but the converse can be true as well - the CAs need
to lay a complete factual predicate upon which their rulings
are premised without requiring the reader to connect the
dots. Mike S.
|
2002-CA-001089.pdf
Size: 43 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Dehaven
v. Dehaven
Divorce, Property Distribution, Post-Divorce Agreements
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial court's findings
that husband and wife had agreement as to how marital farm
is to be divided when husband took issue with survey and
wife proposed to switch piece of land each was to retain
post divorce . This inquiry/offer (deemed
"inquiry" by wife and "offer" by finding
of the court) was not disturbed by Court of Appeals because
Court held that post decree agreements are encouraged and
the factual finding of the trial court (i.e. that there was
an offer and acceptance) would not be disturbed by Court of
Appeals.
|
2002-CA-001213.pdf
Size: 30 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Whitaker
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Circuit Court's denial of pro se
Defendant's motion to vacate alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel. |
2002-CA-001254.pdf
Size: 33 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Wise
v. Alpha Leasing Co., Inc.
Lease, Fiduciary Duties
C.A. upholds lower court's Summary Judgments based upon
agency law and unjust enrichment claims, all of which were
questionable given the facts. Interestingly for the
second week in a row the C.A. interprets the underlying
meaning of a vague Complaint. |
2002-CA-001297.pdf
Size: 24 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Davis
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Circuit Court's denial of pro se Defendant's
CR 60.02 and 60.03 motion to vacate based upon prosecutorial
misconduct. |
2002-CA-001570.pdf
Size: 24 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Morris
v. Kentucky Retirement Systems
Government Employment
Preexisting condition,(two prior auto accidents), not on
the job, and no workers comp claim made makes for the
ingredients of a denial of disability cake for an EKU
professor. |
2002-CA-001592.pdf
Size: 50 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Billiter
v. Miller
Real Property, Deeds
CA did not disturb trial judge's findings of fact and
affirmed holding CA bound by the finding that party had
notice of unrecorded deed. |
2002-CA-001723.pdf
Size: 34 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Newcomb
v. Cox
Real Estate
CA affirmed TC that post-judgment motion to modify,
alter or vacate a judgment confirming a Master Commissioner’s
sale of real property was not timely filed. |
2002-CA-001978.pdf
Size: 27 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Sparks
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Defendant's conviction for Failure to Make
Required Disposition of Property following bench trial.
"Defendant received a fair trial, tainted neither
by the improper loss of exculpatory evidence nor by the
improper admission of evidence, and the Commonwealth
introduced sufficient evidence of her guilt to justify her
conviction." |
2002-CA-002291.pdf
Size: 19 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Hall
v. Tate
Family Law, Custody
Parents divorce, custody of child is given to mom, child
goes to live with aunt and uncle, and child lives with aunt
and uncle for over a year with child doing well. Aunt
and uncle give child a good home and then aunt and uncle
file a juvenile petition seeking an emergency custody order.
The commissioner held a hearing on the petition and
before the time ran for exceptions to be filed, the Court
affirmed the commissioner's findings. Mother appealed
and Court of Appeals affirmed holding that maybe procedure
was not followed completely, but there were no erroneous
findings by Court. |
2003-CA-000191.pdf
Size: 22 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Jones
v. Ferguson
Inmate Discipline
CA affirmed Circuit Court's dismissal of pro se
inmate's Petition of Declaration of Rights. Inmate not
denied due process. There was sufficient evidence to
support disciplinary action. |
2003-CA-000370.pdf
Size: 74 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Hamilton
v. Kentucky-W.Va. Gas Co.
Workers Compensation - Reopening
Hamilton injured his back in 1991, received
an award of social security disability benefits, and then
received an Opinion and Award of PPD benefits for a 60%
occupational disability which was entered in 1994.
He never returned to work after entry of the 1994
award. Hamilton moved to reopen his claim in
August, 1 998 alleging increased occupational disability
and a surgical recommendation. The claim was
assigned for the taking of proof and was then placed
in abeyance for an extended period of time on Hamilton's
motion. Hamilton testified about having more
frequent and more intense symptoms and lessened ability to
engage in physical activities. The medical opinion proof
conflicted as to whether there had been a worsening
of condition which had resulted in increased occupational
disability after 1994. ALJ D. Smith found that
Hamilton's testimony of the severity of his pain and
limitations on his activities appeared basically the same
as his complaints prior to the 1994 award, was persuaded
by Dr.Goodman's opinion that there had been no worsening
of condition, and denied any change in Hamilton's award of
disability benefits but found the proposed s
urgical procedure to be compensable and was
affirmed by the Board and Court of Appeals. On
appeal to the Board, Hamilton also sought remand of the
claim for purposes of entry of an award of TTD benefits un
til such time as the contemplated surgery was performed
and maximum medical improvement was attained. Having
f ailed to seek such an award of interlocutory benefits
from the ALJ or otherwise preserving the issue before the
ALJ, the Board held it could not order such a remedy
on appeal and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
|
2003-CA-000443.pdf
Size: 37 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
|
Wal
Mart Stores v. French
Workers Compensation - AMA Guides
French was struck in the head in 1999.
Dr. Anthony was the only physician to assign an AMA rating
but cited an incorrect section of the Guides as the
basis for his rating. ALJ Cowden accepted Dr.
Anthony's opinion and based an award of PPD benefits
on his rating and was affirmed by the Board. The
Court of Appeals also affirmed. An inaccurate
citation to the AMA Guides does not render a physician's
rating o pinion incompetent. It is a question of
credibility and weight of the evidence. An ALJ
could use such an inaccuracy to discount the
physician's credibility and choose not to accept the
rating but is not required to do so. A ch allenge to
the ALJ's finding that French's stroke was causally
related to the work injury was rejected on the grounds
that the decision was supported by substantial evidence of
record.
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2003-CA-000472.pdf
Size: 18 kb
Date: 8/6/2003
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Merrick
Printing Co. v. Vertress
Workers Compensation - Subrogation -
Reopening
Vertrees injured his back in 1998,
underwent surgery, and then settled his claim in February,
2000. He filed a malpractice action against the
surgeon in November, 2000 and settled that action on July
5, 2002. The employer's motion to intervene in the
civil action to assert its subrogation rights filed on
July 8, 2002 was denied as not having been timely filed
pursuant to KRS 411.188(2). The employer sought
reopening of the workers' compensation claim based on the
"newly discovered evidence" provision of KRS
342.125 to obtain relief against Vertrees obtaining a
"double recovery" prohibited by KRS 342.700(1).
Reopening was denied by ALJ Lowther who was affirmed by
the Board and Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
explanation for its ruling was:
"At the time the settlement was approved, the civil
action was pending which could have resulted in either
settlement or trial. Under the circumstances, the
settlement cannot be considered newly discovered
evidence."
Comment: If the civil action
was filed in November, 2000, how could it have been
"p ending " at
t he time of the February, 2000 settlement
approval? TGH
Moral: If an employer wishes to
assert its subrogation rights, it should do so at
the earliest date possible to avoid this type of
situation. TGH
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Cases In Context - a/k/a
"The One-Minute CLE"
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Argument, Improper
- Argument, General Rule
- Commonwealth, Department of Highways v.
Reppert, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 575, 576 (1967).
Great latitude is allowed in closing arguments. Each advocate is free to draw reasonable conclusions from the facts before the
court, but may not present arguments to the jury in closing statements unsupported by the record.
- Horton v. Herndon, 254 Ky. 86, 70 S.W.2d 975, 977 (1934)
"[W]here an attorney makes a prejudicial statement of fact unsupported by the evidence, and the improper argument is brought to the Court's attention, the Court should promptly reprimand him and instruct the jury to disregard the statement and, if it be so prejudicial that it may improperly influence the jury, should set aside the verdict obtained by such attorney, and the failure of opposing counsel to ask that the jury be discharged is not a waiver of proper action by the Court."
- Horton v. Herndon, 254 Ky. 86, 70 S.W.2d 975, 977 (1934).
"The rule is that where an attorney makes a prejudicial statement of fact unsupported by the evidence, and the improper argument is brought to the court's attention, the court should promptly reprimand him and instruct the jury to disregard the statement and, if it be so prejudicial that it may improperly influence the jury, should set aside the verdict obtained by such attorney."
- Reasonable Inferences from Evidence Permitted
- Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McGuire's Adm'r., 38 S.W.2d 913 (Ky.App. 1931)
Arguing that there was trumped up evidence, faked
pictures, and changed testimony probably went further than counsel should have gone, but he was entitled to draw his inferences from the evidence before the jury. As long as statements are based on the evidence, or the inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, counsel has the right to express to the jury his analysis of what he thinks the evidence shows.
- Prejudiced
- Horton v. Herndon, 254 Ky. 86, 70 S.W.2d 975
(1934)
"While we cannot say with certainty that the improper argument affected the result, we cannot say it did not. A party aggrieved by egregious argument should not be required to demonstrate prejudice, ordinarily an impossible task, for to do so would in most cases render reviewing courts powerless to correct the error."
- Risen v. Pierce, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 945 (1991)
"While we cannot say with certainty that the improper argument affected the result, we cannot say it did not. A party aggrieved by egregious argument should not be required to demonstrate prejudice, ordinarily an impossible task, for to do so would in most cases render reviewing courts powerless to correct the error. Moreover, we take this opportunity to state that such conduct will not be tolerated. Our decision in
Horton v. Herndon, 254 Ky. 86, 70 S.W.2d 975, 977 (1934), fairly states the law of Kentucky and we reaffirm our reliance thereon:
"With the view of securing fairness in jury trials, we have adopted a rigid rule to prevent counsel from going outside the record in their arguments to the jury. The rule is that where an attorney makes a prejudicial statement of fact unsupported by the evidence, and the improper argument is brought to the Court's attention, the Court should promptly reprimand him and instruct the jury to disregard the statement and, if it be so prejudicial that it may improperly influence the jury, should set aside the verdict obtained by such attorney, and the failure of opposing counsel to ask that the jury be discharged is not a waiver of proper action by the Court." (Emphasis added.)
For informational purposes, some of the argument is provided as
counsel were referencing photographs taken by the plaintiff just
prior to trial and outside the disclosure rule and therefore
excluded by the judge.
MR. SPRAGENS: If the Court please, that is entirely an improper argument. THE COURT: Objection sustained.
MR. SPRAGENS: Ask that the jury be admonished.
THE COURT: Well, we didn't get enough into it. Go ahead.
MR. GERALDS: Adage we learn early in the practice of law, when it hurts, object.
MR. SPRAGENS: Your Honor, that is an improper statement.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SPRAGENS: Ask that the jury be admonished.
MR. GERALDS: I told you.
THE COURT: Don't consider the remark, ladies and gentlemen.
MR. SPRAGENS: He said, 'I told you,' which is a further improper statement. Ask that the jury be admonished again about the continual offhand comments to the jury.
THE COURT: Just stick to the testimony.
MR. GERALDS: Yes, sir."
- Preserving by Objection
- Birkhead v. Home Ins. Co., 82 S.W.2d 310 (Ky.App. 1935)
Misconduct on the part of any attorney in making an improper argument to the jury cannot be considered unless the alleged improper argument is objected
to.
- Chappell v. Doepel, 192 S.W.2d 809 (Ky.,1946)
Reversed judgment where case was close and court sustained defendant's objections first to incompetent questions and then to argument, and plaintiff's counsel nevertheless continued the same line of
argument.
- Admonition
- Knuckles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 261 S.W.2d 667, 671 (1953)
Admonition to the jury to disregard an improper argument cures the error unless it appears the argument was so prejudicial, under the circumstances of the case, that an admonition could not cure it.
- Legitimate Parameters
- Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407 (1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113, 109 S.Ct. 3174, 104 L.Ed.2d 1036
(1989)
Accusing defense counsel of presenting a "great octopus" defense; of pulling a "scam;" and questioned the intelligence of defense
counsel was within the legitimate parameters of argument. "A prosecutor may comment on tactics, may comment on evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of a defense position."
- Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Brian's Adm'r, 6 S.W.2d 491 (Ky.App. 1928)
Attorney's argument that jury would regret it if they did not award damages in full for death held not improper.
Argument that, if jury did not allow $12,000 or more for death, they should return verdict for defendants, held not prejudicial.
- Matters Outside Record
- City of Newport v. Maytum, 342 S.W.2d 703 (Ky.,1961)
Alluding to inadmissible evidence and referring to matters outside record, was prejudicial misconduct.
- Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Gregory, Ky., 284 Ky. 297, 144
S.W.2d 519 (1940)
Reversible error for counsel to attempt impeachment of a party's testimony by reference to excluded testimony and inferentially criticize opposing counsel for making objections. "We have written that when counsel deliberately go outside the record in the jury argument and make statements, directly or inferentially, which are calculated to improperly influence the jury, this court will reverse the judgment...."
- Stacy v. Williams, 69 S.W.2d 697 (Ky.,1934)
References during argument to plaintiff's leg injury which was exposed, throughout counsel's argument
was improper and prejudicial.
- Financial Ability
- Walden v. Jones, 158 S.W.2d 609 (Ky.App. 1942)
"There is no law applicable to the poor that is not likewise applicable to the rich, nor is any law applicable to the rich that is not likewise applicable to the poor, and an endeavor on the part of an attorney or litigant to inflame the minds of the jury by referring to the financial status of either of the parties is improper."
- Bryant v. Conrad, 420 S.W.2d 666 (Ky.,1967)
Improper to argue that jurors should return verdict for plaintiff and let "us" worry about collection of the money.
- Murphy v. Cordle, 197 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1946)
Argument "to make the rich defendants pay" improper.
- Southern-Harlan Coal Co. v. Gallaier, 240 Ky. 106, 41 S.W.2d 661
(1931)
Improper to ask jury to make Defendant, a "rich and
powerful corporation" to pay.
- Insurance
- Finch v. Conley, 422 S.W.2d 128 (Ky.,1967)
A reference to automobile liability insurance except in absence of a clear showing of
nonprejudice, will constitute a reversible error.
- Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W.2d 87 (Ky.,1955)
Generally, proof that a party is wholly or partially indemnified by insurance is neither relevant nor material to any issue in case, and any attempt to bring such matter to attention of jury by opening statement, examination of witnesses or parties, or by argument of counsel constitutes reversible error.
- Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v.
Witten, 77 S.W.2d 53 (Ky.App. 1934)
In action against insurance company, statements of plaintiff's counsel, in closing argument to jury, that he knew from experience that waiting for defendant to come into court and admit just claim would require long wait, and that defendant should not have collected premiums and kept them if policy was not valid, and that defendant was trying to avoid paying what it agreed to pay, were improper and required granting of a new trial.
- Lawyer's Personal Beliefs
- Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Saulsberry, 262 Ky. 31, 88 S.W.2d 949.
"The defendant's attorney in the course of his argument to the jury referred to a certain witness for the plaintiff and added, 'If you believe him, you don't know him probably, but I'll tell you I wouldn't believe anything he told me.'
" was improper but waived by failing to object.
- Out of State Party
- Clement Brothers Co. v. Everett, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 576, 577 (1967).
Appeals to bias against out-of-state residents and corporations have historically been condemned by the courts of this Commonwealth.
- Passion or Prejudice
- Wallen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 232, 234 (1983).
A prosecutor may not encourage the jury to return a verdict based on passion or prejudice, or for reasons not reasonably inferred from the evidence.
- Personal Comments Against Counsel
- Louisville Water Co. v. Robinson, 228 S.W.2d 444
(Ky.,1950)
Where objection was sustained to closing argument of plaintiff's counsel to jury when counsel referred to inadmissible document, and objection was sustained when plaintiff's counsel suggested that defendant's counsel were trying to hide the facts in the case, and verdict was not excessively large, there was no reversible error.
- Verdict - Passion and Prejudice
- Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Riley,
Ky., 414 S.W.2d 885, 887 (1967)
"[I]t is well established that a jury verdict on a
disputed question of fact “may be reviewed and upset where,
as in the present case, the amount at first sight appears
excessive and to have been rendered as a result of passion or
prejudice.”
- Simpson County Steeplechase Ass’n, Inc.
v. Roberts, Ky. App., 898 S.W.2d 523, (1995)
Passion and prejudice test applies to punitive damages.
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