July 28, 2003 

Vol. 2003/22       


  • The Kentucky Decisions
    • No Ky Supremes
    • 1 Published Ky Ct App
    • 19 Nonpublished Ky Ct. App.
    • 1 Western District of Kentucky
    • 20 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
       
  • Change - I've decided to print the links to all the 6th Cir. Cases published during the week.  No summaries, however.
     
  • HIPAA Forms available on-line at the LBA.
     
  • Guide to Kentucky Courts on-line at LBA.
    Phone numbers, judges names and more.
  • Index to past issues of Law Wire:  www.LouisvilleLaw.com/lawwire/index.htm
     
  • "One-Minute" CLE - In light of the medical negligence case, we did a short cle on elements of proof in med-mal cases.  Also, last month talked about amendments to pleadings so we did a primer on this one, too.
  • Does anyone miss the "Big List" of Kentucky Jury Verdicts and the occasional summary of trials reported in the Kentucky Trial Court Review?  If so let me know.  If I get enough feedback (favorable), then we will start that one up again.  Your call.  Email me at stevens@LouisvilleLaw.com with your two cents worth (credit cards not accepted ;^)
     
  • Jefferson Family Court Forum set for September 12 @ 11:30 to 1:00

    Chief Judge Kevin L. Garvey, the Family Court Judges, and the Family Court Advisory Committee invite all interested practitioners to attend an open discussion of the draft Family Court Rules of Practice and Procedures.  

    You may obtain a copy by contacting Jim Birmingham, Family Court Administrator at (502) 595-4392.  However, I have asked for a digital copy and will either email it to all or post at this site if received.  Warning, warning, warning - cut-off date for comments is Sept. 15.

  • Looking for Forms in all the Wrong Places

    • The Jefferson MCD in PDF can no longer be found at the official site, and I did not have the smarts to save the PDF file myself.
    • Does anybody out there have an Excel formatted child support or MCD form which calculates the stuff automatically (or at least one in MS Word).
    • Email them to me at stevens@louisvillelaw.com
    • I will share these with y'all.
    • Thanks.

Comedy Caravan to Benefit the Jefferson County Public Law Library
CALL THE LIBRARY @ 574-5943
Tell 'em we sent you.  Sorry, no discount

  • When - Wed., Aug. 20 @ 7:00 pm

  • Who - Mike Armstrong

  • Who dat again - Former Louisville policeman, now comic

  • Where - Comedy Caravan

  • How much - 15 Bucks!

  • Why - Proceeds benefit your local law library (Jeff Cy Public Law Lib)

  • What else - Free hors d'oeuvres at Avalon (1314 Bardstown Rd) from 6 - 7 pm.

  • What's in it for me/you?  Laughs, hang out with your own ilk, and support a good cause - your library.

  • Really, what else?  Chance to win an HP Digital Camera donated by NetGain Technologies - gotta be there to win!  Free food but cash bar before the show.



KBA Proposed Advertising Regulations

  • All comments should be sent to the KBA no later than September 1, 2003 - the Attorneys' Advertising Commission, c/o Bruce K. Davis, KBA Executive Director, 514 West Main Street, Frankfort, KY 40601-1883.
  • Proposed Rule Changes - In PDF  <<<--- Here's a link to the proposed changes. 

Thanks to the editors/contributors:

  • Jeri Barclay 
  • Tim Hatfield 
  • Paul Schurman  
  • Mike Stevens 
  • Jim Worthington 

 

  • Want some other email legal updates?
    Although we appreciate your allowing us to POP out of your email box every week with these eLegal Summaries of Kentucky law, we must let you know there are other outfits out there you may want to check out.

    • Kentucky Workers Compensation 
      Comp Ed.,Inc. is a very good source for Kentucky Workers Comp. info. Not only do they have links and pages regarding W.Comp. regs, statutes, forms, etc, but you can search CA, SC, and Board opinions maintained on their site.  Ched Jennings and his people do an outstanding job - carved a niche and service it well.

      You can subscribe to an emailing of board opinions and appellate opinions.  No summaries, but you receive  a link to the full opinions.  Go to the main page, and follow the instructions for subscribing to their newsletter.  No charge.  www.comped.net/comped/

      I just noticed a recent message forum for discussion groups.  It looks like it is just in the birthing stages, but sounds like a great concept.  Check it out for a e-forum for asking questions and getting ideas.  You can either participate of simply be a cyber voyeur.

    • United States Supreme Court Decisions
      USSC+ emails you digests of the Supremes' decisions within hours.  Free.  You can also buy some CD's of opinions for a nominal price (however, most are available on line elsewhere).
      www.usscplus.com/

    • Sixth Circuit  
      FindLaw has a plethora (lots) of email subscriptions for newsletters on topics and decisions.

      • Topics include - Legal Headlines, Corporate Counsel, Contracts, Family Law, Government Benefits, Civil Procedure, Insurance, etc. etc.

      • Court Decisions - broken down by Supremes, Circuits and a few states.

      • Where? http://newsletters.findlaw.com/

    • If anybody has other suggested sites, let me know stevens@louisvillelaw.com, and we will spread the word. 
       

  • KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS 
    FOR JULY 14-18, 2003
    Adobe Reader Required (www.Adobe.com)
     
  • Kentucky SUPREME COURT Decisions 
    PUBLISHED - None
     
  • Kentucky SUPREME COURT Decisions
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - None

     
  • Kentucky COURT OF APPEALS Decisions
    PUBLISHED - July 18, 2003
    2001-CA-001662.pdf
    Size: 36 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Bank One Kentucky NA v. Vaught
    Divorce and Subsequent Sale of Residence
    In a case of first impression in Kentucky, the CA held that a circuit court’s divorce decree which divided a couple’s marital interest in real property held by them as tenants by the entirety is binding in a subsequent circuit court foreclosure action where a mortgagee, who had obtained a mortgage against the marital property solely from the husband during the marriage and while the property was held by the couple as tenants by the entirety, claimed an interest in the net sale proceeds from the foreclosure.

    "At the time Bank One foreclosed on Arvin’s interest, the Vaughts were divorced, the tenancy by the entirety had been converted to a tenancy in common, and the former spouses respective interests in the property had been adjudicated. As a contingent interest, Bank One’s claim against Arvin’s interest in the property was determined upon the finality of the divorce action."

 

  • Kentucky COURT OF APPEALS Decisions
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - July 18, 2003
    2001-CA-000156.pdf
    Size: 32 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Deal v. Eberlin
    Family Law, Maintenance Calculations and Bankruptcy
    CA vacated and and remanded the trial courts decisions on maintenance of two divorced doctors with one moving out to the West Coast post divorce and bankruptcy petitions filed also post divorce on the grounds that the trial court did not make adequate findings of fact.

    Money, money, money and bankruptcy mess up maintenance obligations of formerly married medical doctors.  The trial court noted that "[i]n neither bankruptcy proceeding did either party file any objection to dischargeability of debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(15) . . . [and that] [a]s a result, both parties are stayed and/or enjoined from seeking an allocation of any debts which existed pre-petition. The trial court concluded that “any issue as to the allocation of debts is moot.”"

    Some black-letter law analysis might prove useful: "In order for an award of maintenance to be proper, the elements of both KRS 403.200(1)(a) and (b) must be established.  Drake v. Drake,  Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 728, 730 (1986).  Thus, before awarding Eberlin maintenance, the trial court was required to first find that she lacked sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to her, to provide for her reasonable needs, and that she was unable to support herself through appropriate employment according to the standard of living established during the marriage.   Id. at 730 (citing Lovett v. Lovett, Ky., 688 S.W.2d 329, 332 (1985)). After these required findings are reviewed to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence, this Court “must consider whether the amount awarded . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion.”" 

    2001-CA-002067.pdf
    Size: 22 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    McFarland v. Com.
    Criminal - Search & Seizure
    CA affirmed Trial Court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.  Defendant consented to search.  Further, parole officer was not used as "stalking horse" for police.
    2002-CA-000016.pdf
    Size: 28 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Heavrin v. Jones
    Medical Negligence - "Lost Chance" & Failure to Diagnose
    CA affirmed dismissal of medical negligence case based on failure to diagnose cancer since plaintiff failed to proffer evidence that alleged negligence caused him any harm.  CA looked at the "lost chance" of recovery from the missed diagnosis and relied upon precedent which required probable harm and not just possible harm.  Showing a possible premature death was insufficient.  Plaintiff, however, cited Richard v. Adair Hospital Foundation Corp., Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 791 (1978) arguing that the proximate cause required by Kentucky precedents is only a "substantial probability" that negligence resulted in harm, not necessarily a likelihood "more probable than not."  CA never even needed to address this since plaintiff's proffered evidence did not even get to the substantial probability standard.

    Comment:  The CA noted that the claimant presented an interesting theory,  but the evidence was insufficient to require them to address it.  CA also footnoted  Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital, 858 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.1993) (discussing but rejecting several variations on the lost chance theory of recovery).  Quick research on Kentucky cases noted that this Nonpublished opinion is the first "lost chance" case on failure to treat/diagnose case in Kentucky (or at least the only case to ever use the magic words of "lost chance" even though the nature of this claim was addressed in Richard Adair).   Two Kentucky cases however were cited by this panel of the Ky CA - Baylis v. Lourdes Hospital, Inc., Ky., 805 S.W.2d 122 (1991); Walden v. Jones, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 571 (1968).

    I took a look at Walden  and Richard Blair, and noted Walden was a failure to administer a myelogram and the expert testimony therein was shrouded in the  'possible'.  The Walden court then stated in reliance on other Kentucky med-mal cases (none of which were a failure to diagnose situation that "[W]e have adhered to the rule that the causal connection between an accident and an injury must be shown by medical testimony and the testimony must be that the causation is probable and not merely possible." Walden v. Jones, 439 S.W.2d 571 (Ky.,1968).

    As most would agree, applying the 'probability' causation standard makes sense if the negligence is an affirmative act of a physician.  But the standard breaks down when it's a failure to actor worse yet failure to treat since now you have to compare the natural course of the untreated condition with the treated course.  

    Let's look at one of the out-of-state cases noted by our Kentucky CA - Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (Wa. 05/26/1983) whereby the estimate of a full recovery from lung cancer was closer to 14 % and clearly under 50 % on an admitted negligence if it had been diagnosed and treated when it should have been.  However, you will note the false premise in these failure to diagnose/treat cases is that the causal link is to a recovery rather than the harm caused.  To say there is no causal connection to a harm in the absence of probability begs the question.  Just simply refocus on the harm that was inflicted rather than the recovery sought.  By my calculations and common sense, there is some harm here.  First, the claimant has the pain and suffering from a lost opportunity to live longer and recover.  Second, and more importantly, the failure to diagnose and treat surely caused some harm to the claimant if it decreased one iota their  chances of recovery.  For example,  what if the delay changed the recovery chances from 30 % down to 15 %.  Sounds to me like the medical negligence reduced the chances of recovery by one-half and that '15 %' chance of recovering is worth something and was 'probably' caused by the med-mal.  Therefore, the harm is not the complete recovery but rather the reduced chance of recovery shown by medical probability or even a more painful progress of the untreated disease.  To say there is no causation when a  proper diagnosis would only have meant a 49 % chance of a recovery at that time is ludicrous and ignores the value of those increased chances not to mention the p & s from failure to treat the cancer and the reduced life expectancy rather than a complete recovery.  

    Will there be a change in light of the current 'med-mal insurance crisis'?  I don't know (doubtful).  But the appellate courts should no longer focus on the probability of recovery as opposed to the probability of a harm (eg., lost chance, reduced life expectancy, slowing down the disease, and aggressive onset of symptoms).  I am sure any cancer victim would take a 30 % chance of recovery over a 15 % chance and that difference is worth something so long as the experts can show that those numbers are 'probable.' 

    Rather than rely solely on a Herskovits-type analysis, the CA would do well next time to take a peek at some more recent opinions such as Shellenbarger v. Brigman,  101 Wash.App. 339, 3 P.3d 211, 2000 which did not shoot the claimant down at SJ.  

    More importantly, the Ky CA's decision in Richard v. Adair Hospital Foundation Corp., Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 791 (1978) shows that there is precedent in Kentucky recognizing acting and failing to act are not the same.  In Richard, the claimant withstood a SJ by the defendant in a failure to treat a minor with pneumonia - the CA noted that "Given the medical testimony in this case, that it could safely be said that this child's chances of recovery would have been substantially greater and better had she been treated earlier, a summary judgment was premature."  The door is ajar, let's just open it up some.

    Mike Stevens, ed.

    2002-CA-000301.pdf
    Size: 24 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Diktik, Inc. v. The Somerset Refinery, Inc.
    Corporations, Capacity to Sue
    CA affirmed dismissal of foreign corporation's lawsuit in Kentucky on grounds that it lacked the capacity to sue because it had been previously dissolved as a corporation in its home state.

    Comment:  Please note that the defendants also raised issues regarding a foreign corporation not registered in Kentucky transacting business in Kentucky which were specifically sidestepped by the CA's decision.
    2002-CA-000605.pdf
    Size: 36 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Walker v. Com.
    Criminal
    CA affirmed Defendant's convictions but reversed and remanded for new sentencing hearing.  Defendant was not entitled to lesser included misdemeanor instruction; Defendant not entitled to mistrial nor directed verdict.  However, CA vacated sentence because jury was allowed to view prior unredacted indictments that included charges that were subsequently dismissed. 
    2002-CA-000619.pdf
    Size: 29 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Spilman v. Com.
    Criminal
    CA affirmed convictions for being felon in possession of firearm.  Evidence in consolidated appeals was not seized illegally. Officer's mistaken grand jury testimony was not abuse of system and did not prejudice Defendant.  Prosecutor's closing argument was not improper.
    2002-CA-000725.pdf
    Size: 36 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Waford v.Com.
    Criminal
    CA affirmed TC's denial of pro se Defendant's RCR 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
    2002-CA-000819.pdf
    Size: 18 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    J.W.M. v. E.K.M.
    Appeals, Not Final
    CA dismissed appeal since not final as trial court had not ruled on motion for new trial.  

    "This court has jurisdiction of appeals from final judgments or orders of circuit courts. See KRS2 22A.020(1). The filing of a motion for a new trial suspends the finality of a judgment until the motion is ruled on by an order. See CR 73.02(1)(e) and White v. Hardin Co. Bd. of Ed., Ky., 307 S.W.2d 754, 755 (1957). Bates v. Connelly, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 586 (1995) Therefore, since the circuit court did not rule on the motion for a new trial, the judgment awarding custody was not final when J.W.M. filed the notice of appeal herein. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Patterson, Ky., 237 S.W.2d 57, 58 (1951)."

    Comment:  As you can see the nonpublished opinions are showing the appeals are losing their appeal for failure to go by the numbers.

    2002-CA-000833.pdf
    Size: 32 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Johnson v. Thornbury
    Mining Leases, Statute of Limitations
    CA affirmed dismissal citing KRS 413.120(12)that the five-year statute of limitation therein was applicable and that any action based on fraud or mistake should have been brought within five years after the execution of the leases.
    2002-CA-000934.pdf
    Size: 29 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    B.C.R., Jr. v. D.G.
    Adoption, Stepdaughter
    CA affirmed TC's dismissal of step-parent's adoption.  

    KRS 625.090(2) provides in relevant part that a circuit court may not terminate parental rights unless it first finds “by clear and convincing evidence” the existence of one or more of several grounds.  CA found no abuse of discretion.  Note that the natural father had some difficulties but these did not go far enough to result in a parental termination.

    2002-CA-001001.pdf
    Size: 18 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Bowman v. Bright Built Homes
    Statute of Limitations, Latent Structural Defects
    CA affirmed dismissal as there were no latent structural defects and the claims were therefore barred by statute of limitations.
    2002-CA-001012.pdf
    Size: 26 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Harris v. May
    Appeals,  Attorneys Fees,  Necessary Party
    CA affirmed award of attorneys fees to the counsel in an action to compel the sale of jointly owned land which could not feasibly be partitioned and opposing party had failed to preserve the issue on appeal since attorney was not a named party on the appeal.

    Comment:  For those who are curious about the cases regarding when you join the attorney, see:  Tyler v. Bryant, Ky., 394. S.W.2d 454 (1965); Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Company v. Fenton Rigging Co., Ky., 522 S.W.2d 862 (1975); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Patton, Ky. App., 631 S.W.2d 850 (1982); Boyle County Fiscal Court v. Shewmaker, Ky. App., 666 S.W.2d 759 (1984).  

    2002-CA-001086.pdf
    Size: 35 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Malcomb v. Malcomb
    Appeals,  Dismissed on Procedural Grounds
    CA dismissed appeal without addressing merits since appellant failed to include  a necessary party.  In boundary line dispute, wife of property owner is a necessary and indispensable party.

    "Upon its filing, a notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction of a case from the circuit court to the appellate court. Clark Equip. Co., Inc. v. Bowman, Ky. App., 762 S.W.2d 417 (1988). It places the named parties within the jurisdiction of the appellate court. City of Devondale v. Stallings, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 954 (1990). Because the notice of appeal filed in this case transferred jurisdiction of only the named parties to the court of appeals, we do not have jurisdiction over Juanita Malcomb. We believe that she is a necessary party with respect to any proceedings before us."

    2002-CA-001281.pdf
    Size: 26 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Mason v. Com.
    Criminal
    CA affirmed Jefferson Circuit Judge Stephen Ryan's order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion to suppress.  TC found consent was not given to enter home; however, Defendant's subsequent consensual appearance provided proper grounds for seizure.
    2002-CA-001459.pdf
    Size: 20 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Tacket v. Com.
    Criminal
    CA affirmed TC's order revoking Defendant's probation.
    2002-CA-001475.pdf
    Size: 32 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    McKee v. Com.
    Criminal- Search & Seizure
    CA affirmed TC's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.  Police officer was permitted to search vehicle pursuant to "search incident to arrest" exception to warrant requirement.  TC properly allowed Defendant to waive competency hearing after issue was raised.
    2002-CA-002469.pdf
    Size: 29 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Crum v. Sealmaster Bearing
    Workers Compensation -
    Notice Defense
    Crum, an assembly-line worker felt a severe pain in her back when she was placed in an awkward position reaching around the back of a machine near the end of her shift on July 27, 1999.  She did not report this to her employer that day.  The next morning she telephoned her supervisor and told him she was not able to come to work because she had hurt her back the day before and she went to her family physician that day.  On August 3, 1999 she signed a leave of absence request form indicating the request was for personal illness or injury. She never returned to work.  She underwent a discectomy at L4-5 in October, 1999 and was continuing to receive injections and other treatment throughout 2000.  She received salary and medical expense benefit payments under the employer's sickness and accident coverage. The employer had notices posted throughout its plant regarding the requirement for reporting injuries and Crum had filled out accident report forms on 2 prior occasions.  Crum's filing of a Form 101 on July 27, 2001 was the first time she explicitly told her employer that she was seeking workers' compensation benefits for her injury.
     
    Crum told her supervisor she was in severe pain from a back injury she sustained "yesterday" and argued this was sufficient to place the employer on notice that she had sustained a compensable work related injury and that it had a duty to make further inquiries and investigate the circumstances of her injury. Crum claimed her employer stuck its head in the sand, took a "hear no evil, see no evil" approach, and ignored her attempt at notice. Crum’s argument, failed.  The statutory dictates require the claimant to provide information on the time, place, nature, and cause of the accident resulting in a work-related injury. There is no burden on the employer to investigate the circumstances of an injury when an employee gives no indication it was work-related other than it occurred at some unspecified time on a workday.  Crum's claim was dismissed by ALJ Riggs for lack of due and timely notice to the employer.  The dismissal was affirmed by the Board and Court of Appeals.
    2002-CA-002641.pdf
    Size: 37 kb
    Date: 7/16/2003
    Weathers v. Town and Country Ford
    Workers Compensation - Statute of Limitations
    Weathers worked as a car salesman. On Sunday, April 26, 1998, he attended church with his brother, Sidney.  Weathers drove a demo car supplied by his employer and Sidney was interested in buying a car. As a result, it was decided that Sidney would drive the car home from church services for the purpose of test-driving it.  While stopped at an intersection with Sydney at the wheel, they were struck from behind by a third party. Weathers experienced no pain at the time, went to work the following day, and informed his employer of the accident. He did not inform the employer that he was injured in the accident. He testified he began to feel stiff but worked throughout the week. He felt pain and weakness the following Saturday and first sought medical care when his legs collapsed the following Monday.  He underwent multiple surgeries.  His  private insurance carrier paid all of his medical expenses,he received short and long term disability benefits under his employer's plan, and was awarded Social Security disability benefits.  He alleged that when he first began to experience pain he informed his employer it was related to the accident and that he was going to seek medical attention.  However, he represented on the short term disability application, 24 days after the accident, that the accident or illness was not work-relate and that he was not eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits.   Thereafter, he filed a Form 101 on April 28, 2000 seeking workers’ compensation benefits (2 years, 2 days after the accident).  ALJ Cowden dismissed the claim as having been filed outside the 2 year statute of limitations and was affirmed by the Board and Court of Appeals.

    Weathers argued that the employer was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense based on its failure to comply with the statutory reporting requirements of KRS 342.038 (first report of injury) and/or KRS 342.040 (report of termination or failure to pay benefits).  However, the ALJ determined that there was no indication the employer had acted in any other way than in good faith and that Weathers had not presented any credible evidence that he ever reported his condition to the employer as a work related injury prior to the filing of the Form 101.  Thus, the employer had no obligation to file any of the notices required by statute.

    Note:  This opinion includes an excellent discussion of the use of equitable estoppel to bar employers from asserting the statute of limitations defense if they have failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements.  TGH

     

Federal Cases involving Kentucky - Week of July 21-25, 2003
  • Western District Court - Kentucky
    Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company, Travelers Indemnity Company and Essex Insurance Company v. Russ Coleman d/b/a Johnny's Bad Ass Motorcycles, P.W.C., Inc. and Lawrence Gray
      Insurer brought declaratory judgment action concerning the coverage provided by a commercial general liability policy. Specifically, the insurer sought a declaration that its policy excluded all damages assessed against its insured arising out of a fire that damaged a building in which the insured rented space. The Court concluded that under the policy the insurer was generally liable for all damages assessed due to fire but that the ?own, rent or occupy? exclusion exclude coverage for damage to the portion of the building actually rented by the insured. The Court also held that the insurer could not avoid coverage as a result of the insured?s failure to directly notify it of the fire and/or cooperate in the litigation because the insurer failed to demonstrate that the failure materially prejudiced the insurer.

     

  • Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
     
    Opinion DocketSheet Pub Date Short Title/District
    03a0238p.06 01-6326 2003/07/22  Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan
        Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington
    03a0239p.06 01-5602 2003/07/22  USA v. Solorio
        Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville
    03a0239p.06 01-5666 2003/07/22  USA v. Dennis
        Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville
    03a0239p.06 01-5603 2003/07/22  USA v. Luna
        Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville
    03a0239p.06 01-5667 2003/07/22  USA v. Juarez
        Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville
    03a0240p.06 01-3851 2003/07/23  Roberts v. Carter
        Southern District of Ohio at Columbus
    03a0241p.06 01-2394 2003/07/23  Kellogg Co v. Toucan Golf
        Western District of Michigan at Kalamazoo
    03a0242p.06 01-4254 2003/07/23  Husvar v. Rapoport
        Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati
    03a0243p.06 02-1133 2003/07/24  Jurado v. Burt
        Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor
    03a0244p.06 01-6077 2003/07/24  Shah v. Racetrac Petro Co
        Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville
    03a0244p.06 01-6451 2003/07/24  Shah v. Racetrac Petro Co
        Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville
    03a0245p.06 99-2147 2003/07/24  USA v. Darwich
        Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit
    03a0245p.06 01-2044 2003/07/24  USA v. Darwich
        Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit
    03a0246p.06 01-3888 2003/07/24  Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins Co
        Southern District of Ohio at Columbus
    03a0247p.06 01-1211 2003/07/25  McMullen v. Meijer Inc
        Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit
    03a0248p.06 00-4316 2003/07/25  Hall v. Consol Freightways
        Northern District of Ohio at Akron
    03a0248p.06 00-4431 2003/07/25  Hall v. Consol Freightways
        Northern District of Ohio at Akron
    03a0249p.06 01-3414 2003/07/25  Hindall v. Winterthur Intl
        Northern District of Ohio at Toledo
    03a0250p.06 01-4178 2003/07/25  Clark v. Chubb Grp Ins Co
        Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland
    03a0251p.06 03-5149 2003/07/25  USA v. Rocha
        Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington
Cases In Context - a/k/a "The One-Minute CLE"

Amendments to Pleadings

  • Civil Rule 15.01
    A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
  • Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Phillips, 404 S.W.2d 449 (Ky.,1966)
    "
    Denial of motions to file amended complaints was an abuse of discretion, where there was no showing that defendant's position had been worsened by delay in offering amendments to complaint, and there was an excuse for delay in light of defendant's long delay in responding to interrogatories."
  • Bradford v. Billington, 299 S.W.2d 601 (Ky.,1957)
    A party may amend his pleading after motion for summary judgment has been made only by leave of court or written consent of adverse party.
  • Burns v. Capitol Beverage Co., Ky., 472 S.W.2d 510 (1971)
    Defendant was permitted to amend his answer to litigate his true defense where plaintiff had ample time to investigate this defense and to prepare for trial, and hence, there was no element of surprise.
  • Caldwell v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., Ky., 455 S.W.2d 67 (1970)
    Employer permitted to file special answer asserting defense of statute of limitations although not filed within time required by board's rules of procedure.  "A court, under CR 15, has liberal discretion to allow amendments to pleadings, and is directed to give leave freely when justice so requires. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Rules it  had been held that a defendant was entitled to amend his answer at any time before judgment to plead limitations. We would not conceive that there should be less liberality in the treatment of the rules of procedure adopted by the board for workmen's compensation cases."
  • Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., Ky.App., 37 S.W.3d 770, 779 (2000)
    "Although leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, the decision is within the discretion of the trial court. Furthermore, the discretion of the trial court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."
  • Teague v. Reid, Ky., 340 S.W.2d 235 (1960) 
    Trial court abused its discretion by declining to allow defendants to amend their answers even though the motions to amend were not filed until the court was considering motions for summary judgment.

Medical Negligence, Elements of Cause of Action

  • Duty and Standard of Care
    • Mitchell v. Hadl, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 183 (1991)
      In arena of medical negligence, physician has duty to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of reasonably competent practitioner in same class to which physician belongs acting in same or similar circumstances.  
    • Noble v. Sartori, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 8 (1990)
      Hospital staff physician, who was not on emergency room duty but who was only physician available who could have treated heart attack victim, could be held liable if his actions in refusing to render assistance to heart attack victim were a substantial factor in causing victim's death.
    • Schrand v. Grant, 1999 WestLaw 540877 (Ky. Ct. App.)
      Doctors' alleged negligence in allowing patient, who was suspected of overdosing on pain medication, to drive home, instead of ordering her to be rushed to hospital, was not relieved by the alleged negligent acts of either patient, who drove her vehicle and became involved in automobile accident injuring motorist, or nurse, who allowed patient to drive, for purposes of negligence action brought against doctors by motorist.  

      Nor could liability be escaped by lack of foreseeability of victim from car accident. 

      Even intervening criminal act does not relieve one for liability for his negligent acts or omissions, where the criminal act is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's negligent act.
    • Hambry v. University of Kentucky Medical Center, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 431 (1992)
      In medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is always used to show the standard of care for a particular type of practice and procedure. The standard of care for physicians and surgeons is established by the medical profession itself.
    • Blair v. Eblen, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 370 (1970)
      In a medical malpractice action, evidence of doctor's adherence to proper standard of care may include elements of locality, availability of facilities, specialization or general practice, proximity of specialist and special facilities.
    • Davenport by and Through Davenport v. Ephriam McDowell Memorial  Hospital, Inc.,  Ky.App., 769 S.W.2d 56 (1980)
      Court found use of anesthesiology standards useful as guidance regarding standard of care. 
      • Comment:  Use the internet to search for published standards of care or protocols regarding specific procedures. For example, go to www.google.com and enter the criteria such as 'retinopathy prematurity standards'.
      • See Web Article on 'The Legal Ramifications of NCCN Practice Guidelines' by Frances H. Miller, Esq, Boston University School of Law and Boston University School of Public Health.
    • Morgan v. Hill, Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d 232 (1984)
      A medical doctor can testify as to the cause of any injury, just as a chiropractor may so testify, but a physician may not testify to the chiropractor's standard of care because he does not have the appropriate training and experience to determine what constitutes chiropractic malpractice.
    • Johnson v. Vaughn, Ky., 370 S.W.2d 591 (1963)
      Negligence or wrong of physician in malpractice case must be established by medical or expert testimony unless negligence and injurious results are so apparent that laymen with general knowledge would have no difficulty in recognizing it. 
    • Jarboe v. Harting, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775, 778 (1965)
      In addressing the "general rule" that "expert testimony is required in a malpractice case to show that the defendant failed to conform to the required standard," the Court stated - "However, it is a generally accepted proposition that the necessary expert testimony may consist of admissions by the defendant doctor. [Citations omitted]. And there is an exception to the rule in situations where the common knowledge or experience of laymen is extensive enough to recognize or to infer negligence from the facts."  This is a case where "the necessary expert testimony" may be found in the "admissions by the defendant doctor." 
  • Breach of Duty of Care
    • Rogers v. Kasdan, Ky., 612 S.W.2d 133 (1981)
      Suggested jury instruction regarding breach of duty:
      "It was the duty of the defendant Humana and its employees to exercise toward Mrs. Rogers that degree of care and skill ordinarily expected of reasonable and prudent hospitals under similar circumstances. If you are satisfied from the evidence that they failed to comply with that duty and that such failure on their part was a substantial factor in causing the death of Mrs. Rogers, you will find for the plaintiff against Humana; otherwise you will find for Humana."
    • Paintsville Hospital v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985)
      A hospital could be held liable on principles of ostensible agency or apparent authority for negligence of physician who furnished treatment to patient in emergency room which was provided by hospital and open to public, notwithstanding that physician was not actually employed by hospital.
    • Holton v. Pfingst, Ky. App., 534 S.W.2d 786 (1976)
      Ophthalmologist was not liable for the patient's loss of the sight of one eye which resulted from an unsuccessful, but properly performed, surgical procedure.
    • Mitchell v. Hadl, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 183 (1991)
      General surgeon who informed patient's family before receiving biopsy results that patient had carcinoma of pancreas with metastatic disease to liver and would die within three to six months, and who reiterated diagnosis even after receiving negative biopsy report, did not breach duty to patient, given that surgeon's diagnosis was based upon his examination of patient's internal organs, surgeon was under duty to fully disclose all reasonably held medical opinions about patient's condition, and no evidence indicated surgeon's opinion fell below standard of reasonable competence.
    • Duetsch v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141 (1980)
      Necessary expert testimony to establish that doctor failed to conform to required standard of care may consist of admissions by defendant doctor.
  • Injuries and Damages
    • Farmers Bank and Trust Co. of Bardstown v. Rice, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 510 (1984).
      Discusses recoverable damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions.
    • Schork v. Huber, Ky.,  648 S.W.2d 861 (1983).
      Held that parents could not recover damages based on costs of raising healthy but unexpected child from doctor following an unsuccessful sterilization procedure.
    • Rice v. Rizk, Ky.App.,  453 S.W.2d 732 (1970).
      Death of viable fetus caused by negligence of another gives cause of action for which damages may be awarded.
    • Guiliani v. Guiler, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 318 (1997).
      Held that minor children could maintain claim for loss of parental consortium.
    • 411.145 DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
      (1) As used in this section "consortium" means the right to the services, assistance, aid, society, companionship and conjugal relationship between husband and wife, or wife and husband.
      (2) Either a wife or husband may recover damages against a third person for loss of consortium, resulting from a negligent or wrongful act of such third person. 
    • 411.135 DAMAGES IN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OF MINOR
      In a wrongful death action in which the decedent was a minor child, the surviving parent, or parents, may recover for loss of affection and companionship that would have been derived from such child during its minority, in addition to all other elements of the damage usually recoverable in a wrongful death action.
  • Proximate Cause (Standard of Care)
    • Duetsch v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141 (1980).
      Proximate cause consists of finding of causation in fact, i. e., substantial cause, and absence of public policy rule of law which prohibits imposition of liability.  In determining whether negligence was substantial factor in causing harm, substantial factor test applies to event which results in injury, not injury itself, and injury need only flow directly from event.
    • Morris v. Hoffman, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 8 (1997).
      Ordinarily, expert evidence is necessary to support conclusion of causation in medical malpractice actions, and medical testimony must be that causation is probable and not merely possible.
    • Bayliss v. Lourdes Hospital, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 122 (1991).
      It is an accepted principle that in most medical negligence cases, proof of causation requires the testimony of an expert witness  because the nature of the inquiry is such that jurors are not competent to draw their own conclusions from the evidence without the aid of such expert testimony. Jarboe v. Harting, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775 (1965). While evidence of causation must be in terms of probability rather than mere possibility,  substance should prevail over form and that the total meaning, rather than a word-by-word construction, should be the focus of the inquiry.  Walden v. Jones, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 571 (1968);  Morris v. Hoffman, Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d 8 (1977). The standard of "totality of the medical testimony" was adopted for use in Workers Compensation cases by the Court of Appeals in  Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Greenwell, Ky.App., 713 S.W.2d 825 (1986), wherein the Court held that terms such as "distinct possibility" and "high likelihood" went beyond speculation and amounted to substantial evidence of causation, an inquiry not dissimilar to the question of proximate cause in malpractice action.
    • Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1987).
      Determination of proximate cause is a factual one, not a legal one, depending upon whether the evidence shows that the results of misconduct are reasonably foreseeable. 
    • Jarboe v. Harting, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775 (1965).
      It is an accepted principle that in most medical negligence cases, proof of causation requires the testimony of an expert witness because the nature of the inquiry is such that jurors are not competent to draw their own conclusions from the evidence without the aid of such expert testimony. 
    • Walden v. Jones, 439 S.W.2d 571 (Ky.,1968)
      "[W]e have adhered to the rule that the causal connection between an accident and an injury must be shown by medical testimony and the testimony must be that the causation is probable and not merely possible." 
    • Richard v. Adair Hospital Foundation Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky.App.,1978)
      Medical testimony that it could safely be said that child's chances of recovery from pneumonia would have been substantially greater and better had she been treated earlier gave rise to fact question as to whether hospital was negligent in twice refusing hospital admission to infant presented at emergency room, based upon child's condition when admission was requested and when an unmistakable emergency situation may have existed, precluding summary judgment in action for wrongful death of infant.

 

 

 

 

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Thank you, 

Mike Stevens

Editorial Staff (Folks who summarize these)

  • Jeri Barclay 
  • Tim Hatfield 
  • Paul Schurman  
  • Mike Stevens 
  • Jim Worthington