-
Join the LBA at Slugger Field
for a CLE Ethics program
followed by a Bats game (6/26). This package deal includes reserved
seating for the game, picnic-style buffet dinner and a one-hour
CLE ethics program.
For
more info click here.
-
KBA Proposed Advertising Regulations
-
Lawyers' group may limit television ads
- CJ article from 6.11.2003
-
The original deadline to submit written comments
concerning the proposed attorney advertising regulations was
June 1, 2003. Due to the interest this issue has generated
within the Bar, the Attorneys' Advertising Commission has
extended the deadline for filing written comments to September
1, 2003.
-
The Commission has also approved a delay in
implementation of the new regulations until after September 1,
2003 in order to allow itself the benefit of all comments.
- Any comments must be received in writing at the KBA no later
than September 1, 2003.
- All comments should be sent to the Attorneys' Advertising
Commission, c/o Bruce K. Davis, KBA Executive Director, 514
West Main Street, Frankfort, KY 40601-1883.
- Copies of the proposed regulations are available from Susan
Adams, Advertising Commission Paralegal, at 502-564-3795, ext.
238 or by email at sadams@kybar.org.
- Proposed
Rule Changes - In PDF from the KBA! <<<--- Here's a
link to the proposed changes.
- Kentucky Supreme Court Decisions - None
- Kentucky Court of Appeals - PUBLISHED
-
June 6, 2003
2001-CA-002163.pdf
Size: 22 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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Stinnet
v. Com.
Criminal, Sentencing
Defendant's sentences reversed by CA because the
Trial Court failed to instruct the jury on whether to run the
sentences concurrent or consecutive. Defendant was
convicted under lesser included misdemeanor offenses of
Criminal Trespass, Criminal Mischief, and Theft. The
Trial Court ran the sentences consecutive for a total of 240
days to serve. Although not preserved for appeal, the CA
found the failure to request concurrent or consecutive
sentencing from the jury constituted palpable error. |
2002-CA-000482.pdf
Size: 46 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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United
Services Automobile Association v. Bult
Insurance, Bad Faith
This was the $1.2 million bad faith case plus attorneys
fees verdict that Lee Sitlinger obtained in Jefferson
County. The CA did their quick summary of bad faith
insurance law and then noted - "The evidentiary
threshold is high indeed. Evidence must demonstrate that an
insurer has engaged in outrageous conduct toward its
insured. Furthermore, the conduct must be driven by evil
motives or by an indifference to its insureds’ rights.
Absent such evidence of egregious behavior, the tort claim
predicated on bad faith may not proceed to a jury. Evidence
of mere negligence or failure to pay a claim in timely
fashion will not suffice to support a claim for bad faith.
Inadvertence, sloppiness, or tardiness will not suffice;
instead, the element of malice or flagrant malfeasance must
be shown."
Although USAA did not look very good
on the manner in which it handled a wrongful death claim
involving two of it's own insured's to include liability on
one car and UIM on the other, and the fact that USAA was a
little slow in reaching and offering it's reserves, the CA
concluded it was NOT bad faith. Per the CA, "A
review of the evidence presented by the Bults reveals a
complete absence of the type of conduct required to meet
this standard." This conclusion was reached even though
the plaintiff had four expert witnesses say it was bad faith
- Former Judge and State Farm Agent Michael McDonald, USAA
insured, reserve admiral and trial lawyer Larry Franklin,
and law school professor Martin Huelsman.
Comment:
There is no real law in this case. Just an aggressive
reading of the facts. However, this decision seems at
odds with another
recent CA case (Globe - 2001-CA-001420.pdf)
but with a different result albeit unpublished! The other panel
approached the facts from a different angle. In the USAA case the CA went into a
laborious analysis of the facts and proceeded to substitute
their own fact finding for that of the jury and concluded
the matter should not have even gone to the jury. The Globe case
did not substitute its judgment for that of the jury and reviewed the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict - "Without
again reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we conclude
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict on each of the ten interrogatories decided in favor
of the Bowmans on their bad faith claims." Don't
forget that in the USAA case, the liability defendant paid
money beyond their policy limits and assigned the bad faith
claim to the plaintiffs, not to mention that a judge in a
damages trial concluded damages in excess of $2.3 million
(which oughta been some clue that the policy limits should
have been offered immediately and might have avoided the
personal exposure of the defendants!)
One panel exemplified judicial activism,
the other allowed the jury system to work and limited
involvement to curtail abuse (and finding none allowed the
jury's verdict to stand). I hope to see the Supremes
look at this one. I find it hard to believe that no CA
was sufficiently offended by the same company on both sides
of the case such that clear standards were not implemented
to avoid abuses and potential abuses. If 'chinese
walls' are difficult to enforce in conflict situations
involving lawyers, imagine the potential abuses when
insurers driven by the profit motive and adjusters driven by
job security and lack of legal ethical training are thrown
into the mix. In Gailor v. Alsabi, the SC declined to
elevate an adjuster to the attorney's ethical
standard. Consequently, I would not expect an adjuster
to be able to keep up the wall either. If I were the
SC, I would place the company under the strictest scrutiny
on the handling of the claim such that if you are on both
sides, then technical violations of the UCSPA are
presumptively bad faith. Outside or third party
adjusters might be the solution (but not so in Globe).
Basic fact of organizational hierarchy is the
'pyramid.' Consequently, there is some level somewhere
up the feeding chain where a single adjuster supervises both
sides. Ouch.
|
2002-CA-001303.pdf
Size: 27 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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Schultz
v. Cooper
Statute of Limitations, Professional Services, KRS 413.245
CA asked to decide whether Old Mason's Home of
Kentucky, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky. App., 892 S.W.2d 304
(1995), was dispositive. Answer? Yes.
"The discovery
rule contained in KRS 413.245 is a clearly worded
default rule governing the date upon which a period of
limitations begins. The parties in this case made a
deliberate election to replace that date with a date certain
for the accrual of any action. Neither the courts nor the
legislature have found such private deviations from the
statute to be unconscionable or violative of public policy.
On the contrary, the courts have specifically sanctioned the
validity of such provisions as part and parcel of the
freedom of parties to fashion their own agreements. Mitchell
is the controlling authority, and we do not find any
justification or compelling circumstances in this case to
depart from its holding. For the foregoing reasons, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing
Schultz's complaint against Weber. Accordingly, the judgment
of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed." |
- Kentucky Court of Appeals - NOT TO BE PUBLISHED -
June 6, 2003
2000-CA-001584.pdf
Size: 17 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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Vaughn
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Trial Court's
judgment requiring Defendant to register as sex offender.
Sex Offender Registration Act may be applied to persons
committing offenses prior to enactment of law. |
2001-CA-001320.pdf
Size: 36 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Dye
v. Western Kentucky University
Employment, Civil Rights Discrimination
|
2001-CA-002519.pdf
Size: 36 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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Wernigk
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Defendant's
convictions for two (2) counts of Third Degree Rape.
Trial Court did not err in failing to conduct competency
hearing; no error in excluding evidence of victim's criminal
charges for sodomizing Defendant's son; no error in failing
to suppress Defendant's confession; no error in
admitting statements made by victim to his brother; and no
error in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts. |
2001-CA-002568.pdf
Size: 39 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Cardona
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Defendant's
convictions for 2nd Degree Manslaughter, 2nd Degree Wanton
Endangerment, and DUI. Defendant was not entitled to
directed verdict; Trial Court did not err by failing to
instruct on statute concerning duties of pedestrian; and
Trial Court did not err in denying Defendant's proposed
instruction on "intervening causes". |
2001-CA-002640.pdf
Size: 31 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Byrd
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Defendant's
convictions for drug trafficking and drug possession.
CA acknowledged that prosecution elicited improper KRE
404(b) evidence and improper hearsay testimony by police
officer at trial in violation of Trial Court's ruling on
Motion in Limine, but nonetheless, found this to be
harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of
Defendant's guilt. CA went on to voice its displeasure
on the way appellate counsel handled the issue as well.
Finally, Defendant not entitled to mistrial based upon
prosecution's statements in closing argument. |
2002-CA-000173.pdf
Size: 28 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Willis
v. Com.
Criminal
CA reversed Trial Court's
denial of Defendant's 11.42 motion and request for hearing
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial
Court erred when it failed to apply the reasonable
probability standard and erred when it failed to find that
the record on its face conclusively resolved Defendant's
claims. |
2002-CA-000312.pdf
Size: 58 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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Wilbourn
v. Shiben
Medical Negligence, Expert Proof Required, Summary Judgment
Medical negligence was based upon failure to diagnose
brain tumor. Treating doctors ordered CT scan which was
negative. Treating doctors continued to see nothing
wrong or thought it was psychiatric. Turns out later
that the plaintiff went to Vanderbilt and an MRI found the
tumor. Plaintiff sued the hospital, treating doctors,
and radiologist. Radiologist admitted misreading the
film and settled. Hospital was dismissed with no
appeal. Remaining ER doctors moved for SJ because
plaintiff ailed to identify experts in answers to
interrogatories. Medical depositions of various other
treating physicians, to include the Vandy Dandies, did
not shore up the proof that two of the remaining named
defendants deviated from the standard of care for their
specialties. In fact, the other doctors noted that the
appropriate test, a CT was ordered, but it was misread by
the radiologist. Defendant doctors moved for SJ for
failing to have medical proof that they deviated from std.
of care.
Up to now nothing unusual, but the plot
thickens. Defendants were granted SJ BEFORE the
plaintiffs pretrial deadline for listing expert
witnesses. Plaintiffs claimed premature ejection from
the lawsuit, but the CA held that all that is required is
that the plaintiff have the opportunity to complete
discovery, not that it have completed discovery.
ouch. SJ affirmed.
Comment:
As a trial practice tip, note that a litigant failed to
obtain KRE 902 authentication of a medical record at trial
and was not allowed later to correct the record and attach
to the appeal. Imagine the plaintiff's pickle - still
had months to find an expert for trial in compliance with
the pretrial order but shot out of the water by the current
state of proof and failure to provide an expert in response
to interrogatories. So, which has precedent the
pretrial order or the interrogatories? Hmmm. How
often have we seen the answers to interrogatories for CR
26.02 experts say that decision has not been made yet but
will comply with pretrial orders? Lots. This is
not necessarily a savings answer per this case if there is
some medical proof which by implication blocks your path.
mike s.
|
2002-CA-000397.pdf
Size: 23 kb
Date: 6/5/2003
|
Yahya
v. Lexmark International, Inc.
Civil Rights Act, Discrimination, Appeals
Once again the CA
makes note of failure to follow the civil rules. Basic
case where the magic words "substantially limits a
major life activity" were never used. Can win if
you don't follow the rules.
"As a threshold matter, neither of
the briefs filed by appellant comport with Ky. R. Civ. P.
76.12(4)(c)(v), which requires "...at
the beginning of
the argument a statement with reference to the record
showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review
and, if so, in what manner." Such a failure puts this
Court in the position of necessarily reviewing the record in
detail from beginning to end in order to determine whether
such alleged error has been properly preserved.2 Regardless,
we have determined to conduct an exhaustive review of the
videotaped trial testimony as well as the written record on
appeal."
Ouch. Fifth shot within a month by the
CA on quality of appellate briefs. |
2002-CA-000855.pdf
Size: 48 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
City
of Eddyville v. Kuttawa
Equitable Estoppel Public Service
Case applied Grayson Rural Electric Corp. v.
City of Vanceburg, Ky., 4 S.W.3d 526 (1999)(since
Grayson chose not to compete for the existing non-municipal
customers being served by EPB and its predecessor VUC, we
find that Grayson has acquiesced in and is estopped from
contesting Vanceburg’s EPB’s current service rights in
the disputed area) so that City of Kuttawa could
provide natural gas to "Old Eddyville" and the
State Penetentiary. |
2002-CA-000935.pdf
Size: 30 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Hix
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Defendant's
convictions for Receiving Stolen Propery > $300 and
Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon. Defendant not
entitled to directed verdict as sufficient evidence was
presented concerning value of property and location of
weapon. Trial Court did not abuse discretion in
denying motion for continuance. |
2002-CA-000963.pdf
Size: 31 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Trayner
v. Trayner
Family Law
Wife appealed denial of permanent maintenance and award
of only $1500 of $60,000 in attorneys fees. Husband
did not file brief. Husband lost on appeal on
maintenance but fees were affirmed.
Comment. "As a preliminary
point, we note that Lynn failed to file a brief.
Procedurally, we would be justified in imposing sanctions
against Lynn as provided in CR 1 76.12(8)(c), as follows: (i)
accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues
as correct; (ii) reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief
reasonably appears to sustain such action; or (iii) regard
the appellee’s failure as a confession of error and
reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the
case. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.Since Brenda has not
invoked the rule to seek a penalty, we shall avoid either
extreme of summarily reversing the trial court or accepting in
toto Brenda’s version of the facts. See,Scott v.
Scott, Ky.App., 80 S.W.3d 447 (2002), and Whicker v.
Whicker, Ky.App., 711 S.W.2d 857 (1986). Instead, we have
reviewed the record in its entirety and have elected to
address the issues on their merits." Sounds like
the attorney representing the wife failed to ask for the
particular relief and the CA made their own decision.
mike s.
|
2002-CA-001002.pdf
Size: 20 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Mullins
v. Board of Trustees Kentucky Retirement System
Disability Retirement, Government
Plaintiff fails to meet
the burden of proof, appeals, and still misses the mark.
|
2002-CA-001009.pdf
Size: 19 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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Skinner
v. McMurry
Family Court, Failure to Comply with Discovery
CA did not find abuse of discretion in family court's
dismissal of ex-wife's motion for increased child support
for failure to comply with court order to answer
ex-husband's discovery requests (denominated in opinion as
'requests for interrogatories'). Both parties’
income exceeded the child support guidelines, and the CA
concluded that the parents' income and expenses were
relevant to the determination of child support.
"Moreover, we are of the opinion that appellant’s
continual refusal to answer the interrogatories formed a
sufficient basis upon which to justify the circuit court’s
dismissal of the current action. It is well established that
dismissal of an action is an appropriate sanction where a
party has failed to respond to interrogatories. Benjamin
v.Near East Rug Co., Inc., Ky., 535 S.W.2d 848 (1976); Naive
v. Jones, Ky., 353 S.W.2d 365 (1961). We also note
that appellant has suffered little prejudice by the
dismissal as appellant may file another motion to increase
child support."
Comment: However, the children may end losing the
potential benefits of any increased child support in the
event any subsequent motion is applied retroactively to the
filing of the second motion rather than the first motion.
|
2002-CA-001267.pdf
Size: 18 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Utley
v. First Citizens Bank of Hardin County
Statute of Limitations, Slander of Title
"The limitations period applicable to a claim under KRS 382.365 is five years. KRS 413.120. According to KRS 382.365, the cause of action accrues thirty days after demand for release is made. Such demand was made by counsel for the Utleys on
January 27, 1995; the statute began o run on February 27, 1995. This complaint was filed outside the limitations period, and is therefore time-barred. The judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed."
mike s. |
2002-CA-001733.pdf
Size: 18 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Thomas
v. Com.
Criminal
CA affirmed Defendant's
conviction and 5 year sentence for 1st Degree Sexual Abuse.
Here, the Trial Court ruled Defendant's statement to police
would be admissible for impeachment only if Defendant
testified. Defendant elected not to testify and the
statement was never introduced as evidence. CA
ruled the issue was not properly preserved for appeal - i.e.
Defendant had to take the stand. CA reasoned that it
would be required to speculate as to whether prejudicial
error would have occurred had Defendant taken the stand.
Further, CA reasoned that allowing this argument on
appeal would permit the Defendant to "plant"
reversible error in the event of a conviction. |
2002-CA-002122.pdf
Size: 23 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Easter
Seals West Kentucky, Inc. v. Wright
Workers Compensation
Affirmed ALJ's finding of work-related knee
injury. "The ALJ considered the 20% functional
impairment to the body as a whole, as well as the extensive
medical restrictions on performing any job. The ALJ believed
the claimant’s testimony and considered further
limitations or other factors in arriving at a permanent
total disability rating. Under Ira A. Watson Department
Store v. Hamilton, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 48, 51-52 (2000), the
fact finder can consider these other factors in converting
the functional limitations to the body as a whole into
vocational disability." mike s. |
2002-CA-002233.pdf
Size: 18 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
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Rivers
v. Taylor
Appeals
Affirmed trial court's decision. Appellant did not
overcome presumption that trial court's decision was
proper. Reason - bad pro se brief.
"We observe that appellant has filed a pro se brief with this Court. The brief fails to comply with Kentucky Civil Rule of Procedure 76.12. It does not include a statement of the case, an argument, or a conclusion. Most importantly, appellant has failed to cite a single case or statute in support of the arguments advanced in the brief. Moreover, the arguments are curt and unclear.
It is well established that “in order to secure a reversal of a judgment, it is incumbent upon the appellant to show error and to overcome the presumption that the trial court’s decision was correct.” Sloan v. Jewel Ridge Coal Corp.,ഊKy., 347 S.W.2d 504, 506 (1961). Here, appellant has failed to demonstrate any error or to overcome the presumption that the trial court’s decision was proper."
Comment: There must be something in the
water; either the briefs are getting worse, the
judge's getting testy; or whatever. But read between
the lines and follow the rules and KISS (keep it simple
stupid). May be a good time for an appellate advocacy
or writing class.
|
2002-CA-002274.pdf
Size: 34 kb
Date: 6/4/2003
|
Mitchell
v. F.G. Trucking
Workers Compensation
Affirmed ALJ's ruling that claimant not entitled to
benefits for psychiatric impairment. The conflicting
evidence which was adduced below was not so overwhelming as
to compel a different conclusion by the ALJ. mike s. |
|
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Cases In Context - a/k/a
"The One-Minute CLE"
This week
is a little boring. Goes back to basics on "how to read da
policy." Better name is insurance 101. Consider
it a refresher. Hope you enjoyed the KBA.
Insurance, Strict Construction of
Contract / Policy
- Wolford v. Wolford, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 835 (1984)
Since the policy is drafted in all details by the insurance
company, it must be held strictly accountable for the language
used.
- Kemper Nat. Ins. Companies v. Heaven Hill
Distilleries, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 869 (Ky.,2002)
Policy whould be constructed as a whole.
Where the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous,
the policy will be enforced as written. Strict construction
of policy exclusions should not overcome plain, clear language
resulting in a strained or forced construction.
- Meyers v. Kentucky Medical Ins. Co., 982
S.W.2d 203 (Ky.App.,1997)
The rule of strict construction against an insurance company
certainly does not mean that every doubt must be resolved against
it and does not interfere with the rule that the policy must
receive a reasonable interpretation consistent with the parties'
object and intent or narrowly expressed in the plain meaning
and/or language of the contract. Neither should a non-existent
ambiguity be utilized to resolve a policy against the company. We
consider that courts should not rewrite an insurance contract to
enlarge the risk to the insurer.
Insurance, Contract Construction,
Exclusions
- Koch v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp.,
230 S.W.2d 893 (1950)
Exclusions in insurance policy are to be narrowly interpreted
and all questions resolved in favor of the insured.
- State Automobile Mutual Ins. Co. v. Trautwein,
Ky., 414 S.W.2d 587 (1967)
Exceptions and exclusions are to be strictly construed so as
to render the insurance effective.
- St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Powell-Walton-Milward, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 223 (Ky.,1994)
Any limitation on coverage or an exclusion in a policy must be
clearly stated in order to apprise the insured of such
limitations. Stated otherwise, not only is the exclusion to be
carefully expressed, but, as in this case, the operative terms
clearly defined. Where exclusion of insurance policy
is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, interpretation
favorable to insured is adopted.
Insurance, Contract Construction,
Ambiguity
- Aetna Life & Cas. Co. (Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co.) v. Layne
554 S.W.2d 407 (Ky.App. 1977)
The rule that an ambiguity in an insurance policy is to be
resolved against the insurer has no application to a term so
clearly defined in the policy as to exclude coverage under the
circumstances involved in the case. Any doubt as to the
coverage or terms of a policy should be resolved in favor of the
insured.
Insurance, Contract Construction,
Rules of Construction
- Sutton v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 971 S.W.2d
807 (Ky.App.,1997)
Look at the terms in the policy.
However, a definition under one coverage under a policy does not
automatically apply to the same term under a different coverage in
different underwriting considerations apply. However, the personal
automobile policy encompasses, among other things, bodily injury,
basic liability, collision, and uninsured motorist coverage. A
separate premium is charged for each type of coverage. It is
logical that terms may have different definitions depending upon
the policy provision involved.
- Perry's Adm'x v. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co.,
71 S.W.2d 431 (Ky.App. 1934)
Construction of word "automobile" in accident policy was
for court, not jury, in action thereon; not being dependent on
disputed facts.
- Simon v. Continental Insurance Co., Ky., 724
S.W.2d 210, 212 (1986).
Contracts of insurance which are ambiguous (i.e., susceptible
of more than one reasonable meaning) are subject to the
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations and must be
interpreted so as to provide the insured entity with all coverage
that it may reasonably expect under the policy. "
- Deerfield Ins. Co. v. Warren County Fiscal
Court, 88 S.W.3d 867 (Ky.App.,2002)
"We must heed two principles of construction in
interpreting insurance policies: (1) they must be "liberally
construed" as a whole and (2) exceptions and exclusions must
be "strictly construed to make insurance effective."
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. McKinney, Ky., 831 S.W.2d
164, 166 (1992), citing Grimes v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
Ky.App., 705 S.W.2d 926, 931 (1985).
Insurance, Contract Construction,
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
- Simon v. Continental Insurance Co., Ky., 724
S.W.2d 210, 212 (1986).
Contracts of insurance which are ambiguous (i.e., susceptible
of more than one reasonable meaning) are subject to the
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations and must be
interpreted so as to provide the insured entity with all coverage
that it may reasonably expect under the policy.
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