• Proposed Rule Changes - In PDF from the KBA!
• Advertising Rules - Current Ky Advertising Rules
• You would have expected the public comment period to have ended AFTER the KBA Convention this summer, but no can do.  The opportunity for a potentially lively debate or seminar at the convention was missed since the deadline is JUNE 1 and convention is June 11-13. 
• Short and dirty gripe session:
  • If Kentucky is the only state that requires pre-approval of advertising, does that mean we are ahead or behind?  Hmmmm. How does 'behind' grab you.  I say they're behind on the restraint issue. They are finally addressing the internet and modern marketing terms and words, but clamping down is not the answer.  Try as they may the days of the family lawyer that everyone knew with the security of fee schedules and no advertising is gone with the horseless carriage and those tethered telephone thingies tied to your wall.
  • Marketing and advertising must be quick and timely without the heavy hand of the government encroaching on us every single step of the way.
  • Are web pages advertising?  Get a grip folks.  One they require the ability to be updated and changed on-the-spot.  But they are no different than a flyer for your clients. If you can have an office brochure so that there is nothing wrong with a member of the public locating you through the telephone listings or the local bar association, then walk into your waiting room and grab a brochure while they wait.  Then why can't a member of the public look you up on google.com, go visit your on-line waiting room and then grab the on-line brochure.  Silly KBA, tricks are for kids, not adults.
  • There really are no complaints to the BBB regarding misleading or deceptive advertising.  So if it ain't broke, then why fix it?
  • Instead of prior restraint in the form of approval, just spell out the guidelines as to what is good and what is not.  If the KBA does not want actor-endorsements, then so long Robert Vaughn a/k/a "Gary Becker". :-)  If they don't like the actors rather than the real clients, then say no and let it go.  If they don't like the dollar amounts being broadcasted, then slam the door on those.  But don't require every card, handout, flyer, yellow page, newspaper, radio spot, etc. etc. be subject to the KBA filter.  Set up the enforcement mechanism to resolve complaints and allow the attorneys a permissive prior approval.
  • But let's get real,  does anyone really think the present advertising is all that bad?  The marketplace will regulate what is good and what is not in the long term.  Times change and they roll around again.  Remember, 40 years ago when Esso (now Exxon) put a tiger in your tank, and now a local law firm puts a tiger in your court.  Go figure.  Silly, catchy, not your cup of tea maybe.  But these ads are not fooling the public.  Just the advertising commission.
    

• 2003-3 ORDER AMENDING (in pdf format) - 
  KRE Changes, eff. 7.1.2003 - Rules 412 and 618
• 2003-2 ORDER AMENDING (in pdf format) - KYLAP 
  (Ky lawyer assistance program and impairments)
• 2003-1 ORDER AMENDING (in pdf format) - 
  Ky Rule of Prof. Resp. 7.3 - Advertising Commission
  This is not the proposed rule changes referenced above, but looks to be the long arm of the law of setting up an advertising commission of 9 who will, among other things be just like your big brother and (boy we were asleep at the wheel on this one:-( 
       "(e) Seek out violations of these Rules and resolve the violations under Rule 7.06(4) .
       (d) Hold hearings, conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses and documents
  and administer oaths or delegate this authority to a Commission member or a hearing officer who shall proceed in the name of the Commission (emphasis added)."  Entered 1/17/2003.
  

Kentucky Bar Association Annual Convention 
"Advancing the Profession Through Leadership, Ethics and Education"
June 11-13, 2003 - Louisville, Ky. 

• Additional Information

• Registration
    

• Kentucky Farm Bureau v. Cook, Ky. App., 613 S.W.2d 426 (1980)
  The "other automobiles" clause provides that it does not apply to any vehicle "available for the regular use of the named insured."  Such exclusions are intended to preclude a person from insuring several vehicles for the price of one without defeating the general objective of the "other automobiles" clause to protect the named insured during occasional use of some vehicle other than his own.  Court of Appeals defined the term "available for regular use" to mean usually and regularly be had or be used whenever it is wanted, needed or desired and that such use may be made without seeking permission of the owner for each such use. 
  
• Kentucky Farm Bureau v. Hill, Ky., 278 S.W.2d 729 (1955)
  The "regular use" exclusion did not apply to brother-in-laws who lived at the same residence when the separately owned autos were not used interchangeably.  Evidence on issue as to liability of insurer on 'drive othercoverage of automobile policy sustained finding that the automobile which the insured was using at time of accident had not been 'furnished for his regular use, within exclusion.
   
• Kentucky Farm Bureau v. Kitchen, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 769 (1965)
  Evidence that plaintiff insured, whose Plymouth automobile was insured by KFBM, drove his son's Ford automobile for approximately 4 1/2 months, that he kept Ford in good running condition, that he was using Ford in car pool arrangement at time of accident, and that he did not report to son when he used Ford established that son's automobile was 'available for regular use of insured,' within provision of insured's policy excluding from coverage other automobiles available for regular use of named insured.
  
• Murphy v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Ky.App., 2002 WL 31496501
  Regular-use exclusion in two household members' underinsured motor vehicle (UIM) coverage, stating that an "underinsured motor vehicle" did not include any vehicle owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of the insured or any family member, was not against public policy as applied to claim of 14-year-old who was killed in a car accident involving a third household vehicle, and whose estate sought to recover benefits under two other household members' UIM policies, which policies covered automobiles other than one involved in accident, and which stated that UIM damages would be paid to an insured, including insured's household family members.
  

• Windham v. Cunningham, Ky. App., 902 S.W.2d 838 (1995)
  Injured party may NOT stack liability coverage which is not personal, but runs with the vehicle.
  
• Butler v. Robinette, Ky., 614 S.W.2d 944 (1981)
  Upheld policy provision prohibiting stacking of liability coverages; this type of coverage pertains to the vehicle.
  

• Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Snell, Ky., 319 S.W.2d 462 (1958)
  Where farmers traded work among themselves, they were not employees so as to defeat coverage under liability provisions of the policy.
  
• State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Shelton, Ky., 368 S.W.2d 734 (1963)
  A cook employed by a group of railroad workers was not an employee of a member of the group, and therefore exclusion in member's automobile liability policy of an employee other than a domestic did not apply, and in any event, even if cook was an employee of the member she was a "domestic" and thus within coverage of the policy.  Employee does not include independent contractor.  Also domestic help is defined by the nature of the work rather than the place of work.
  
• Craddock v. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co., Ky. 451 S.W.2d 658 (1970)
  In determining whether event was excluded from coverage under automobile liability policy by "injury to any employee" provision in policy, inquiry should be as to whether injury arose out of and in course of injured driver's employment by insured.
  
• Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Hudson, 124 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Ky. 1954)
  Transportation by an employee who is under an express or implied obligation to transport employees to and from work is with the employee exclusion of the policy.
  

• Windham v. Cunningham, Ky. App., 902 S.W.2d 838 (1995)
  Injured party may NOT stack liability coverage which is not personal, but runs with the vehicle.
  
• Butler v. Robinette, Ky., 614 S.W.2d 944 (1981)
  Upheld policy provision prohibiting stacking of liability coverages; this type of coverage pertains to the vehicle.
  

• Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Snell, Ky., 319 S.W.2d 462 (1958)
  Held where farmers traded work among themselves, they were not employees so as to defeat coverage under liability provisions of the policy.
  
• State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Shelton, Ky., 368 S.W.2d 734 (1963)
  A cook employed by a group of railroad workers was not an employee of a member of the group, and therefore exclusion in member's automobile liability policy of an employee other than a domestic did not apply, and in any event, even if cook was an employee of the member she was a "domestic" and thus within coverage of the policy.  Employee does not include independent contractor.  Also domestic help is defined by the nature of the work rather than the place of work.
  
• Craddock v. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co., Ky. 451 S.W.2d 658 (1970)
  In determining whether event was excluded from coverage under automobile liability policy by "injury to any employee" provision in policy, inquiry should be as to whether injury arose out of and in course of injured driver's employment by insured.
  
• Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Hudson, 124 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Ky. 1954)
  Transportation by an employee who is under an express or implied obligation to transport employees to and from work is with the employee exclusion of the policy.
  

• Lewis v. West American Ins.Co., Ky., 927 S.W. 2d 829 (1996)
  Family or household exclusion provisions in liability insurance contracts violate public policy are unenforceable.
  
• Bishop v. Allstate, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 865 (1981)
  Household exclusions are valid as to coverages not required by MVRA.
  
• Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nolan, Ky. App., 10 S.W.3d 129 (1999)
  Allowed a claim by parents against their son over insurance company's objection because the parents were insureds and thus barred by policy language from receiving benefits (Lewis decision was not mentioned, however.)
  
• Marley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ky.App., ___ S.W.3d ___ (2002)
  Household exclusion of liability coverage was void in both automobile and umbrella policies.
  

• State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ellis, Ky.App, 700 S.W.2d 801 (1985)
  Clause in automobile policy which excluded from coverage any person "using a vehicle without reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so" did not absolve insurer from providing coverage.
  
• Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. DeMarsh,  Ky. 515 S.W.2d 242 (1974)
  A second permittee driving an automobile for the benefit or advantage of the first permittee is afforded the protection of the omnibus clause under the theory that the automobile is being operated within implied permission of the named insured.
  
• Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hassell, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 133 (1967)
  Where employee was permitted to use employer's automobile to make deliveries and to drive it to his home and to his employer's place of business, a Sunday trip to a town 30 miles away from his home on personal errand was not within contemplation of owner in permitting employee to use the automobile and was therefore a material deviation, exceeding the scope of the implied permission, and hence owner's insurer was not liable under policy which covered anyone using the insured automobile with permission of insured or his spouse for damages caused on Sunday trip.
  
• Covington Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurst, Ky. App., 656 S.W.2d 742 (1983)
  Provided coverage  based on good faith belief that employee could use employer's truck anytime since implied permission rather than express.
  
• Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Ky., 872 S.W.2d 469 (1994)
  Policy did not afford minimum liability coverage where operator of insured vehicle did not have owner's permission to use it, to include thieves. 

• Maze- Law won't affect contracts
• Sex businesses a thorny issue for Louisville
• O'Connor relishes trailblazer role 
• Former parks chief's lawsuit is dismissed 
• Second suit filed alleging priest abused boy at hospital 
• Suit alleges '90 abuse by priest 
• Abramson names 3 lawyers, banker, principal to new police merit board
  • Scott Dickens, a lawyer Abramson appointed to the board, was charged with driving under the influence in 1992. That charge was reduced to disorderly conduct. Abramson said he was aware of the charge. 
  • Funny how these criminal records were a problem for the racial task force but not for the police merit board.   Double standard or just friends in wrong places?  I dunno.  Maybe nutting at all.
• Rally protests murder charges in car crash